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PREFACE 
"We stumble toward a new technological era made possible by the 
emerging technologies of computer, video, telephone, and high-quality 
sound. Alas, the stumbling is not guided by any understanding of the 
nature of interaction. Instead, it is more like the tale describing the 
groping of those legendary blind men touching an elephant. ... the 
technologies are provided by the technologists. It is, therefore, no 
wonder, that most new devises, including computers and their software 
applications emphasize technology over all else .... We need to view 
each of our activities in a larger framework (Norman 1993 xii-xiv)." 
The vast computer network of computer networks, described most 
generally as "the Net," has been growing at an unprecedented rate of fifteen to 
twenty percent a month, and institutions are strained to keep up with the 
demand (Chapman 1995). As millions of users connect into vast networks of 
computer systems daily, the Net expands like a transglobal parasite--colonizing 
the very frontier it creates in host institutional environments. The amazing 
growth of the Net has left individuals, institutions, and governments in a 
dilemma in terms of how to conceive and apprehend this growing techno-social 
phenomena. 
Although novel in many regards, the Net is not an isolated occurrence. 
Rather, it is a social phenomena--one element in a broader social milieu. As a 
social phenomena the Net can only be understood sui generis. That is, on one 
hand the Net is nothing more than a series of interconnected wires, electronics, 
and computer technologies. On the other hand, these technologies constitute a 
vast medium and environment for human communication. The Net is more than 
the sum of its technological parts, it is a social environment where people meet 
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others, socialize, play, do business, shop, and publish creative works. The 
social environment of the Net cannot be explained or reduced in terms of the 
technological components that comprise the medium alone. As individuals 
interact on, in, and through computer networks, a socially constructed 
environment emerges that is greater than the wires, telephone lines, and 
computers that comprise it. In short, what emerges is inherently social, and 
circumstantially technological--not vice-versa. 
Furthermore, the seemingly novel development, diffusion. and growth of 
the Net cannot be divorced from its situatedness in a general history of societal 
change. The Net emerges in a historical period of change that is most generally 
described as the movement from industrial to post-industrial eras. The post-
industrial age, often dubbed "the information age," represents a condition in 
which knowledge and the control of information is more central than the 
production of material goods (Bell 1976). The history of societal change 
accompanying the socio-cultural movement from industrial to post-industrial 
eras, is marked by numerous changes including the infiltration of high 
technologies of transportation, mass media, and communication into the reality 
of everyday social life (Schement and Lievrouw 1987). Like the major eras that 
preceded it, the dawn of the information age has been (and will continue to) 
alter the nature of institutional arrangements in complex social processes that 
accompany the diffusion of these information technologies. 
Elementary sociological precepts repeatedly suggest that changes in 
societal, institutional, and interpersonal arrangements impact experiences of 
everyday life. Although various theoretical traditions account for this 
relationship in widely diverse and often conflicting ways, it may be assuredly 
stated that the shift from industrial to an information era will fundamentally alter 
experiences of social reality in everyday life. These changes will not only alter 
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the physical and social reality of institutional environments but transform 
experiences of personhood by altering the dynamic ongoing processes by 
which individuals produce and subjectively experience self. 
Computer networking represents one contemporary technology capable 
of illuminating these processes of socio-cultural change. Contemporary 
computer technologies offer opportunities for new interactive experiences and 
new forms of interaction (Norman 1993). Nicholas Negroponte (1995) argues 
that these forms of techno-social activity are increasingly resulting in 
experiences of a "digital state." In short, contemporary life is increasingly 
sustained by a sea of technological innovations by which persons listen to 
digital music, view the world through digital medias, socialize in digital 
neighborhoods, play in digital parks, travel digital paths to reach digital 
destinations, and meet digital others. In short, people are becoming digital. 
Contemporary life increasingly entails not only the digitization of entertainment, 
institutions, and industry, but also is a matter of being digital (Negroponte 1995). 
This study builds on the concept of being digital. Emergent from a 
broader socio-cultural context, the computer-mediated environment of the Net 
represents a technologically sustained and socially constructed digital social 
world. This study aims to explore, explain, and propose understandings of the 
online world as a social phenomena, rooted in a distinct form of techno-human 
interaction whose reality is emergent in the interrelations between participants. 
In short, this study is about the nature of virtual techno-social worlds that have a 
special illuminating relationship to an emergent information reality. 
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Organization 
This dissertation will be organized into five chapters, each with it's own 
intended aims. Chapter one, the "Literature Review," will provide the reader 
with a brief and general background on the research context. The primary task 
of the "Literature Review" is to familiarize the reader with the nature of the online 
environment, and identify generally acknowledged characteristics of social 
interaction in online computer-mediated contexts. The second chapter, 
"Conceptual Framework" summarizes and seeks to re-formulate interactionist 
and dramaturgical theoretical positions in terms applicable to computer-
mediated social worlds. In this chapter, all conceptual cards are laid on the 
table. Of central importance is identifying the relevance of interactionist and 
dramaturgical theoretical perspectives to the online world, modifying, and 
proposing new interpretative approaches for understanding online phenomena. 
The third chapter will detail the methods used for data collection. In the fourth 
chapter, findings will be presented in conjunction with what is traditionally 
called "discussion." Due to the complexity of the phenomena "findings" will not 
be arbitrarily divorced from "discussion." Finally, in the fifth chapter research 
findings will be summarized and conclusions will be made. The conclusions 
will seek to specify theoretical implications of this research, and to expand 
understandings of contemporary forms of human selfhood in lieu of the findings 
of this study. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Computers have revolutionized the way we organize and operate within 
and through important sectors of life in society. The "computer revolution" has 
transformed industry, government, education, and countless other institutional 
environments. However, in spite of the growing importance of computer 
technologies in contemporary society, "understanding computers is about as 
easy as understanding a bank statement (Negroponte 1995 pp. 89)." 
Computers and computer networking technologies are surrounded by techno-
jargon and procedures that read like a VCR owners manual--both of which 
hinder effective learning and meaningful understanding. Although this study 
will seek to avoid computer techno-jargon as much as possible, this brief 
introduction will attempt to demystify pertinent elements of the computer-
mediated environment, provide the reader with a general background on 
computer-networking technologies, and identify major elements of recreational 
computer-mediated communication central to this study. 
The Net 
In recent years, computers have been electronically linked together 
(networked) resulting in shared access of databases, information services, and 
a host of computer resources. These "networks" of computers can themselves 
be linked together, creating networks of networks. The result is a massive and 
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almost incomprehensible web of interconnected computers, information, and 
electronic technologies that is most generally referred to as "the Net." It is "a 
network of innumerable computer networks representing thousands of hot, 
buzzing machines (Patton 1994 pp. 134)." Within this "network of networks" an 
impressive array of information from around the world can be accessed 
electronically by anyone with a modem, computer, and online access. 
"The Net" is a loose term that actually refers to thousands of separate, yet 
interconnected services that have been electronically linked together through 
phone lines and fiber-optic cable. Metaphorically, the Net is like an electronic 
river. The Net, like a river, has many branches and tributaries that may be 
loosely referred to as one on the grounds that they are connected. These 
branches and tributaries are like online services--they draw from a wide array of 
populations, geographic locales, and vary in size from a few to a few million. 
Like a river, each of these services are electronically connected and may be 
loosely referred to as one "Net." Some of the main components of the Net 
include: 
The World Wide Web: The World Wide Web is a global "hypertext 
system." Hypertext simply means that persons can jump from one document to 
another by clicking components contained within documents that are 
electronically linked together. The World Wide Web is graphically oriented, 
user-friendly, colorful, and flashy. Through pointing and clicking portions of a 
"web page" one accesses computers from around the world, each containing 
information that ranges from pornographic pictures to the most recent cancer 
treatments. The user friendliness of the World Wide Web has excellerated its 
growth at an incalculable rate. 
Usenet: Usenet is a system of electronic messages that participants can 
read and/or respond to. All messages and replies are "posted" and available 
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for all to view. For all practical purposes, usenet is a big electronic bulletin 
board divided by more than ten thousand topics of interest (Moore 1995). 
Commercial Servers: Commercial servers are the shopping malls of the 
Net (Patton 1994). A commercial server is usually a nation-wide, for-profit, pay-
by-the-hour industry that provides user-friendly access to their services and 
often limited dimensions the broader online world (i.e. limited access to the 
. World Wide Web, Usenet, and so on). Commercial servers are companies with 
big computers that are willing (for a fee) to connect persons to a broader 
network (Moore 1994). Currently, the major commercial servers include 
America Online, CompuServe, Prodigy, Delphi, and E-World--many of which 
boasts membership rates in the millions. In short, commercial servers "are 
doing for the Net what McDonald's did for the cheeseburger (Moore 1994 pp. 
4)"--they popularize, commercialize, and diffuse it. 
Bulletin Board Systems (BBS): Bulletin boards are the crudest unit of 
the Net (Patton 1994). A bulletin board system is little more than a computer 
with a phone line linked to it. Using a modem, persons access the "host 
computer" which contains anything from catalogs of library information to 
interactive games. A bulletin board system may be set-up by almost anyone, 
and requires little more than a shoestring bu~get to maintain. Most bulletin 
board systems offer online games, chat areas, e-mail, free software, technical 
advice, and so on. Almost anything that can be computerized is probably 
available on a bulletin board system somewhere. Furthermore, some bulletin 
board systems have formed coalitions and guilds. For example, "KinkNet," 
which is a number of leading BBSs with prurient themes--"a kind of agricultural 
co-op that is to porn what Ore-Ida is to potatoes (Patton 1994 pp. 135)." 
As for numbers of persons "logged on," conservative estimates place the 
number of privately operated bulletin board systems at around sixty thousand 
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and rising, each averaging at least two dozen participants a day. Add to that 
roughly four to five million people currently believed to be using commercial 
ontine services and an estimated ten to twenty-five million persons who have 
direct access to the World Wide Web and Usenet, and the estimates of the 
number of persons thought to be be colonizing the online world ranges from 
thirty to fifty mimon and growing (Rose 1995). However, it is not possible to 
count exact numbers of persons online, and therefore an honest assessment 
can only conclude that their are a lot of people on the Net and tomorrow there 
will be a lot more. There is no agreement on the estimated number of users on 
the Net, nor is there an accurate means to count them. However, it is generally 
agreed that the number of users is rocketing skyward (Moore 1994) at a rate of 
fifteen to twenty percent growth per month (Chapman 1995). 
Interaction on the Net: Online Chat 
Some of the biggest successes in online services are "chat areas" where 
persons interact with groups of other participants, engaging in live text based 
discussions (Rose 1995). In 1995 Prodigy (which is not the largest commercial 
online service) reported that its subscribers spend 1.2 million hours a month 
"chatting" with other users (Steinberg 1996). These popular chat services 
comprise a unique medium for computer-mediated communication that alters 
the scope, range, and nature of electronic media, creating new social 
environments, allowing participants to interact with new collectivities, groups, 
and individuals (Jones 1995). 
In these popular chat services, it is apparent that the Net is more than an 
electronic means for accessing information--it is an environment and a medium 
for social interaction. Social dimensions of the Net are evident in the briefest 
visit. Widespread opportunities for chat-related social interaction exist along 
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with information services. Commercial services such as America Online, 
CompuServe, and Prodigy have emerged as popular avenues to not only find 
information (as the phrase information superhighway suggests) but to meet 
others for games, conversation, and romance (Resnick 1992; Spear 1991: 
Gunn 1994). 
David Meyers (1987), in an early experimental study of a New Orleans 
bulletin board system, notes that users of the service establish an online screen 
name, and online identities that they wish to retain. Myers notes that anonymity 
plays an important role in online social interaction. Online users tend to protect 
demographic and other forms of personal information. To the extent that 
anonymity is maintained, anyone can be anything in cyberspace. Furthermore, 
Meyers notes that in cyberspace identities are changed as easily as hats. Thus 
anonymity--the power to create these identities--becomes highly valued and 
well guarded. 
More recently, Sherry Turkle (1995) has written extensively on social 
dimensions of the Net. Turkle notes the extreme fluidity of self that is exhibited 
in these techno-social environments, as persons enact, and cycle through 
multiple anonymous identities. "Role-playing" writes Turkle, "sounds as if we're 
putting on, playing at. I'm saying these are all bona fide aspects of our self 
(1996 pp. 164)." Throughout her analysis, Turkle emphasizes how computer-
mediated forms of social interaction encourage people to play with a multiplicity 
of selfhood in a threshold between what is real and what is virtual: 
"'This is more real than my real life,' says a character who turns out to be 
a man playing a women who is pretending to be a man. In this game the 
self is constructed and the rules of social interaction are built, not 
received. (Turkle 1995 pp. 10)." 
The numerous opportunities for online communication encourage people 
to create personally meaningful identities through interaction with others (Turkle 
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1995; Myers 1987; Stone 1995; Baym 1995; MacKinnon 1995). The fact that 
participants identify or present themselves in the online contexts suggests two 
conditions. First, the fact that participants present meaningful identities in the 
online context confirms the environment as inherently social. That is, 
participants interpret action as perceived by others. In short, in order to have an 
identity bestowed onto oneself, it is necessary to be in a context where one can 
identify with others. Secondly, such a situation highlights how cyberspace 
involves users in a virtual reality that blurs the distinction between the physical, 
social, and computer environments (Shapiro and McDonald 1992). 
Cyberspace is "real" in the sense of wires, chips, and thousands of hot buzzing 
machines, but is perceived by users not merely as a series of interconnected 
computers, but as a tangible place--a medium and environment that cannot be 
explained or reduced into its technological components alone. 
Both these conditions illustrate the socially constructed nature of online 
environments. Cyberspace is a socially constructed reality that exists within 
computer networks and supporting technologies. Like other constructed 
realities, cyberspace isn't so much a physical thing as it is a concept that 
contains shared understandings and information (Shapiro and McDonald 
1992). Yet, because of it's computer-mediated and virtual nature, popular 
literature often ascribes a lesser reality-status to online environments, 
subsequent forms of social interaction and experiences of self (see Turkle 
1995). Although questions of "reality" are rapidly becoming a slippery slope of 
political interests (consider, for example, the struggle of many Native American 
Tribes to be considered "authentically real"), at this point it may be prudent to 
suggest that questions pertaining to the "reality" of online social worlds and/or 
online selves are closely related (if not identical) to the fundamentally 
unanswerable question of whether any self or community is genuine, veritable, 
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true, or authentic. The difficulties in conclusively establishing the reality of 
online selves and online communities simply mirror, and highlight the same 
ontological dilemma of any self and any community. Therefore, whether or not 
an online self can exist is less important than the fact that people claim to have 
attained it. Likewise, whether or not an online community truly exists is less 
important than the wide spread belief among users that it does. That is, when 
we perceive things as real we achieve something that is not only 
epistemological or ontological, but experiential as well (Aycock and Buchignani 
1995). For these reasons, the experiential dimension of online interaction 
suggests that participants' claims to online selves and online communities 
should be perceived as existing through the same processes of interaction by 
which any self and community emerges, is maintained, and transformed in 
everyday life. 
Statement of Intent 
Until recently, empirical research on computer mediated communication 
has been conducted almost exclusively by scholars in the field of 
communications. Predominately armed with experimental designs, most 
studies have sought to document the effects of computer technologies in 
institutional and professional environments and on task-related activities. 
These studies are abundant and often aim to identify the computer as the 
primary cause for certain transformations of interpersonal behavior, as well as 
changes in institutional and professional contexts (see Walther and Burgoon 
1992; Walther 1992; Sproull and Kiesler 1991; Baron 1984). Much of the 
literature on computer mediated communication emphasize the effects of 
interaction in the absence of spoken words, non-verbal, and contextual cues. 
This research frequently assumes either a single set of characteristics or a 
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causal relationship between the unique characteristics of computer mediated 
communication and its users. Contemporary scholars have noted the lack of 
research emphasizing computer mediated communication as an expressive 
form of leisure and communication play (Danet 1995; Meyers 1987). Missing is 
a conceptualization of computer mediated communication as an emergent 
phenomena (Baym 1995), where meanings are negotiated in the processes of 
social interaction. In sociological terms, absent from the literature is an 
understanding of computer mediated symbolic interaction. 
This study will draw from interactionist and dramaturgical theoretical 
orientations in an attempt to provide a foundation for filling the observed gap in 
the literature. This study will explicitly apply interactionist and dramaturgical 
concepts to shed critical-analytical light on the complexities of computer-
mediated symbolic interaction. Additionally, this study also seeks to establish 
computer-mediated communication as a uniquely adept area for interactionist 
analysis, modifying existing interactionist and dramaturgical perspectives, and 
suggesting new ideas to heighten its applicability to this emerging context for 
sociological activity. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Parallel Worlds and Multiple Selves 
"Self" and "social world" are central concepts to the analysis of online 
social environments. In this study, the term "social worlds" will be used as a 
construct to imply that "reality" is socially constructed and sustained within 
dynamic and ongoing patterns of social interaction1. A social world refers to 
both the reality of human situatedness in time and space, and the interaction 
between persons which construct, sustain, and transform such realities. 
A social world may be as broad as an entire nation-culture, or as micro 
as an individual's home. Social worlds may include the activities of millions of 
people, or as few as two (or at least the perception of another presence). A 
social world may persist for centuries, or emerge and dissipate in one casual 
encounter. Social worlds are frequently associated with a wide array of 
qualities (mystical, secular, playful, solemn, erotic, etc.), and may be formal or 
impromptu in nature. Social worlds may exert considerable objective force on 
the individual, or may exist so subtly as to not warrant notice. Indeed, all 
"demographics" of social worlds are possibilities that merely exist as a function 
of what social world one is examining, when, with whom, and at what level of 
analysis. 
In spite of its fluidity, social worlds have at least two constant qualities. 
First, they cannot exist apart from human interaction. Secondly, they are 
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pluralistic (existing in multiples and parallels2). For example, the bureaucratic 
social world of one's academic environment is separate and distinct from the 
social world of one's home, church, peers, and so on. Traditionally, each social 
world emerges from interactions that are segregated (at least cognitively) to 
those situations. Thus, social worlds often consist of unique, unrelated, and 
sometimes conflicting patterns of interrelationships, expectations, and world 
views that sediment into distinct socially sustained realities. 
As participants interact with others in a meaningful context (a social 
world) selves emerges. A self is that which is an object unto itself (Mead 1934). 
Or more simply, the self is the meaning of the human organism. The human 
organism assigns meaning to itself only through interaction with others in the 
context of particular social situations, roles, and/or encounters that collectively 
constitute the foundation of social worlds. In short, through social interaction 
participants construct social worlds as they (in conjunction with others) 
simultaneously construct themselves within them. Through interaction with 
others a context attains meaning and a social world emerges at the same 
moment that meaning is assigned to the individual (Mead 1934). In these 
regards, both selves and social worlds emerge, persist, and transform through 
the same "moments" of production in on-going patterns of social interaction 
(Berger and Luckmann 1966). Self and society are two sides of the same coin 
(Mead 1934), as each is dependent on the processes of the other. As stated by 
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966): 
"It goes without saying, then, that the organism and, even more, the self 
cannot be adequately understood apart from the particular social context 
in which they were shaped .... the statement that man produces himself in 
no way implies some sort of Promethean vision of the solitary individual. 
Man's self-production is always, and of necessity, a social enterprise. 
Men together produce a human environment (pp. 50-51 )." 
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It is essential to note (as alluded to by Berger and Luckmann) that the 
duel nature of self and social world is not a Cartesian mind-body distinction. 
Rather, the duel nature of self and social world is a statement of the relationship 
between individuals and interrelations with others in a meaningful social 
context. It is a means of conceptualizing the nature of social interaction in a 
context that both includes the individual, others to whom the individual interacts, 
and a social reality that is greater than the sum of its individual participants. In 
short, it is a conceptual tool for understanding the dynamic relationship between 
individuals, relations that culminate into socially constructed realities, and social 
worlds that act-back exerting influence on its human creators. 
Like any other relationship, the self-social world relationship is subject to 
change. As will be illustrated in the following sections, self-social world 
relationships exist in a fluid interplay between individuals, social situations, and 
the means by which persons interact within situations. A central theme to this 
study is that selves and social worlds emerge within constant processes 
predicated on interaction, however alterations in the means by which persons 
interact will subtly alter the boundaries and nature of selfhood, social worlds, 
and the transform self-social world relationship itself. 
Face-to-Face Interaction: Multiple Selves and Parallel Social 
Worlds 
"Inevitably we construct ourselves. Let me explain. I enter this house 
and immediately I become what I have to become, what I can become: I 
construct myself. That is, I present myself to you in a form suitable to the 
relationship I wish to achieve with you. And, of course you do the same 
with me (Pirandello 1962 pp. 157-158)." 
Social life is a shifting sea of situations, roles, and encounters that 
individuals navigate in, around, and through. In the process, persons routinely 
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shift from one social world to another, and social relations become dynamic, 
displaying remarkable degrees of fluidity. For example, the professor who 
leaves a committee meeting and returns home to eat lunch with his/her spouse 
will experience a shift between an "academic social world" and a "home social 
world." This shift is accompanied and sustained by alterations in social 
relationships, self presentations, and subjective experiences as the individual 
moves from a set of self-academic to self-spouse relations. Shifts like these are 
an expression of the dynamic nature of social interaction in complex societies 
where it is necessary to maintain multiple and parallel social worlds3. 
From its earliest conception, symbolic interactionists have examined the 
interplay between multiple social worlds and the emergence of self. In the 
foundational work of George Herbert Mead (1934), a form of situationalism that 
emphasizes the emergence of self in social worlds is clearly stated. In Mead's 
work, a self emerges as the meanings associated with actions in an given social 
context are bestowed unto the person. From Mead's perspective, human 
behavior is fully situational, as people become the persons of the situations they 
find themselves in. From this perspective, a self simply cannot "be" anything 
apart from interaction (Brissett and Edgley 1990). As Mead (1934) states: 
"The self is essentially a social structure, and it arises in social 
experience .... it is impossible to conceive of a self arising outside of 
social experience (pp. 140)." 
Since selves are rooted in the interactions that comprise social worlds, 
as persons interact with numerous others, in a variety of social settings, a 
multiplicity of selves emerge. Symbolic interactionists have long noted that a 
multiplicity of selves is a normative reflection of the degree to which individuals 
occupy multiple social worlds: 
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"We carry on a whole series of different relationships to different people. 
We are one thing to one man and another thing to another. ... We divide 
ourselves up in all sorts of different selves with reference to our 
acquaintances. We discuss politics with one and religion with another. 
There are all sorts of different selves answering to all sorts of different 
social reactions. It is the social process itself that is responsible for the 
appearance of the self; it is not there as a self apart from this type of 
experience. A multiple personality is in a certain sense normal (Mead 
1934 pp. 142)." 
To Mead, "the unity and structure of the complete self reflects the unity 
and structure of the social process as a whole (Mead 1934 pp. 144)." 
Therefore, when individuals interact with others in a multiplicity of social worlds, 
multiple selves emerge. As Mead (1934) summarizes: 
"What we have here is a situation in which there can be different selves, 
and it is dependent upon the set of social reactions that is involved as to 
which self we are going to be (pp. 143)." 
To Mead individuals construct a self through interaction with others in a 
social context. Only through interaction is meaning bestowed unto the things 
people do, and consequently only though interaction in a social context can a 
self emerge. Human activities collectively comprise social worlds as they 
simultaneously provide the meaning to the individual of the individual. 
Furthermore, within each social world individuals enact differing sets of 
behaviors, and as a consequence different selves emerges. Thus, an individual 
has as many selves as s/he acts within unique situations. 
As people enact multiple selves in a variety of social worlds, a 
metaphorical drama occurs. In other words, as people move about the drama of 
life they enact a wide range of ongoing performances through presenting and 
negotiating a multiplicity of selves. In these regards, Erving Goffman and the 
dramaturgical tradition extend the situationalism of George Herbert Mead by 
emphasizing the means by which individuals enact and maintain performances 
on the various stages of multiple social worlds: 
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"A person's self (in the singular) is not carried from situation to situation. 
Rather, individuality is fashioned in terms of the resources and audiences 
available in the immediate situation in which the individual is acting 
(Brisset and Edgley 1990 pp. 114)." 
While a self is imputed to an individual, and inextricably concerns the 
individual, the self does not derive from its possessor, but from the whole scene 
of human interaction (Goffman 1959). That is, the imputation of self to a person 
"is a product of a scene that comes off, and is not a cause of it (Goffman 1959 
pp. 252)." Consequently, "without a presentation of self, a self is not possible 
(Krielkamp 1976 pp. 137)." 
Selves are meanings that are staged, not "things" (Becker 1962). Selves 
are communicated, in the broadest sense of the word. Persons communicate a 
self through a variety of means including speech and language, conduct, 
appearance, gestures--any object or action capable of conveying meaning. It is 
in this broad sense of both discursive and nondiscursive communication that 
dramaturgy is interested (Brisset and Edgley 1990). From a dramaturgical 
perspective, a self is basically a symbolic system--a linguistic device. A self is a 
system of discursive and non-discursive language in a constant process of 
modification as persons interact with others (Becker 1962). 
In spite of its constant state of flux, a modicum of socially constructed 
continuity exists between the various selves that one enacts. This continuity is 
sustained by socially accepted role repertoires (we accept the roles of police 
officer, Boy Scout Leader, husband, and father as complimentary. This would 
not be the case if the roles were police officer, Catholic Priest, transvestite, and 
father). More commonly, are socially accepted means for segregating various 
self enactments (consider, for example, common phrases such as "leave your 
work at the office," "leave the locker-room talk with your bar buddies," etc.). 
Most importantly, modern western societies promote an ideological system of 
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beliefs that prescribe a faith in the unity of self, and thus color interpretations of 
individual activities and the activities of others. In short, people see themselves 
as unified because of socio-cultural prescriptions that tell them so. 
Because of widespread socially accepted role repertoires and 
ideological means of viewing selves as unitary, only when an activity is 
interrupted does one become conscious of one's selfhood and it's multiplicity. 
As such, dramaturgical analysis is fundamentally interested in situations where 
interactions have gone awry--hence, the preoccupation with such issues as 
embarrassment, faux-pas, apologies, accounts, and the like (Brisset and Edgley 
1990). In these situations we not only become conscious of our self enactments 
(Brisset and Edgley 1990), but also confront the multiplicity of our self-social 
world relationships. 
In summary, the self--as a dramatic linguistic devise--exists in a state of 
plurality, a condition best illustrated in situations where the self breaks down 
under the weight of it's own multiplicity. In these conditions, individuals not only 
become aware of the multiple selves they enact, but also aware of the various 
(and sometimes conflicting) social worlds they inhabit. These occurrences 
frequently entail "dramaturgical awareness" (Brisset and Edgley 1990) and the 
possibility for personal and social transformation, as they threaten the taken-for-
grantedness of social interaction and its constituent reality. As stated by Berger 
and Luckmann (1966): 
"Most conversation does not in so many words define the nature of the 
world. Rather, it takes place against the background of a world that is 
silently taken for granted. . ... conversation can afford to be casual 
precisely because it refers to the routines of a taken for granted world. 
The loss of casualness signals a break in the routines and, at least 
potentially, a threat to the taken for granted reality (pp. 152-153)." 
. Generally speaking, traditional interactionists and dramaturgical analysts 
have been preoccupied with "face-to-face" interaction. This preoccupation is 
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sometimes legitimized by the general view that "real" flesh-and-blood 
interactions in the "here and now of the present" represent the prototype for all 
forms of human sociality (see Berger and Luckmann 1966). This preoccupation 
conveniently implies that multiple selves are enacted as the physical body 
moves from one social world to another. Furthermore, this preoccupation often 
explicitly views the collision and/or juxtaposition of social worlds as deeply 
problematic (embodied by such widely used terms as "role-conflict"). It is often 
implied (if not overtly stated) that social worlds are functionally segregated, and 
in the rare case where multiple social worlds and role performances collide, the 
individual will experience a personal state of crises--a problematic situation to 
be avoided and/or overcome. 
This preoccupation with "face-to-face" social worlds, and the negative 
bias toward overlapping social worlds, may have had some legitimacy, when 
technologies of transportation and communication were nonexistent or 
insufficiently diffused. In conditions where persons are born and raised, living 
and dying the span of their life in the same enduring communities, they will 
become personally known within a stable social world. These conditions are 
conducive to the emergence of a stable set of selves, and facilitates the illusion 
of personality and/or a core self--a self that is, for all practical purposes, only 
influenced by cultural prescriptions associated with human developmental 
processes (i.e. childhood, adolescence, adulthood, old age). Furthermore, 
within these conditions the enactment of multiple selves can only be 
accomplished through the movement of ones physical body from one social 
world to another. However, if such a world once existed, then without a doubt 
that era is long past. 
The contemporary world is marked by widely diffused technologies of 
transportation and communication that infiltrate and colonize the reality of 
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everyday life. Through these technologies (especially communication 
technologies including the mass media), persons are exposed to a broad array 
of diverse social worlds that are constantly in a state of overlap, collision, and 
juxtaposition. To the extent that a self is primarily a dramatic linguistic devise (a 
process of communication) then these technologies will exert an impact on 
experiences of selfhood. That is, by altering the means, availability, and range 
of communication and transportation technologies, alterations can be expected 
in the self-social world relationship. Such a situation is widely observed in 
contemporary society, and will be articulated in terms of "electronic social 
worlds." 
Electronic Communication: Fragmented Selves and 
Hypercontextual Social Worlds 
"Until recently, place-bound , face-to-face interaction was the only means 
of gaining 'direct' access to the sights and sounds of each other's 
behaviors. The physical barriers and boundaries marked by walls and 
fences as well as the passageways provided by doors and corridors 
directed the flow of people and determined, to a large degree, the 
number, type, and size of face-to-face interactions .... electronic media 
override the boundaries and definitions of situation supported by 
physical setting (Meyrowitz 1985 pp. 35 and 38)." 
In No Sense of Place, Joshua Meyrowitz (1985) notes how electronic 
media represent a unique form of interaction that dislocates the traditional 
relationship between physical setting and social situation, rearranging social 
forums so that individuals find themselves in contact with new persons in new 
ways. Electronic media override the boundaries and situational definitions that 
emerge in the physical settings of distinct social worlds. While watching 
television, or communicating via telephone, the situation we are "in" is only 
marginally related to physical location (Meyrowitz 1985). For example, 
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electronic forms of communication allow a person to drive an automobile while 
conversing with a phone sex operator on a cellular phone--the physical context 
of the automobile has little or nothing to do with the social context of the erotic 
conversation. 
As electronic media transgress the traditional relationship between social 
situations and physical setting, it rearranges social forums, blurring social 
spheres that were once distinct. For example, driving an automobile while 
conversing with a phone sex operator is a novel social situation achieved only 
by the physical dislocation and symbolic convergence of two separate social 
worlds--the physical and social world of an automobile, and the physical and 
social world of sexuality. These kinds of situations can only be accomplished 
through mediated forms of interaction. 
By repeated transgressions of social situations and physical settings 
through electronically mediated forms of communication (telephone, television, 
radio, etc), people find themselves in increasing contact with others in new 
ways, as electronic medias alter the significance of space, time, and physical 
barriers to human interaction (Meyrowitz 1985): 
"By changing the boundaries of social situations, electronic media do not 
simply give us quicker or more thorough access to events and behaviors. 
They give us, instead, new events, behaviors [and social situations] 
(Meyrowitz pp. 43)." 
Electronically mediated forms of human interaction represent far more 
than simply a neutral delivery system for communication, and more than merely 
a channel for conveying information from one location to another (Meyrowitz 
1985). By rearranging the significance of time,· space, and physical barriers to 
human interaction, electronic communication transforms social worlds into 
altogether new social situations. Emergent from these conditions is a unique 
form of social interaction that transcends the traditional relationship between 
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physical place and social situation. Consequently, distinct social spheres are 
transformed into new environments with new patterns of action, feeling, and 
belief (Meyrowitz 1985). 
According to Kenneth Gergen (1991), these techno-social 
transformations of situations are anything but benign. Technological 
advancements of the past century have resulted in radical shifts in exposure 
and relationships between people. Advancements in transportation, 
communications, computers, and electronic media have significantly altered 
everyday experiences of social reality and selfhood. These technologies result 
in frequent encounters with an ever increasing variety of people from 
widespread differing social worlds, encompassing a boggling array of divergent 
viewpoints. As electronic medias infiltrate and colonize everyday experiences 
of human social life, social worlds are increasingly desegregated, as they 
constantly overlap, collide, and juxtapose themselves within other social worlds. 
The result is a state of "social saturation (Gergen 1991 )." 
Increasing degrees of social saturation reduce the possibility of living 
within a limited cast of significant others in small and enduring communities. As 
technologies of social saturation infiltrate the reality of everyday life, human 
experiences occur relative to an enormous ever-expanding range of other 
people, special interests, forms of relationships, ·unique circumstances, and 
opportunities. Consequently, "with social saturation each of us comes to harbor 
a vast population of hidden potentials (Gergen 1991 pp. 71 )." In a condition of 
social saturation there is no individual essence to which one remains true or 
committed. Each "hidden potential" represents a possible self that under the 
right conditions may spring to life. Selves are continuously emergent, re-
formed, and redirected as one moves through a technologically sustained sea 
of ever-changing relationships. Through electronic media one's self is exposed 
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to a broad array of "we's" and "them's," each potentially and simultaneously 
representing what we were, are, and can be (Gubrium and Holstein 1994). In 
sum, technologies of social saturation become an additional means for social 
interaction that entail an ever-increasing possibility for the development of a 
"populated self," or the acquisition of simultaneously multiple potentials for 
being (Gergen 1991). 
Electronic communication technologies subtly transform experiences of 
self and social world in ways that are not possible in face-to-face interaction. 
Electronic communication technologies highlight a condition where selves 
become experientially fragmented, and social worlds manifest themselves 
hypercontextually. That is, electronic technologies of communication 
desegregate social worlds, and as one interacts through a plethora of electronic . 
technologies that have colonized the reality of everyday life fragmented selves 
and hypercontextual social worlds characterize any given situation. In short, 
electronic forms of communication allow for a simultaneous multiplicity of social 
worlds to manifest themselves in a single given social situation, and by enacting 
selves appropriate to each, selfhood becomes experientially fragmented. Thus, 
the essential difference between electronic forms of social interaction and face-
to-face forms of social interaction is not the existence of multiple selves and 
parallel social worlds, but the fact that electronic technologies of communication 
serve to desegregate social worlds and experiences of self that were previously 
confined to those situations. 
It is essential to note, however, that fragmented selves and 
hypercontextual social worlds are not caused by new forms of electronic 
communication. Rather, the influences of electronic technologies of 
communication on the self-social world relationship (as presented here) merely 
highlights broader socio-cultural conditions in which selves and social worlds 
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are rooted in contemporary consumer-media culture of western societies. 
Experiential dimensions of "electronic social worlds" and its influences on the 
emergence of self are not limited to social situations involving telephones, 
televisions, or any other communication technology or media. Rather, the 
fragmentation of self and hypercontextualism of social worlds that is endemic to 
electronic forms of communication and interrelationships is more broadly 
reflective of socio-cultural conditions of an imploding capitalist system (se~ 
Schwalbe 1993). For example, in complex mass society bureaucratic social 
arrangements "McDonaldize" (Ritzer 1993) most public relationships. Aside 
from what we can create in the small spaces of our private lives, we lack 
personally meaningful communities in which to anchor, cultivate, and crystallize 
our selves (Schwalbe 1993). Because we are more mobile than ever before, 
we tend to fail in developing identities that are meaningfully associated with 
places (Schwalbe 1993). Because we are bombarded with a broad array of 
different view points from an overwhelming diversity of people, situations, and 
events--all of which confidently assert themselves as "correct"--we lose faith in 
the possibility for "truth," or any other "essence" of (or to) anything. The culture 
industry has commodified and sold to the public the images we use to fashion a 
sense of self (Schwalbe 1993), and the prerogatives of our public personae 
combined with the degradation of "ultimate truths" compel us to use these 
"image commodities" for lack of anything else to affix a self to. Indeed, 
electronic medias simply provide a grounded metaphor in which we may 
illustrate an increasing experiential state of general dislocation and 
fragmentation of the self-social world relationship. 
To summarize, the self-social world relationship of face-to-face 
interactions is multiple and parallel. As persons move from one unique 
situation to another, differing selves emerge out of differing sets of expectations 
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and meaning associated with the context of interaction. However, in a socio-
cultural context that includes the widespread diffusion of electronic 
communication technologies, the self-social world relationship acquires an 
additional characteristic of simultaneousness. Here, social worlds 
simultaneously impose themselves upon one another, persons acquire 
populated selves, and the self-social world relationship implodes into an 
experiential state of fragmentation and hypercontextualism. 
Scholarship examining the impact of electronic forms of communication 
on the enactment of selves and the emergence of social worlds offers 
provocative insights on changes within the self-social world relationship. 
However, this analysis remains fundamentally wed to traditional assumptions of 
physical space. That is, this scholarship emphasizes how electronic forms of 
communication highlight the juxtaposition of social worlds within specific 
physical places, the consequence of which is the emergence of self enactments 
that are fragmentedly multiple. What scholars have not considered is the 
emergence of self and social world within the technology of communication 
itself. That is, in spite of considerable investigation on the impact of electronic 
forms of communication, these investigations have been preoccupied with how 
such forms of communication have highlighted certain transformations in 
physically situated self-social world relationships. The possibility of selves and 
social worlds emerging and existing within technologies of communication--not 
merely because, or as a result of them--has not been considered. Computer-
mediated forms of social interaction exemplify the emergence of self and social 
world inside the technology itself and expose new techno-social dimensions to 
the self-social world relationship 
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Digital Interaction: Disembodied Selves and Dislocated Social 
Worlds 
"The cyber perspective, as we have seen, seeks from the new 
communication technologies access to new forms of sociality, freed from 
the body yet still sensorily vivid. It also seeks different ways of presenting 
identity and developing relationships, ways which combine efficient 
simulation of the presence of other people with deliberate uncertainty 
concerning the real identities of interlocutors. . .. What is the social and 
cultural context in which we are developing electronic communications 
environments, which fire our imaginations but about which we really 
know too little? Only now are we beginning to ask ourselves the right 
kinds of questions (Mantovani 1996 pp. 130-131)." 
To say that digital social worlds exist within technologies of computer-
mediated communication is to say that both self and social worlds emerge, are 
maintained, and transformed in a process of communication situated inside the 
technology itself. When interacting online, the computer is a communication 
medium and a social environment, where selves and social worlds emerge 
through the processes of computer-mediated communication. When online, the 
self-social world relationship is translated to a process of communication where 
personhood and social situations are emergent within digital-symbolic 
representations. Since no physical objects exist in digital environments, all that 
remains are the living socially constructed artifacts of selves, social worlds, and 
communications. These characteristics, unique to computer network 
environments, transform the self-social world relationship by presenting new 
social situations, new forms of interaction, and new social contexts that are not 
possible in either face-to-face or electronic forms of interaction alone. 
Computer-mediated communications stem from previous electronic 
technologies of communication (most notably the telephone), and therefore 
contain both similar characteristics of it's electronic predecessor technologies, 
and characteristics that differ in important ways. Thus, it must be emphasized 
that characteristics of online social worlds are not completely different from 
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other forms of social interabtion. Like in face-to-face interactions, selves and 
social worlds emerge only as persons interact with ,others and meaning is 
associated to the person and the context of interaction. Like electronic forms of 
interaction, online environments juxtapose social contexts, creating 
hypercontextual situations (multiply and simultaneously) where persons enact 
fragmented self performances. The key difference, however, is that when 
selves and social worlds emerge within technologies of computer-mediated 
communication, the self-social world relationship is not only multiple and 
parallel (as in face to face environments), not only fragmented and 
hypercontextual (as in electronic social worlds), but also dislocated and 
disembodied. 
Computer-mediated communication occurs in dislocated social 
environments. That is, interaction is neither defined nor confined by the 
geographic locale of participants. Similar to electronic communication, yet in a 
more pronounced form, computer-mediated communication dislocates social 
worlds from the constraints of physical space. So pronounced is dislocation of 
physical contexts in online social worlds that alternative terms have emerged to 
describe the "space" of online interaction. 
Commonly, the term "cyberspace" is used to describe the "place" where 
online interactions occur. However, cyberspace is a fictional term coined by 
novelist William Gibson (1984), and intended to describe a virtual reality where 
people log their minds into computer technologies capable of entering, 
perceiving, and exploring the data matrix. In the non-fictional world, cyberspace 
is an intuitive concept--a metaphor. "Cyberspace" is a consensual hallucination 
that refers to a virtually uncomprehensible and seemingly endless array of 
computer mediated electronic communications and supporting technologies. 
Because the term lacks clear and concise definition it is understood 
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metaphorically. Furthermore, these metaphors are indicative of its socially 
constructed nature. 
In common use cyberspace implies a "place" where both real-time and 
delayed interaction occur between people via computers, on telephone lines, in 
e-mail, on bulletin boards, and in on line chat areas (Tribe 1991 ). The labeling 
of certain dimensions of cyberspace as "rooms," or "lobbies," even services 
such as "E-World," and the term "information superhighway" illustrate the way 
cyberspace is perceived--a real "place" to which people may go. However, 
contrary to the common metaphor, people neither travel, nor do they "surf" 
anywhere along an "information superhighway." When online, "People do not 
'navigate to' information; rather information comes to them from a variety of 
sources (Laurel 1993 pp. 182)." Thus, the use of these metaphors suggest that 
dimensions of cyberspace are socially constructed realities, that have certain 
perceived qualities, that are not to be taken literally. 
The common metaphors for online environments (information 
superhighway, bulletin boards, rooms, lobbies, etc) illustrate how the 
dislocation of the online context serves to blur common sense distinctions 
between physical and computer environments (Turkle 1995; Stone 1995; 
Shapiro and McDonald 1992). It is true that cyberspace is comprised of and 
dependent upon physically real technologies that occupy a definitive space in a 
specific locales. Nonetheless, it is also true that cyberspace is perceived by 
users as a tangible place--an environment that cannot be explained by, or 
reduced to, the geographic locale of its technological components. 
Consequently, if we are to consider the experiential dimension of online 
environments, we must view these "places" as existing in-and-between a vast 
array of geographic locales and physical spaces. Persons manipulate a 
computer that exists in a specific geographic locale and network other 
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computers in other geographic locales, yet what emerges exists in-and-
inbetween such locations in an interactive processes between the various (and 
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often uncomprehendable) sets of connections that link them together. 
For these reasons, cyberspace is often labeled "spaceless." Although 
the meaning of the term "spaceless" is g~nerally understood, it is more accurate 
to conceive of cyberspace as dislocated. Quite simply, computer network 
technologies are physically real, they do occupy space, and the existence of 
these technologies is a prerequisite to online interaction. Cyberspace is not 
purely imaginative, but is contained within concrete physical technologies that 
exist somewhere. What occurs online is not necessarily "spaceless," rather 
space has little bearing on what transpires. Like other constructed realities, 
cyberspace isn't so much a set of geographic spaces as it is a concept that 
contains shared understandings and information (Shapiro and McDonald 
1992). Online realities are constructed andsustained with information alone 
(Benedikt 1991) in an ongoing process of communication, entirely dislocated 
from physical locale. Distant and divergent social worlds are immediately 
available in the same medium of communication in the here-and-now of the 
interacting present. 
In summary, the social worlds of online environments exist in a "space" 
where geographic locale and spatial distance are insignificant factors. 
Interaction in this context is dislocated from the geographic locale of the 
computer networking technologies. Instead of being "spaceless," online 
interaction exists in an experiential "place" that is in-and-inbetween geographic 
locales. Consequently, similar to many electronic forms of communication, 
online environments allow participants access to social worlds that are entirely 
removed from any form of physical space (as traditionally conceived). 
The social world of computer mediated communication is not only 
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dislocated, but a disembodiedform of interaction. That is, online interaction is 
"faceless" and "voiceless" in the literal sense of the ,words. Although an 
estimated thirty to fifty million users are currently logged onto the Net (Rose 
1995), nowhere will one find a physical body. Online interaction proceeds 
through communication alone, and the existence of a physical body has little (if 
any) bearing on what transpires between people in the course of interaction. 
When online, one is completely removed from face-to-face forms of interaction 
that dominate symbolic interactionist and dramaturgical theoretical orientations. 
All that remains are the computer-mediated communication dramas by which 
selves are enacted and social worlds constructed. 
The absence of physical bodies in the context of cyberspace poses a 
serious challenge to interactionist and dramaturgical theoretical orientations. 
From traditional interactionistand drarnaturgical theoretical orientations, a 
physical body is a prerequisite to a self. Although interactionist and 
dramaturgical theoretical orientations emphasize that the human body may be 
decorated, and otherwise altered along a seemingly infinite range to 
communicate awide array of self enactments, the physical body remains a 
powerful element in the self-social world relationship. In face-to-face 
interaction, and to a lesser degree in electronic forms of social interaction, self 
enactments will vary greatly, but the physical existence of ones body always 
presents limits and mandates to the range of multiple selfhood: For example, in 
relation to issues of identity Peter Berger (1963) states: 
"It is not difficult to change from garbage collector to night watchman. It is 
considerably more difficult to change from clergyman to officer. It is very, 
very difficult to change from Negro to white. And it is almost impossible to 
change from man to woman (pp. 98)." 
The thrust of Berger's argument rests on the real limitations posed by the 
empirically verifiable physical body on the range of the multiple selves that an 
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individual can enact. In both face-to-face and electronic forms of interaction, the 
body this always there--outside of the realm of meaning alone. Regardless of 
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how the body is altered or transformed, it always exists as a physical thing: 
"In everyday life, our efforts at self-presentation usually assume that we 
cannot change the basics of our appearance. Physical characteristics, 
although open to cosmetic or fashionable manipulation, are basically 
unalterable. What we look like, we have to live with, and this fixity 
underpins our social institutions .... Male·, female, black, young, old, poor 
and affluent are all terms that resonate through our culture, and each 
depends in part on the fixity of physical form, and our ability to affix 
meaning to that form (Reid 1994 pp. 61)." 
In digital social worlds, these bodily constraints do not exist. Only in a 
digital social world is the body transformed into pure symbol in the processes of 
social interaction4. Only in a digital social world can we state without hesitation 
or quotation marks that bodies and selves exist as pure socially constructed 
meanings that emerge in the process of communication. Only in a digital world 
do both bodies and selves emerge in the process of interaction as fluid entities 
to think with, anc:i interact through--not within. Only in digital social worlds can 
we speak without hesitation or qualification .about the experience of 
disembodiment. 
In a digital context, selves ·ancl social worlds emerge entirely in a process 
of dislocated and disembodied communication. Online interaction proceeds in 
a "place" without "space," in a geographic location without physical presence. 
These conditions represent an extension of electronic forms of interaction and 
allows for unprecedented degrees of multiplicity. Whereas electronic forms of 
communication allow for the emergence of fragmented selves in 
hypercontextual situations, limits on the degree of multiple selves and social 
worlds are posed due to the physical presence of the body in geographic 
space. When online, however, self-social world relationships emerge and 
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maintain themselves apart from physical bodies, and geographic locales. 
When apart from the constraints of the physical body, and apart from the 
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constraints of geographic space, online interaction represents the ultimate 
context of multiplicity. 
The digital nature of online interaction, which _most directly expresses 
itself in a disembodied and dislocated form, poses unique social situations that 
highlight changes in the self-social world relationship. Consider, for example 
the following situation: 
Wife Accused of Cybersex Cheating 
"Sommerville, NJ --A man filing for divorce accused his wife of 
carrying on a 'virtual' affair via computer with a cybersex partner who 
called himself 'the Weasel." · 
Diane Goydan's relationship with the man apparently never was 
consummated; but her husband, John Goydan of Bridgewater, claimed 
the pair had planned a real tryst this weekend at a New Hampshire bed 
and breakfast. 
Goydan filed divorce papers Jan 23 that included dozens of e-mail 
exchanges between his wife and a married man she met on America 
Online. The man, whose on-line name was 'The Weasel,' was identified 
in court papers only as Ray from North Carolina (Associated Press, Feb. 
2 1996)." 
This unprecedented case of "virtual infidelity" highlights the conditions of 
disembodied interaction in dislocated social contexts. According to traditional 
definitions, the political and legal status of "married" is,. and always has been, 
firmly affixed to the physical body. That is, regardless of the range of self-
enactments that one engages within multiple and parallel social worlds, the 
political and legal status of "married" is firmly affixed to the physical body (as 
iconized by physical symbols affixed to the body, namely a wedding ring on a 
specific finger). In traditional terms, it is the body that has the ontologically 
privileged status as "real." The body is the necessary element to which a 
person is acknowledged as a "citizen," and thus affixed the rights, duties, and 
responsibilities of any given political-legal status (see Stone 1995). No matter 
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where that body shall go or what the person does, the status of "married" legally 
and politically applies to the body. However, once in a disembodied and 
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dislocated context, participants enact performances that are freed from these 
constraints. Situations such as these raise new questions and problems made 
possible by the dislocation of space and disembodiment of self enactments. 
Cases like these emphasize how disembodied and dislocated interaction 
depart from other forms· of interaction, resulting in situations that are problematic 
to traditional understandings of selves and social worlds. By posing a new 
range of possibilities that depart from traditionally conceived understandings of 
self and social world new questions and problems arise. For example, how do 
national and state laws apply to the activities of persons who interact with others 
through computers located in different legal jurisdJctions? Is it the location of 
the physical body that determines which laws apply, or is it the location of the 
activity in question? What can be said aboutgender, when a male psychologist 
can convincingly maintain himself as a -handicapped female over the course of 
several years (see Van Gelder 1985)? What is the role of age in defining a 
person when anyone can present themselves as being any age in an online 
context? What does it mean when a virtual persona has a better sex life than 
we do? Is an adult guilty of statutory rape if he/she has virtual sex with a minor 
who claims to be an adult online? Is an adult guilty of statutory rape if he/she 
has virtual sex with an adult that claims to be a minor online? What does it 
mean when a persons virtual persona makes better friends online than as a real 
embodied person? What does it say about contemporary experiences of 
personhood when an individual claims to feel more "them self" online? 
Clearly, widely publicized cases, like "virtual adultery," the "virtual cross 
dressing psychiatrist (Van Gelder 1985)," and numerous other problematic 
scenarios raise serious questions about the nature of self and social world in 
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online environments. These problems and situations are representative of the 
shifting boundaries of the self-social world relationship made manifest by the 
,. 
dislocation of social worlds and disembodiment of self, and serve to mark 
changes in the self-social world relationship. 
The Bit, Self, and Digital Social Worlds 
What is a self when disembodied and emergent in a computer-mediated 
dislocated context? The disembodied nature of online self enactments 
challenges traditional conceptions of selfhood as a unified entity affixed to or 
contained by the body. The dislocated nature of the self-social world 
relationship challenges traditional conceptions of the self as situated in time 
and space. How then are we to co_nceive of the digital self-social world 
relationship? Clearly, the disembodied and dislocated nature of the self-social 
world relationship, as made manifest in online contexts, begs for an adequate 
interpretive apparatus. 
The online self-social world relationship manifests itself in markedly 
different form than in either electronic or face-to-face situations. These 
differences are best understood by re-formulating traditional conceptions to 
include two key elements that cannot be dismissed when considering online 
social interaction. First, online selves emerge in a process of social interaction 
(like any other self). The self is inherently a system of meaning emergent within 
a process of communication--not an entity, or a quality of the person that is 
affixed or contained within the mind or the body. Secondly, the nature of self-
social world relationships is necessarily transformed by alterations in the means 
by which selves are enacted and social worlds are produced (as preceding 
sections have sought to emphasize). That is·, by altering the means by which 
persons interact with others, transformations in the nature and scope of human 
activity accompany the emergence of a new range of potential interactions. 
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These changes allow for the emergence of new forms of interaction, new 
expressions of selfhood, and the construction of unique social environments 
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that do not necessarily adhere to preconceived understandings of self or social 
world. In short, in order to adequately interpret experiences of online 
interaction, re-formulations of a dynamic self-social world relationship must be 
devised, articulating the process by which selves and social worlds manifest 
themselves within the means of computer:.mediated communication. Such an 
articulation can be informed by examining fundamental differences between 
online digital environments and the environments of the physical world. 
According to Nicholas Negroponte (1995) differences between physical 
and digital worlds are highlighted in the fundamental difference between bits 
and atoms. The physical world of matter is composed of atoms, while digital 
worlds of online environments are composed of bits. An atom is an 
independent, objective, physical entity .that occupies space in linear time. An 
atom may be pushed, pulled, and otherwise moved and/or contained. In short, 
an atom is a "thing." A bit, on the other han~, has. no fixed physical form, no 
weight, and does not occupy space. In short, a bit is not a "thing" at all, it is a 
state that can only be described as eith~r "on" or "off" (or "+"·and "-"5 ). 
Worlds composed of atomsare Worlds of "things" that have a relatively 
stable, fixed form, which occupy physical space, and are time dependent (i.e. 
atomic things of matter have a knowable history and a future). Online digital 
worlds, composed of bits, are worlds composed of states that have a non-fixated 
form, do not occupy physical space, and are conceivably infinite~ The world of 
atoms is a world composed of "things," while the world of bits is a world 
composed of states of being. Atoms occupy geographic space and thus, in the 
physical world of atoms "things" have a place. Bits, on the other hand, do not 
occupy physical places and are not constrained by geography, thus digital 
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worlds emerge as places within things (namely computer technologies). 
Furthermore, in the physical world of atoms, persons move from place-to-place . 
. ,. 
However, in the digital world of bits, "place" itself may be transmitted from one 
location to another (Negroponte 1995) . 
. Things composed of atoms are things that have inherent and relatively 
stable "properties." Therefore, atomic things have an empirical reality that can 
be observed and formulated into principals and/or "laws." Things composed of 
bits are not necessarily anything but malleable states of being that may be re-
formulated or otherwise altered without necessary referent to what is empirically 
real. Things composed of bits do not have a fixed form and may be 
manipulated, transformed, and re-formulated infinitely (conceivably) without the 
constraints imposed by physical matter. As such, digital worlds consist of 
malleable "things" that have pragmatic reality. Or in other words, digital "things" 
are representational states oriented toward action arid ·thought--not reflections 
of what is necessarily empirically veritable. 
To interact with others in the online context it is neces~ary to translate 
ones actions into the conventions of the medium. Or in other_words, to interact 
with others in the online context, it is necessary to "be digital." "Being digital" is 
to compose ones self enactment and social worlds of bits--fluid, discursive, non-
physical states of being. Thus, "being digital is the option to be independent of 
confining standards," including the "spatial and experiential sense of place 
(Negroponte 1995 pp. 44 and 66)." A digital self-social world relationship is 
one that builds from interactions in a disembodied and dislocated form that is 
neither confined nor defined by elements of the physical world, nor is there 
necessary commitment or referent to the "physically real." Rather, the digital 
self-social world relationship is a fluid and discursive horizon of multiple 
possibilities for being. 
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The Problem of Reality 
"Few of us think about 'reality' much... It is, p'erhaps, the conceptual 
equivalent of unconscious motor functions such as breathing. It is vital to 
life--without it, we would be unable to distinguish the real from the 
imaginary, the true from the false, the natural from the artificial. But we do 
not have to think about it to use it--indeed, as soon as we do start thinking 
about it, it becomes extremely difficult to continue using it (Woolley 1993 
pp. 2-3)." 
Without referent or necessary commitment to the "physically real," the 
social production of online environments allows individuals to construct new 
places (Meyrowitz 1985), new roles (Spear 1991 ), and personally meaningful 
personae (Stone 1995; Turkle 1995). With a click of an icon participants 
interact with diverse others, in a multiplicity of techno-socially produced places, 
allowing for the emergence of disembodied selves situated in dislocated social 
worlds, where commitments to any given self are as easily dispensed with as 
they are accessed--a mere click of an icon. 
These conditions of extreme potential fluidity presents problems of how 
to frame reality. As reflected by numerous contemporary controversies 
concerning online activities, defining what is "real" in an online context is 
particularly problematic (i.e. is "virtual infidelity" really adultery? Is "virtual sex" 
subject to the same legal prescriptions that apply to physical sex? Is digital 
pornography subject to the same laws as other forms of pornography?). 
Numerous scholars have noted the difficulties in assessing what is "real" in 
relation to the unique situations posed by electronic medias (see Chayko 1993; 
Altheide and Snow 1991; Zerubavel 1991; Eco 1986), and current researchers 
of computer-mediated environments have noted how these problems are 
compounded in online environments (see Rheingold 1991; Turkle 1995; Stone 
1995; Jones 1995). 
In traditional frames of reference, reality is defined by the empirically 
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verifiable. Traditionally speaking, that which is empirically verifiable (or at least 
subject to measurement) is given the privileged ontological status as "real." 
,I• 
Founded on concepts of "objective empiricism," "physical evidence," "proof," 
and the implicit validity of the scientific method, this "seeing is believing" Perry 
Mason approach to reality is deeply rooted in a history that cannot b~ separated 
from the emergence of science and the general acceptance of scientific 
evidence as the ultimate means by which "truth" is accepted or rejected. 
However, in the context of o·nline social worlds the only empirical "things" that 
exist are the wires, chips,. and plastic that comprise the technology of the 
medium--all else exists as symbolic representation. As previously stated, online 
environments emerge inside computer networking technologies, however the 
selves and social worlds that emerge within these environments are neither 
defined by or a function of the empirically verifiable technologies themselves. 
What is the status of "reality" when one interacts in a disembodied and 
dislocated social world, where all "things" present themselves as fundamentally 
non-empirical symbolic-representations?· 
"Grounding" Hyperreality 
Several authors have given serious attention to the problem of defining 
online realities, and many find solace in the postmodern articulation of 
"hyperreality." Jean Baudrillard (1981) describes "hyperreality" as a simulation 
that is no longer of territory, referential being, or substance. The hyperreal is 
generated through an infinite Xerox of models from a real, that is no longer of 
known origin or verifiable reality. It is a condition of pure simulation that 
threatens the difference between "true" and "false," "real" and "imaginary" 
(Baudrillard 1981). As Baudrillard (1981) states: 
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" .... it is no longer anything but a gigantic simulacrum: Not unreal, but a 
simulacrum, never again exchanging for what is real, but exchanging in 
itself, in an uninterrupted circuit without reference or circumference .... it 
plays at being an appearance .... it is no longer in the order of 
appearance at all, but of simulation (pp. 11-12)." 
To Baudrillard, Disneyland illustrates the nature of hyperreality. The 
elements that comprise the "things" of Disneyland have no real reference or 
situated boundaries of existence. Walt Disney constructs images, that in 
Disneyland are simulated to assume a reality for which their is no referent. 
Once we experience the never-never world of Disneyland, Los Angeles 
appears strikingly real. As Turkle (1995) illustrates: 
"Los Angeles's shopping malls seem authentic, even though they, too, 
are recreations. The shopping malls.enclose another dream: a golden 
age that never was of idyllic small-town life. What we have are dreams 
within dreams (pp. 234)." · 
In a similar fashion,· computer environments display a dimension that 
some scholars call "hyperreal :" 
"The objects on the screen have no simple physical referent. In this 
sense, life on the screen is without origins and foundation. It is a place 
where signs for reality may substitute for the real. Its aesthetic has to do 
with manipulation and recombiflatiori. . .. files and documents on my 
computer screen function as copies of objects of which they are the first 
examples. I become accustomed to seeing the copies as the reality. The 
documents that scroll before my eyes as I compose this book on a 
computer screen function as real enough. They are my access to the 
thing itself, but there is no other thing itself (Turkle 1995 pp. 47)." 
The computer is fundamentally a "tool"S of representation and surface 
images. All things represented on a computer have an underlying reality that 
has no meaning or necessary referent to the representations produced. For 
example, the programing language of any computer software is unknown and 
meaningless (to most people) in reference to the representation produced on 
the computer monitor and/or printer. As this dissertation is being created on a 
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computer, a complex underlying electromechanical process is occurring inside 
the computer that has no referent to the meaning of what is written, these 
processes necessarily relevant to the interpretation and understanding of these 
words, and they are not evident anywhere on the page that you are reading. 
The underlying reality of the electromechanical processes of the computer are 
extraneous to the meaning of what is created?. Furthermore, although I know 
how to operate my computer and manipulate its software, that knowledge 
merely refers to the ability to operate the surfaces of the computer-program. 
When I save this dissertation to disk, I simply manipulate the surface 
representation of an underlying electromechanical reality that is meaningless, 
beyond my comprehension, and whose specific processes are not a necessary 
referent to understanding the consequences of the "save command." In short, 
the contemporary user~friendly personal computer is a medium and 
environment of surfaces, where surface representations are the "things" we 
manipulate, and who's underlying electromechanical processes are 
meaningless in reference to the "things" produced. Consequently, the computer 
is often cited as the icon of the postmodern world. 
In his 1984 article, Fredric Jameson noted that unlike the mechanical 
machines of the modernist era, the postmodern era lacked objects that could 
represent it. A decade later, scholars claim that the computer has emerged as 
an object to represent the postmodern era (see Turkle 1995, chapter one: "A 
Tale of Two Aesthetics'' pp. 29-49). As Turkle states; "Computers embody 
postmodern theory and bring it down to earth (1995 pp. 18)." Or in other words, 
the computer is an object that "fulfills the postmodern aesthetic (Lanham 1993 
pp. 51 ). " Although the the point is well taken--computers do provide helpful 
illustrations of some postmodern ideas, caution must be taken with this 
metaphor. 
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It is fundamentally perilous to suggest the computer as a metaphor for a 
set of ideas that has systematically examined the erosion and decay of all 
... 
metaphors and similar grand narratives (see Lyotard 1993). Since it's earliest 
articulations, postmodern theory has emphasized the processes by which all 
metaphors have collapsed, exposing a perfumed vail of vested ideologies that 
these narratives latently serve to mask. In short, it is unwise to suggest a 
metaphor for a set of ideas that has rejected the validity of all metaphors. It is 
equally perilous to suggest that computers "ground" postmodern concepts of the 
hyperreal. This implies that postmodern ideas can be somehow empirically 
verified in computer environments. Quite simply, to declare the computer as a 
means of "grounding" postmodern theory, is to convolute postmodern 
conceptions into terms amendable to modernist ideologies. To be blunt, one 
simply cannot have their postmodern cake, and eat it too. Furthermore, one 
cannot eliminate the postmodern critique through strategies of intellectual 
imperialism--that is, by simply transforming postmodern ideas into modernist 
language and ideology. The postmodern condition is neither contained within, 
nor is it a result of the computer. 
Clearly, the problem of reality, as posed by computers and computer 
networks, is precariously perched in the problematic margins of two competing 
aesthetics. It is situated in an environment that is dependent on the 
electromechanical processes of the computer, yet what emerges is not 
necessarily related to these processes. That which emerges is clearly 
contained within technologies that empirically exist, yet digital reality is 
completely comprised of and sustained by non-empirical symbolic 
representations alone. "Things" are created, yet nothing empirically exists. The 
"Perry Mason" approach to reality yields us little more than understandings of a 
complex electromechanical process that are meaningless and unrelated in 
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reference to the socially constructed reality that emerges. Equally, a purely 
symbolic "hyperreal" approach not only ignores the existence of concrete and 
,. 
empirically real technologies, but also tends to falsely reify the computer as an 
embodiment of hyperreal. Neither approach is entirely adequate. Thus, we 
arrive at the same question this section began with: what, then, is the status of 
"reality'' when one interacts in a disembodied and dislocated social world, 
where all "things" present themselves as fundamentally non-empirical symbolic-
representations? 
Virtuality 
To overcome the "problem of reality" within computer-mediated contexts 
(and perhaps to even more broadly articulated problems of reality) it is 
necessary to reframe the "reality problem" altogether. It is increasingly 
necessary to acknowledge thatllreality" is not a phenqmena of nature, and does 
not "exist" as an objective empirical entity. This is not to deny the 
epistemologically privileged status of "reality," nor does this suggest some 
Promethean vision of humankind (recall earlier discussions of the production of 
social worlds). Rather, this highlights the fact that human beings do not, and 
cannot, experience "reality" directly. The very fact that humans are capable of 
questioning that which is defined as "real,;, highlights the nature of the problem. 
In short, we must acknowledge that "reality" is always mediated, and can only 
manifest itself in the experiences of persons. That is, reality is always ( 1) 
interpreted according to prevailing definitions and understandings of the world, 
and (2) manifests itself in experiential conditions that are only marginally related 
to predefined empirical, epistemological, and ontologicial understandings. 
Increasingly, empirical research and theoretical orientations, must recognize 
that any attempt to ground "reality" into objective and empirically verifiable terms 
apart from the interpretative and experiential processes by which reality is 
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produced (and vice-vera) will always fail. From this perspective, reality is a 
fluid definition of a situation, and like all definitions it's meaning is always ,, 
subject to changes, Reality is not an either-or-distinction between that which is 
"empirically verifiable" and that which is "symbolic." Rather "reality" is an 
interpretive apparatus that serves to define states of human experience. 
From this perspective the reality posed by electronic and computer 
mediated environments is best conceived by use of the term "virtual." A 
situation may be called "virtual" when it is not entirely real in terms that are 
directly translatable to the empirical boundaries of the traditional "real" frame, 
yet the experience is not devoid of realitY9 (Chayko 1993). Online interaction 
exemplifies a condition of virtuality. Online interaction is "real" in so far as 
people are really communicating. However, online interaction, and indeed all 
of cyberspace, is only a metaphor for the computer-mediated social production 
of space, place, self, and other. Where socially produced locations, situations, 
and identities are malleably created and negotiated in a process of interaction 
between people (Meyers 1987; Turkle 1995; Stone 1995; Jones 1995). It is a 
collective dramaturgy on an empty social stage (Baudrillard 1981 ), where social 
productions are not dependent nor contingent on what is physically real or 
veritable. In the context of online interaction participants construct meaningful 
personal and social experiences (Turkle 1995; Meyers 1987; Reid 1994, 1991 ; 
Jones 1995). Hence, online interaction assumes a virtual quality--it cannot be 
framed as empirically verifiable, yet is defined as experientially real (and 
meaningful) by participants. 
Virtuality is an experience (Rheingold 1991 ), and like any experience, 
cannot be explained or reduced to empirical qualities alone: 
"The adjective virtual describes things--worlds, phenomena, etc--that 
look and feel like reality but lack the traditional physical substance. A 
virtual object, for instance, may be one that has no real-world equivalent, 
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but the persuasiveness of its representation allows us to respond as if it 
were real (Laurel 1993 pp. 8)." 
-.~' 
The precarious endeavor to ground virtual experiences in empirically 
verifiable terms is a futile task. Now, that is not to say that people don't try (i.e. 
the experience of sexual arousal--an inherently virtual experience--is often 
grounded in physically verifiable terms, such as the existence of an erection), 
however most people implicitly understand that these indicators of experience 
are merely one small part of the phenomena (i.e. being sexually aroused is 
more than just erections, it also entails a wide array of cognition, and emotion 
that are as important, if not more so, than the physically verifiable conditions of 
being sexually aroused). In virtual experiences, socially constructed selves and 
situations attain a meaning in a given place and time (like any other self or 
situation). Yet, unlike other situations, virtual experiences do riot have inherent 
meaning grounded in specific socio-culturally prescribed places, nor are they 
necessarily wed to anything that is a part of the physically verifiable world. In 
short, virtuality is a socially constructed situation that is experientially real, yet 
lacks the qualities of physicalitY: 
Thus, the "problem of reality" as posed by virtual situations is not a 
question of how to apprehend virtual social worlds within the taken-for-granted 
bifurcation between that which is empirically real -vs- that which is symbolic 
(see Chayko 1993). We cannot phrase "problems of reality" in this manner, for it 
takes for granted the process of reality production--the very thing we are 
attempting to understand. Thus, the problem must be re-phrased to examine 
how such realities produced, not the status of such realities. In these regards, 
like all other realities, virtual online environments are not either empirical or 
symbolic, but emergent between interacting persons within the processes by 
which it is mediated. 
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The Social Production of Virtual Realities 
'"Virtual' was and remains a much grander word, scandalously 
underused, a huge vessel of semantic vacuity waiting to have meaning 
poured into it (Woolley 1993 pp. 58)." 
By design, the computer is a simulating electromechanical machine. 
That is, computer technologies are designed to represent things that you can 
see, control, and play with (Laurel 1993). The "things" that present themselves 
in computer environments are not "things" at all. Rather, they are 
representations that can be manipulated 10. For these reasons, the computer's 
"interesting potential lay not in its ability to perform calculations but in its 
capacity to represent action in which humans could participate (Laurel 1993 pp. 
1 )." 
' 
Because of its unique simulating capabilities, considerable attention has 
been dedicated to the role of the computer in the production of virtual 
environments (see Rheingold ·1991). Even when examining social-
psychological dimensions of virtuality, technology remains the focus of 
attention. For example, the popular work of Sherry Turkle (1984; 1995) directly 
addresses social-psychological issues of virtuality, building from the view that 
"as people come to a greater acceptance of a kinship between computers and 
human minds, they have also begun to pursue a new set of boundary questions 
about things and people (1995 pp. 24)." As such, Turkle's analysis centers on 
issues of virtuality and the social-psychological consequences of a 
contemporary condition in which "we have become accustomed to opaque 
technology," and "we have learned to take things at interface value (1995 pp. 
23)." However, on both grounds Turkle's popular analysis of computer-
mediated virtual realities not only over-emphasizes the role of technology, but is 
fundamentally flawed from the start. 
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First, there is no reason to assume that technology is any more "opaque" 
in the emergent computer-mediated information age of "virtual reality" than any 
,,. .• 
other preceding era. Anthropologists have long informed us that human 
societies have always exhibited a tool-making quality, and have always 
integrated technological innovations into the taken-for-granted everyday lives of 
its citizens. Thus, humans have always lived in a technologically "opaque" 
world. On what grounds can we reasonably conclude that technology in 
computer-mediated virtual environments is "more opaque" than any other social 
environment (historical or contemporary, virtual or non-virtual)? Computer 
technologies within virtual environments are "opaque," however the same may 
be said about any technological innovation within any given social situation 
(including non-material innovations, such as new theoretical paradigms), and 
' ' 
therefore is not unique to computer technologies, or computer-mediated virtual 
realities. 
The transformative potential of any given technology is precisely a 
function of its flJndamentally "opaque" nature. Technological innovations exert 
impact on human societies, not because people understand how they work, but 
because they work (or at least are perceived to be working). People implement 
technological innovations for specific purposes, and to the extent that those 
technologies are successful, they alter the nature, range, and scope of human 
activity. It is the opaqueness of technology that allows persons to implement it 
for their purposes, and to the extent that such technologies "work" they serve to 
transform physical and social environments11. Thus, the unique quality of 
computer-mediated virtual environments is not that the technology is opaque--
all technologies are opaque--rather, it's transformative potential rests in how it 
uniquely alters, or at least makes manifest previously existing alterations in the 
nature, range, and scope of human activity. 
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Secondly, Turkle (1995) argues that "we have learned to take things at 
interface value." Yet, here again, human beings ha,ye a/ways took things at 
interface value: 
"Every tool has a human interface: doorknobs are the human interface to 
a door; steering wheels and speedometers are the human interface to an 
automobile. An effective interface was the hand-shaped grip on a stone 
axe (Rheingold 1991 pp. 70)." 
For any technology to be usable, it must have a human interface. Once 
familiar enough to proficiently utilize the technology, the interface is necessarily 
taken for granted in lieu of the purpose of using the technology in the first place. 
We take for granted doorknobs, steering wheels, tool handles, power buttons, 
volume knobs, and channel selectors because they are simply a means to an 
technologically enabled end (opening the door, transportation; lawn care, 
adjusting volume, selecting a channel). Only when the interface fails to produce 
a desired result do we pay attention to that which we previously took for granted 
(i.e. a channel selector or volume knob that works unpredictably). Once again, 
the unique characteristic of computer-mediated virtual realities is not that the 
interface is taken for granted--all technologies have a taken for granted human 
interface--rather, its uniquely transformative potential rests in how persons 
construct and participate in computer-mediated environments that have the 
precarious privilege of being taken for granted. 
As the preceding critique highlights, in spite of considerable hype 
surrounding "virtual reality," attention has focused on technology. More 
specifically, considerations of "virtual reality" unduly focus on the technologies 
capable of creating visual illusions (see Rheingold's 1991 best seller Virtual 
Reality, which should probably at least contain the subtitle Technologies of 
Visual Illusion). As a result we have been blinded by the hype that emphasizes 
technologies that create visual illusions of reality, while ignoring other forms of 
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virtuality (this includes other computer-mediated forms like text-based virtual 
environments12). Furthermore, the preponderance.of literature and popular 
accounts of "virtual reality" have emphasized the role of technology to such a 
degree that it would seem persons simply have no participatory role in the 
production of a virtual environment. Where in all this technology are human 
participants, and do they play a role in the production of virtual environments? 
There can be no doubt that the computer-mediated virtual environments 
are dependent on computer technologies, and that these technological 
innovations bestow these environments with special characteristics. However, 
there is no reason why attention should be narrowly focused on merely; the 
technology, graphically based forms of virtuality, or even computer-mediated 
forms of virtuality alone. To the extent that virtuality is an experience (Rheingold 
1991 ), understandings might best proceed through examination of similar 
experiences of virtuality in relation to computer-mediated virtual environments. 
Or in other words, to advance understandings of virtuality we must also consider 
how these realities are produced as an emergent experience situated in an 
ongoing process of human interaction--not merely the function of operating 
computer systems. 
Brenda Laurel's (1993) influential book Computers as Theater is an 
important contribution toward highlighting processes in which computer-
mediated forms of virtuality emerge within the interaction between persons and 
technology. Although Laurel's intended readership is a specific audience of 
computer programmers, her work is directly relevant to the social production of 
virtuality, and her dramaturgical model bears uncanny sociological familiarity. 
To Laurel (1993), the computer is merely the representer of a virtual world. 
Persons, in the process of interaction with one another and computer 
technologies, create the virtual worlds that computers merely represent. The 
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computer is simply the medium through which representational and virtual 
social worlds may be experienced (Laurel 1993), it is not that which alone 
"' 
creates such social worlds. The technologies of the computer are simply one 
small element of the virtual realities that emerge in computer mediated contexts: 
"Interface is more than screen deep. The interface becomes the arena 
for the performance of some tasks in which both human and computer 
have a role. What is represented in the interface is not only the task's 
environment and tools but also the process of interaction--the 
contributions made by both parties (Laurel 1993 pp. 7)." 
Laurel encourages readers to look beyond the computer environment to 
obtain a more systemic understanding of how virtual situations are created, 
sustained, and experienced. Indeed, once divorced from the technological gee-
wizery of the interface by which computer-mediated virtual experiences are 
produced, virtuality assumes a surprisingly familiar experiential quality. As 
Laurel (1993) notes: 
"Virtual reality is a continuum that is older even than science fiction. 
Enactments around prehistoric campfires, Greek theater, and 
performance rituals of abotiginal people the world over are all aimed at 
the same goal: Heightened experience through multisensory 
representation (Laurel 1993 pp. 187)." 
The magnificent cathedrals, stately government buildings, the noble 
architecture of educational institutions, and even pristine sites of nature have an 
analogous virtual component. For example,. as a Catholic priest stands before 
his congregation--within a magnificent cathedral, adorned with magnificent 
apparel, elevated on a stage that is only belittled by the sight of an enormous 
crucifix, enshrouded in an aura produced by the dim light of stain glass 
windows, candles, incense, and organ music--a virtual environment is produced 
where the meaning of the ordinary is transformed. Computer-mediated virtual 
environments, although contained within computer technologies, are produced 
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and experienced in a similar manner--they emerge dramaturgically. From this 
perspective, the reality of computer-mediated situat.~ons "lies not in the 
machinery itself, but in the users willingness to treat the manifestations of their 
meanings as if they were real (Reid 1994 pp. 4)." 
"Human-computer activities are dramatic in nature (Laurel 1993 pp. 
105)." Like any other dramatic activity, action is the primary component of 
human-computer activity--not characters, environments, interfaces, or objects1s 
(Laurel 1993). If virtual situations are produced dramaturgically, and if 
dramaturgical enactments are sustained by action, then neither the technology 
nor the individual alone can represent that which allows for the production of 
virtual realities. That is, if virtual situations are dramaturgical enactments, then 
like any other drama they cannot be adequately understood by virtue of the 
stage or character alone--the action of the drama must be the focus of analytical 
attention: 
"It's not just that the technical underpinnings of theatrical performance 
are unimportant to audience metnbers;when a play is 'working,' 
. . 
audience members are simply not aware of the technical aspects at all 
... the action on the stage is a// there is ... For actor and audience alike the 
ultimate 'reality' is what is happening in the imaginary world on the 
stage--the representation ... The technical magic [of computer 
environments] that supports the representation, as in the theater, is 
behind the scenes. Whether the magic is hardware, software, or wetware 
is of no consequence; it's only value is what it produces on the 'stage.' In 
other words, the representation is all there is (Laurel 1993 pp. 15-17)." 
Although many computer-mediated virtual environments are text-based 
(composed of words), neither human-computer activity nor online interaction is 
merely text--it is more than simply narrative. Unlike mere text or narrative, 
human-computer activity implicitly incorporates performance (Laurel 1993). To 
highlight, there are at least two grounds on which human-computer activities 
dramaturgically diverge from narrative alone; human-computer activities entail 
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"enactment," and "intensification." 
Both drama and human-computer virtual act(vity involves enactment. In 
other words, what occurs in these environments is acted-out rather than simply 
read (Laurel 1993). Enacted representations involve users in a direct sensing 
and cognition in the environment as a participant. Where as narrative entails 
fundamental barriers in the participants role within the plot of the story, 
dramaturgical enactments necessitate human involvement. Furthermore, both 
drama and human-computer virtual activity is intensifying. That is, elements of 
situations are selected, arranged, and represented, so as to intensify the 
performance and condense time (Laurel 1993). Narratives generally employ 
the reverse process, extensification, where a narrative account may continue at 
great length and detail of a minute event (Laurel 1993). These differences 
between drama and narrative highlight the central role of action and drama to 
the emergence of computer-mediated virtual environments. All human-
computer activities entail a degree of enactment and intensification which are 
embodiment of action and drama, and the means by which computer-mediated 
virtual situations are produced. 
Summary 
In the end, we arrive on the same conceptual grounds that this chapter 
began with: Computer-mediated virtual realities are emergent within the 
actions of participants situated in technologically enabled environments. Which 
is tantamount to saying: The "reality" of a social world is produced and 
sustained within ongoing dynamic patterns of social interaction. The virtual 
realities of computer-mediated environments are produced and sustained 
through the same processes of interaction that "non-virtual" realities of physical 
environments are produced and sustained. What is different about these two 
52 
forms of "reality" are not the processes by which they are produced, but the 
means of their production. 
As highlighted in the previous subsections on face-to-face, electronic, 
and digital social environments, alterations in the means by which selves and 
social worlds are produced bestow unique qualities to the processes of 
interaction that serve to make manifest tran$formations in the nature, range, and 
scope of human activity. Because digital social worlds emerge and sustain 
themselves within the technologies of computer-mediated communication, the 
production of digital social worlds assumes qualities that serve to distinguish it 
from other social worlds. Selves and social worlds that emerge in these 
environments will display fundamental differences simply due to alterations in 
the means by which they are produced. As such, experiences of virtuality 
made manifest by online interaction and the emergence of self and social world 
within technologies of computer networking, become an "antienvironment" 
(McLuhan and Parker 1968) where ordinary occurrences are experientially 
transformed. The antienvironment of digital social worlds is a virtual context 
where simple occurrences assume new meaning, where previously 
unconsidered questions and issues become the source of great controversy. 
The "things" that emerge within digital social worlds, how participants 
apprehend experiences of these virtual environments, and the questions and 
problems that these conditions present, display an awesome contemporary 
struggle over meaning. Participants in digital social worlds represent "reality 
hackers" (Stone 1995)--a population caught in the precarious margins of two 
eras: The implosion of the mechanical age, and the dawn of an information age 
(see Stone 1995). Caught between two eras, these "reality hackers" are people 
struggling to do what they have always done: To understand themselves and 
their world using whatever materials they have at hand (Turkle 1995). 
53 
Given these considerations the virtual self-social world relationship 
produced in online environments are technologically sustained 
,,! 
"antienvironments" that open the door of perception to people otherwise 
numbed in a non-perceivable situation (McLuhan and Parker 1968). 
Examination of this condition is precisely the aim of this study. This study is not 
about a fad, nor is it merely about social games people play with computers. 
This study is about a temporary and isolated glimpse at the shifting boundaries 
of self and social world made manifest by computer networking technologies at 
the dawn of the information age. This study is about relationships between 
people, selves, bodies, social worlds, and the negotiated realities of 
personhood in a contemporary techno-social era. 
"Just as textual technologies--cheap paper, the typewriter, printing--
accompanied new discourse networks and social formations, so 
electronic communication technologies--radio, television, computer 
networks--accompany the discourse networks and social formations now 
coming into being (Stone 1995 pp. 20)." 
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY 
This study is guided by three general questions: (1) How do selves 
emerge in the online context of chat environments? (2) What are the unique 
qualities of these social constructions? (3) What do these findings imply about 
off-line self-social world relationships in everyday life? These research 
questions stem from the theoretical framework detailed in chapter two, and are 
researched using ethnographic-naturalistic methods. 
Ethnographic-Naturalistic Methods 
This study utilizes methods of ethnographic-naturalistic inquiry. 
Consequently, no pretense of replicability is implied or intended. Descriptive 
and illustrative data is used, and these findings can only be judged by the 
degree to which analysis yields understanding. Generally speaking, this 
research is an enthnography that follows from the methodological approach of 
naturalistic interactionism (Lincoln and Guba 1985; Denzin 1989). Like an 
ethnography this study relies on skills of observation and interviews. Like an 
ethnography, this research seeks to examine structures of meaning and 
meaning production. Like an ethnography, this research entailed a substantial 
commitment by the researcher to spend numerous hours amongst participants 
of the selected community under study. This naturalistic-ethnographical 
methodological position adheres to several principals that fundamentally 
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differentiate naturalistic methods from other forms of data collection. 
First, naturalistic-ethnographic methods closely examine the meaning 
.,. 
that participants associate to their activities in conjunction with the activities 
themselves (Denzin 1989). That is, from a naturalistic methodological 
approach, how persons interpret their activities and the activities of others must 
be examined in relation to the actual doings of people. This means research 
must seek to understand how participants perceive others, their activities, and 
themselves in a process of action, in the context of interaction--not as separate, 
but as related happenings. 
Secondly, naturalistic methods seek to accommodate the perspective of 
the participant (Denzin 1989). Although this study is intended to be 
sociologically significant, it seeks to do so by utilizing sociological theories, 
concepts, and world views in conjunction with perspectives supplied by 
participants. In short, sociology must be emergent from the perspectives and 
activities of partic.ipants--not vice.;versa. Obviously, this is idealistic. Any act of 
seeing will be structured by the theories that guide observation. Not unlike the 
ideals of objectiv~ empiricism, this "subjective grounding" is an ideal, yet 
probably remains only attainable .in .degrees. 
Third, participant interpretations must be related to the groups from which 
they emerge (Denzin 1989). In these regards, interactionism is combined with 
naturalistic methods to produce what is sometimes called "naturalis~ic 
interactionism" (see Denzin 1989). From an interactionist perspective structures 
of meaning are inherently problematic. Meaning is negotiated between 
participants as they come to understand what is going on. These meanings, 
although often taken-for-granted by participants, are volatile constructions and 
temporary accommodations. Yet, ultimately these systems of meaning 
represent the foundation for interaction, and the means by which groups 
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emerge. Hence, analysis must examine participant interpretations in 
relationship to these larger group processes. 
A fourth principal, which is exceedingly important to this research, 
involves the recording of the context of interaction as part-and-parcel to the 
phenomena one studies (Denzin 1989). The context (or environment of 
interaction) is paramount in any form of online research. In the computer-
mediated context, it is clear that not only the meaning of persons activities is 
negotiated, but so too is the context and environment. This is not unlike any 
other socia.l context for human interaction, however the computer-mediated 
environment bestows new salience to this important element. In this case, 
analysis must consider the online medium as an instrumental, not merely 
coincidental, element to the processes of social interaction 
Fifth, methods and analysis should include mechanisms that allow for 
considerations of change, process, and stability (Denzin 1989). The process of 
data collection must be more than one momentary slice of time. Analysis must 
consider mechanisms of process--that is, how phenomena not only emerge, but 
evolve, transform, and change. Furthermore, no matter how fluid and 
indeterminate human activity may become, there is always some degree of 
stability (or perceived stability). In the online context, analysis must examine 
where and how stable aspects of social interaction emerge and are maintained 
to produce an environment for human activity. 
Finally, it is important to incorporate the use of sensitizing concepts 
(Denzin 1989). Sensitizing concepts are critical to any form of ethnographic-
naturalistic methodology. Where applicable, preexisting and well established 
concepts will be used to convey meaning to the reader. Elsewhere it may be 
necessary to suggest new concepts to convey something entirely new. 
However, in either case meaning is defined in relation to the understandings 
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that participants attribute to the phenomena. This is equivalent to saying that 
concepts and understandings are grounded in the activities and interpretations 
.j;• 
of participants themselves, and should sensitize the reader to what is examined. 
Limitations of Naturalistic Methods in the Online Context 
As with any enthnographic-naturalistic method, observation and 
interviewing techniques are the primary skills and tools implemented. However, 
due to the unique context of data collection fundamental methodological 
simi'larities and differences between the online context and other more 
traditional contexts of data collection must be noted. Like any other method of 
data collection, this study contains special problems, some of which are related 
to the ethnographic-naturafistic methods employed, while others are related to 
' 
the unique qualities of the on line world itself. The two most serious problems 
posed by ethnographic-naturalistic methods in the context of online chat is the 
problem of third-:order interpretations and the problem of direct observation. 
This study is not particularly interested in "things" or behaviors 
themselves. Rather, "things" and behavidrs become relevant to analysis as they 
are grasped and shaped through the meaning-conferring response of 
participants (Emerson 1988). In short, this study is a description of meanings as 
made manifest in the activities of people. To the extent that all ethnographies 
seek to provide "thick descriptions" of, meaning, all ethnographies struggle with 
the problems of second-order interpretations--interpretations of participants 
interpretations; or in Geertz's (1988) terms, "our own constructions of other 
people's constructions of what they and their compatriots are up to (1988 pp. 
42)." For this reason, ethnographies are often criticized as "second-order" 
interpretations--that is, the researchers theoretically guided interpretation of a 
participants interpretation of what is going on. 
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The problem of second-order interpretation is further compounded in 
online environment. Because ethnographic-natura1istic studies of online 
environments are necessarily computer-mediated, it is at best a third-order 
interpretation. For example, although observation and interviewing are primary 
methods of data collection, simple questions as to what is being observed and 
who is being interviewed are fundamentally unclear in the context of online 
social worlds. In spite of all the words and textual representations of action, 
such presentations are not simply narrative, and yet like narrative they are 
devoid of all that can be heard or seen. The "data" of an electronic ethnography 
is exactly what transpires (i.e. to save the text of an online interaction or an 
online interview is to capture everything that was communicated), yet such texts 
are not the embodiment of on line interaction--they are merely the third-order 
remains of it. This seemingly contradictory statement is best illustrated by Reid 
(1994): 
"It is not a text, but a context. Virtual Interaction loses emotional and 
social meaning when transposed to a computer file and re-read. 
Pauses, breaks, disjunctions, speed and timing of virtual conversations 
are lost in such transposition; and such factors are a crucial signifier of 
meaning and context (pp. 26)." . 
Conveying these important expressions of meaning conferring behavior 
(an explicit goal of any ethnography) is greatly compounded within the online 
context due to; (1) the narrow band-width of information transmission (the vast 
entourage of verbal and non-verbal face-to-face and contextual information that 
is usually critical to the production of a superior ethnography, is simply not 
available), and (2) the computer-mediated nature of the context. Both of these 
conditions serve to further remove the ethnographer from the context of what is 
being studied, a situation non-conducive to producing quality ethnographic 
works. The online environment is fundamentally a computer-mediated narrow 
59 
band-width of interaction, and all that can be captured for the purposes of 
analysis are the remains of interactions that once transpired . 
.t.~ 
In an effort to partially overcome this problem, this research proceeds in a 
"empirically theoretical" manner. That is, the intent of this study is not to provide 
a "thick ~escription" (Geertz 1988) of the online environment, but to advance 
understandings (which are by nature conceptual and/or theoretical), and to do 
so in an empirically grounded fashion. Ideas are the focus of this research, yet 
ideas presented will not simply be measured against reason, but supported with 
empirical illustration. Hence, no arbitrary distinction is made between what is 
traditionally called "data" and "discussion," and no effort is made to "capture a 
slice" of the online ethnographic world. Rather, data and discussion are 
presented as inseparable elements of what this research represents--an 
, 
"empirically theoretical" interpretation of the online context. 
A second and related problem posed by the use of ethnographic-
naturalistic methods in the o,nline context is the unavailability of direct 
observation. Persons in the online context are not immediately accessible, and 
cannot be directly observed. Whatever "data" that can be gathered about 
persons and their interactions is necessarily computer-mediated. Because the 
context is computer-mediated, data collection often assumes qualities similar to 
other mediated forms of data collection (most notably, survey methods). Without 
direct access to the person, one simply cannot be assured that information 
provided or observed is accurate14. Like mail surveys, persons can choose to 
respond to a researchers questions, or ignore the survey altogether. Like 
phone surveys, persons can choose to respond to a researchers questions, or 
simply "hang-up." Worse yet, like all survey methods persons can answer 
questions honestly, or dishonestly, and there is no direct observation to verify 
the validity of responses. 
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To overcome this problem, an ethnomethodological interpretative 
approach is employed. This research makes no attempt to devise a "measure" 
.,. 
of validity, nor does this research merely take participants reports as "fact" (as 
"real" events that stand outside of the phenomena being described). Rather, 
participants reports and observations of their doings are conceptually 
apprehended as inevitably embedded in, and a part of, the phenomena under 
study (Emerson 1988). That is, the reports of participants and observations of 
their doings in the online context are apprehended as "accounts" --not merely 
descriptions. 
In summary, the methods of this study primarily rely on observational 
skills and interviewing techniques that are like an ethnography, yet does not 
proceed with the same explicit go'als of traditional ethnographic work. The 
focus of this study is to suggest a conceptual approach toward interpreting 
online interaction, identifying characteristics of selves and social worlds that 
emerge in the online context, and suggest implications that these findings have 
for off-line self-social world relationships of contemporary everyday life, Hence, 
the focus of this study is theoretical-conceptual, yet these ideas are sustained 
with empirical observations and interview data. 
Research Context 
Data was collected in multiple online contexts including the World Wide 
Web, Inter-Relay Chat, small bulletin board systems, and commercial online 
servers. The immense diversity of these elements of the Net poses practical 
limitations. For this reason, this research focuses on online contexts where 
persons communicate with others in "real-time" (when persons communicate in 
the immediate present, rather than in "delayed-time," which would include such 
things as e-mail or usenet). A focus on "real-time" communication environments 
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is not only practical, but theoretically sustained. That is, in theoretical terms the 
most explicit context in which the emergence of selves and social worlds may 
.. 
be observed are those situations where persons are interacting with others in 
an ongoing process of interactive communication. Only "real-time" online 
communications readily meets this condition. 
However, "real-time" computer-mediated communications also display 
remarkable diversity.. We can generally distinguish between "game-oriented" 
and "chat-oriented" real-time communications. Game-oriented real-time 
communications are interactions between persons that emerge in the process 
of "playing" online games that are loosely referred to as MUD's and MOO's1s. 
These real-time game-oriented social activities have been the focus of the 
majority of the sparse literature in the area of recreational online interaction. 
However, game-oriented real-time communications are at least influenced, if 
not structured by the explicit and implicit rules of the game. They are by nature 
fantasy role-playing activities, and "being in character" is part of the game. 
Furthermore, the social worlds that emerge in these contexts are at least 
partially determined by the context of the game itself. Although participants in 
these games ean construct their owri contexts for play, for all practical purposes 
the social world is predefined--it is a prepared context in which persons can 
role-play for the sake of the game. For these reasons, game-oriented real-time 
communications are of less interest than the unstructured chat-oriented forms of 
real-time communication. 
Chat-oriented real-time communications is the focus of this research. In 
real-time chat people interact with one another for the sake of interacting alone, 
sometimes for related ulterior purposes (i.e. to obtain specific information, to 
achieve sexual arousal, etc). However, with the exception of limitations posed 
by the medium, nothing in a chat environment is "given." Persons can, for all 
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practical purposes, say anything and in the process construct any kind of self or 
social world imaginable. Chat systems represent a no-holds-barred orgy of 
-~' 
directionless communication, and therefore represent an ideal environment to 
examine the emergence of self and social worlds in the context of computer-
mediated interaction. 
Although data were gathered from numerous ontine chat environments, 
one large Nation-wide commercial online service was chosen as the primary 
context for research, all other sources of information were used to supplement 
and extend upon data collected from this one source1e. The selected 
commercial online service is available to customers for a monthly fee, and an 
additional hourly fee. This service was chosen because it is one of the largest 
of many "charter busses" on the information super-highway, providing access to 
a variety of information and services, and is immensely popular as a particularly 
user-friendly means of interacting witli others ir(the sometimes daunting 
computer-mediated world of cyberspace. 
Additionally, Inter-Relay Chat, bulletin board services from around the 
world, dimensions of the World Wide Web, and several other chat-environments 
are considered and used to expand findings beyond the context of this one 
chosen commercial server. Data from these sources supplement findings in 
ways that are not necessarily included within the chosen commercial server, or 
best illustrate ideas in ways not covered in tt,e selected commercial server. 
Methods 
Four methods of data collection were used. First, a rough form of content 
analysis was used to analyze information provided by chat participants. Some 
chat environments allow a participant to report information about themselves to 
be freely accessed by others. These "profiles" are a summary of basic 
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demographic and personal information that are available to anyone within the 
system. A sample of one hundred chat participants was obtained and content 
,. 
analysis was used as an analytical tool for describing the information provided. 
Second, a survey was distributed to online chat participants. A 
convenient sample of volunteers was given an electronic survey sent to their e-
mail address. Fifty-eight surveys were collected. The primary intent of the e-
mail survey was to obtain personal information on the meaning and uses of chat 
environments and the sense of self that emerges through online interaction. 
Because some online participants have ulterior reasons for interacting online 
(which does not include answering researchers questions), and some 
participants pay by the hour for the time they spend in these environments, the 
e-mail survey is more a matter of convenience for the participant than of 
. . 
methodological importance. In short, the e-survey allowed participants to 
answer questions at their leisure. while off-line, and hence not paying for that 
time. The questions asked in tne e-survey are contained in Appendix B. 
The third methodology is participant observation. The author created 
screen names (and where applicable, an accurate "profile" reflective of 
research intent) a.nd entered chat areas, observing what transpires and learning 
as much as possible about how users communicate within such environments. 
Participant observation was central to this study, and tasted over three years. 
Sometimes participant observation was explicitly intended for research 
purposes. At those times the research intent was clearly stated, and consent of 
participants to record and collect data was obtained. At other times, the 
researcher simply partieipated--chatting with others with no ulterior research 
motive. During these' times no data were collected, however insights and 
understandings were gained and proved invaluable to the analysis of online 
chat. In the end, what emerged methodologically were sets of observations and 
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interview questions that were informed from insights gained from being a 
participant in these chat environments. 
Often participant observation became a time consuming task of learning 
the rules of conduct, and how to manipulate the user interface and software 
necessary to effectively communicate in various online chat environments. 
Once proficient with these mechanical processes, considerable time was 
devoted to the context. In all cases, the author became an accepted member of 
the online chat environment--often known and recognized by the "regulars." 
Through carefully maintained rapport and trust, which was often completely 
informed by my insider status, data collection would sometimes begin. In some 
cases, however, data collection was deemed inappropriate and discontinued17. 
The fourth methodology is open-ended interviews. Throughout the 
project a convenient sample of key informants was obtained for open-ended 
online interviews concerning both the context of online chat and the emergence 
of self. This proved to be the most important method of data collection, as most 
of the data presented in this study came from these interviews. A total of forty-
two interviews were conducted. Although all interviews were open-ended, 
several questions were used to warm~up the participant, and create a set of 
responses for the development of more probing questions (see Appendix B). 
Throughout the interview process, participant selection and interviewing 
techniques utilized the methods of naturalistic inquiry. As detailed in the 
following sections. 
Selection of Participants 
This study does not seek a "representative sample" from a broader 
"population" of well defined "subjects." Frankly, such aims would be difficult 
(probably impossible) to achieve given the current nature of online 
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environments (i.e. there isn't even a reasonable way of assessing how many 
persons are online, let alone how many of them frequent chat environments, or 
,, 
what characteristics define that particular population. Therefore, no sampling 
frame can be obtained and therefore this is no means of devising or assessing 
a "representative" sample.). For .these reasons, traditional methods of sampling 
for interview participants were abandoned. Alternatively, this study adopts the 
sampling suggestions outlined by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Lincoln and 
Guba (1985). 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest four guidelines to research sampling 
that stem from the methods of naturalistic inquiry. These guidelines serve as 
the basis of the sampling design of this study. First, according to Lincoln and 
Guba preplanned or "a priori specification" of the sample presumes too much 
and yields to the bias of generalization sampling. In traditional sampling 
techniques, a homogeneous sampling frame is drawn often to fit the needs of 
the researcher. Lincoln and Guba argue that this process conveniently 
eliminates confounding or conflicting situational data. As samples are drawn to 
reflect homogeneity for purposes of better ipferences, the contextual elements 
of the sample grow more similar.· In opposition, the goal of naturalistic inquiry is 
maximum variation--to attain as many diverse elements of the research 
phenomena for exploration and analysis. 
Second, the goal of maximum variation is best met with a selection 
procedure that allows successive participants to be chosen in order to gather 
data and fill missing information. Each participant was selected to fill in gaps in 
the data. Special attention was given to contrasting information, or data that 
extends information previously provided. In this study participants were 
selected within the scope of this methodological goal. 
Third, in the process of data collection and analysis the sampling 
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techniques become successively honed and refocused. That is, different 
respondents with different perspectives were soug~~ as dictated by the needs of 
the ongoing research. To do this, analysis and data collection occurred 
concurrently. The selection of participants was refined as was necessary to 
accommodate the needs of emergent analysis. This involved several stages of 
data collection and analysis, a refocusing of interview aims and persons 
selected. 
Lastly, this research followed th·e principle ofselection to the point of 
redundancy. By far, this principal proved to be the most useful concept of 
naturalistic inquiry. Data collection continued to the point of saturation, where 
participants provided no new information. In each area of analysis, interviews 
and other forms of data collection continued until there was complete saturation 
of information and the researcher could not derive any more useful information 
from participants. 
These guidelines, however, do not specify how one should find potential 
participants. What Lincoln and Guba (1985) do suggest is to b.e fluid and open 
to multiple possibilities--to go where the action is, so to speak. Consequently, 
this research involved numerous chat areas of the Net including; the World 
Wide Web, national online servers, local bulletin board services, and any other 
online "place" where people meet to "chat" Once a location was determined, 
participants were asked if they would voluntarily participate in this project by 
answering a few questions. If they choose to participate, they were given a 
description of the research, guaranteed confidentiality and anonymity (see 
Appendix A), and once they provided consent an open ended interview 
followed. 
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Interviewing 
The study utilized the unstructured and non-,~tandardized interview 
processes described by Lincoln & Guba (1981) and Denzin (1989). This 
interview technique does not entail the use of preestablished set of questions, 
and maximizes the flexibility suggested by the method of naturalistic inquiry. 
Interviews began with a few simple questions (i.e. "how often do you chat?"), 
and moved to more reflective questions (i.e. "to what extent do you think people 
modify who they are when chatting with others online?"), but ultimately 
interviews followed an emergent structure based on probing questions from the 
participants previous responses (i.e. "do you ever change your presentation of 
self while chatting?" "why?" etc.). Instead of a set agenda of questions, this 
research sought to find topics that each respondent was particularly willing and 
able to discuss, and maximized the collection of that information. 
All interviews were conducted in private by the author. No other 
participants were able to see or record data provided in interviews. Immediately 
following each interview, the text was recorded and the screen name of the 
respondent was replaced with a pseudo-name. No record of screen names or 
pseudo-names was kept. For all practical purposes, after the pseudo-name 
was assigned even the researcher could no longer identify participants from the 
recorded interviews. 
Actual Data and Research Findings 
Online interaction involves a form of communication that is a combination 
of written and spoken word (as will be discussed in the next chapter). Because 
of this unique quality, there are three related issues that make "actual data" from 
online interactions difficult to use for research findings, often requiring some 
modification. First, what participants actually type to one another, and how 
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these messages appear do not adhere to syntax of printed English. In online 
chat, grammatical conventions are secondary to thy spontaneity of discussion. 
This can lead to some confusion when reading online data in printed text. 
Further compounding matters, chat participants utilize syntax to convey 
meaning that is sometimes different than what these conventions mean in 
printed text form. For example, ellipses are used by chat participants to suggest 
long pauses (i.e. "I'm not sure ... maybe you are right"). However to literally quote 
this "actual data" exactly as it appears would mislead the reader by suggesting 
that the researcher has cut out part of what the participant said (which is not the 
case). 
Secondly, participants in chat environments are not particularly attentive 
to proper spelling. Like syntax, misspellings and typos are usually tolerated in 
order to sustain an environment of spontaneous discussion. Sometimes these 
misspellings are intentional phonetic spellings (for example "what's up" is 
sometimes phonetically spelled "wazzup?"). As opposed to these stylistic 
conventions, some misspellings and typos are unintentional and can hinder 
effective understanding of what the participant is saying. 
Finally, oriline chat environments almost always entail a multiplicity of 
simultaneous conversations. When there is a multiplicity of simultaneous 
discussions, the messages that appear on one line of chat communication may 
or may not be related to what appears in the previous or following lines. As a 
consequence, one often must sift through numerous unrelated messages in 
order to follow any one of many ongoing conversations. Literally quoting data 
from these discussions would inevitably lead to the inclusion of numerous 
unrelated messages. Following these literal quotes would certainly be 
distractive to the reader. More importantly, these "other messages" are not 
likely to have any bearing on the point that is being made. 
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For these reasons, the findings in this study were modified for research 
purposes. However, at no time was the wording or meaning altered in any way . 
./';' 
Grammar and syntax were translated from the meaning conveyed in a chat 
environment to the same meaning in printed text (except where grammar and 
syntax were used stylistically) to aid in effective communication of what the 
participant was saying. Syntax with specific meaning in the online context (i.e. 
ellipses) were replaced with the proper syntax for printed text (commas, periods, 
dashes, etc.). Like spoken interviews that require that the researcher add 
punctuation, online text must be modified in this way in ord~r to be effectively 
used as findings in any study. Finally, in cases where data were collected from 
situations that involved multiple online discussions, all irrelevant messages 
were deleted from the quoted findings. The researcher does not believe that 
any of these modifications are in any way a form of "massaging" the data. 
These modifications are merel"Y deemed necessary to the translation of actual 
data into research findings. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The findings of this study are organized into four parts. Admittedly, 
dividing the findings of this study into "parts" is an arbitrary imposition of order--it 
is not, however, with out reason. This study aims to be empirically theoretical, 
which is to say that the primary objective is conceptual--introducing a set of 
understandings to account computer-mediated symbolic interaction in the 
context of online chat. Empirical observations are simply the grounded means 
by which theoretical arguments, suggested terms, and constructs will be 
sustained. Findings will be divided into four parts, each stem from the 
theoretical framework discussed in chapter two. 
Part one, entitled "The Medium is the Message," builds from the assertion 
that forms of selfhood, and experiences of ones social world are influenced by 
the means in which they are produced. Air self and social world experiences 
are mediated; online environments just happen to be computer-mediated. 
Consequently, this part seeks to briefly describe the processes of online chat, 
and highlight important dimensions of the computer medium as they translate 
into elements of emergent forms of online selfhood. 
Part two, "Constraints and Creativity," is intended to be the antithesis of a 
body of literature in computer-mediated communication often referred to as 
"cues-filtered out." The "cues filtered out" perspective argues that computer-
mediated environments deny contextual, interpersonal, and emotional cues, 
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and therefore hinder meaningful social interaction. "Cues filtered out" is a form 
of computer determinism that assumes the computer itself posits the causal link 
,, 
between limitations of the computer-mediated environment and a host of social 
communicative outcomes. This part explicitly illustrates the opposite in chat 
environments. It is argued that limitations of the medium represent a structure 
by which chat participants focus creative communication efforts. By creating 
imaginative means for overcoming the limitations of the medium, participants 
latently establish an ideoculture that serves to identify members of the online 
"electropolis" (Reid 1991 ), and distinguishes chat participants as a unique 
group. 
Part three, "Translating Self to the Conventions of the Medium" begins 
with a theoretical distinction. Selfhood entails two separate processes: the 
designation of an agent; and the endowment of agency. To have a self (in any 
context), one must have a designated agent--a recognizable form of 
personhood. To this agent, agency is attributed. That is, meanings are 
bestowed to the agent in a process of human interaction. Given this framework, 
this part seeks to explore how agency is bestowed to the online agent. The 
form and major characteristics of online interaction (from which agency is 
bestowed) is used to describe the nature of "cyberselfhood." 
Part four, entitled "Negotiations of Reality," is perhaps the most important 
component to this study. With considerable time devoted to the examination of 
the online chat environments and computer-mediated forms of selfhood, it is 
necessary to broaden findings to include analysis of off-line self-social world 
relationships. In this part, findings and analysis will refocuses on the 
generalized nature of self-social world relationships in lieu of participant 
experiences of online chat environments. Because chat participants frequently 
find themselves unexpectedly amidst a culturally based ideological conflict of 
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competing self interpretations, how participants negotiate this conflict, and thus 
define the reality of selfhood is key to our understa~ding of online chat 
environments and how these experiences inform the contemporary experiences 
of self and social world. 
PART ONE 
The Medium is the Message: The Mechanics of Chat and the 
Designation of Online Agents 
" ... the medium is the message. This is merely to say that the personal 
and social consequences of any medium ... result from the new scale that 
is introduced into our affairs by each extension of ourselves or by any 
new technology (McLuhan 1964 pp. 7)." 
Online "chat" is a relatively simple process of communication. 
Participants access a chat system, select a chat channel, and proceed to type 
messages to one another. G9ining access to a chat system is a matter of 
deciding what online service(s) one is going to subscribe to. A direct Internet 
connection provides users access to lnterRelayChat (IRC), while online 
commercial servers (such as America Online, Compuserve, E-World, etc) 
contain similar self-contained services that are often called "chat rooms." 
Although each chat system contains different user interfaces, they all function 
about the same. The differences between the various services is usually just a 
matter of size, number of other chat participants, and user friendliness of the 
interface. 
Once access is obtained, participants then select a chat channel to 
participate. To aid participants in this selection, each chat channel is identified 
by a name that functions to define the context of communication and is therefore 
indicative of the content of the conversations. For example, to go to a chat 
channel entitled "Christian Fellowship" is to know the context and general 
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content of communication. Participants of the system create chat channels with 
a simple procedure that involves little more than designating a label to a 
J;' 
particular chat environment. The name of each channel is listed for all 
members within the system, and one may view this listing at any time. The 
number of available channels can range from dozens to thousands depending 
on the system (i.e. a local bulletin board service may contain five to ten chat 
areas, America Online may contain up to a thousand chat rooms, and IRC may 
contain more than five thousand chat channels). Consequently, the user-
selected descriptive label applied to the channel is an important outward cue to 
what people are chatting about and provides an important basis for choosing 
which channel to participate in. 
Once one or more channels are chosen, participants may interact with 
one or all members within the selected chat environment(s). Each person on 
the system is identified by a self-selected screen name (in some systems these 
names are called "nicks," which is short for "nickname"), and each channel 
contains a listing of all screen names within the chat room. Hence, participants 
always know who (as identified by screen name) they are communicating with 
in the channel. 
Communication within chat channels is syncronistic. All persons can 
immediately and simultaneously contribute to online conversation(s) by typing 
messages and clicking icons. Within seconds the message and the screen 
name of the sender will appear on the computer monitor of all other persons in 
the channel. Additionally, private channels of communication are also 
available. These private channels allow participants to send messages directly 
to other participants without persons in the channel "over hearing" (this is 
analogous to whispering in a persons ear while at a party, except in chat 
environments one may "whisper in the ears" of many persons at the same time). 
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Participants in the channel can simply watch the conversation(s) scroll up the 
computer screen, joining when (and if) they choose. By these means people 
.. 
carry on lively discussions on almost any imaginable topic. 
Synchronisity: A Structure for Multiplicity 
To say that online chat is synchronistic is to say that all persons 
communicate simultaneously, and may do so through several different means 
(in the channel, in multiple channels, through private messages, etc.). Imagine 
a text recording of a lively party where various statements are printed in text 
form in the order by which they are received to the recorder. The resulting text 
would be a disjointed set of messages-"'.each individual message may or may 
not be related to the previous or the following. Although th~re may be a known 
order to the messages among various participants, the convolution of 
conversations creates a condition where, when read literally from top to bottom, 
the transcript would not necessarily make reasonable sense. Online chat 
environments frequently resemble this hypothetical situation. Syncronisity 
compromises the linearity of communication due to the potential for numerous 
conversations through a single mode of communication, and the absence of 
taken-for-granted ethnomethological means for sustaining a communication 
order (eye gestures, vocal cues, gestures, etc.). 
In the sycronistic chat environment conversations easily become 
disjointed and quickly dropped, perhaps to be continued later, or to be forgotten 
altogether. Furthermore, within the syncronistic chat environment it is not 
unusual for multiple conversations to occur simultaneously. To illustrate, 
consider the following conversation from a chat channel entitled "tarot" ( the left 
hand column identifies the screen name, the message follows the colons): 
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Trudygal 
ASK4U 
OSusanna 
Wash cycle 
OSusanna 
DogsAime 
Trudygal 
SKYHOOK 
Washcycle 
Trudygal 
Washcycle 
Amulet 
SKYHOOK· 
PVC DC 
Trudygal 
: what goes on in here I am a virgin to all of this 
: you got cards savannah? 
: I don't have to be a psychic to ,accurately tell fortunes, no 
one does · 
: that's what they all say Trudy 
: It's just a matter of a good guess 
: Is anyone available to do a reading?? 
: no really I am 
: Oh Trudy, never tell that to anyone in here! 
:.There are official readings 9-12pm ET 
: why?? 
: and just chat rest of time 
: hey trudy once you get the bill you wont be a virgin 
anymore!!!! 
: I hear SysSage is reading, DogsAime 
: who does the readings? 
: I am already fearing that 
Multiple conversations frequently occur simultaneously and breakdown 
the taken-for-granted linearity of normative communication. In the above 
illustration, "Trudygal" makes a statement that three lines later "Washcycle" 
responds to. On the seventh line "Trudygal" responds to "Washcycle's" 
comment, at which point "SKYHOOK'' responds to "Trudygal" on the eighth line. 
All the while, "OSusanna" carries on di.scussions between various other 
participants in a conversation of a different nature. This kind of syncronistic 
communication is typical and continues on-and-on with each successive 
statement eliciting responses from any one or more persons within the channel 
at any given time. 
"Private messaging" further contributes to the sychronistic experience of 
online chat. While much of the communication within chat channels is available 
for all to view and participate, there are other channels of communication which 
allow privacy. Private messages are communications sent from one user to 
another but do not appear in the "public" text of the channel. Private messages 
can be sent and/or received by anyone in the chat system regardless of what 
channel(s) they are participating in. Since there is no limit to the number of 
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private messages that one may send or receive, private messages allow for 
tremendous flexibility in online chat communication. Users can simultaneously 
.t· 
communicate with others who are not in the same channel, they may have 
numerous private message conversations occurring at the same time, and may 
participate in the conversation that is occurring within the room as well. 
Private messages are widely utilized, and in conjunction with the "public" 
communication in the chat channel creates a party-like atmosphere. As stated 
by one participant, "I feel like I'm talking to the whole world. It's like I'm invited to 
a party all over the c:ountry." In more ways than one, online chat becomes an 
orgy of communication. 
The multiple-syncronistic nature of onnne chat is an important element of 
the chat environment. The syncronisity of online chat communication 
encourages and sustains a multiplicity of simultaneous conversations. 
Furthermore, by use of private messages persons can participate in a chat 
environment, while also communicating with numerous others in any number of 
other on-going conversations atthe same time. Therefore, not only is the chat 
itself syncronistic, but individual participants can converse syncronistically with 
a variety of others through multiple means. In short, the very structure of the 
online chat environment is multiply-syncronistic. 
The Designation of Self. in Online Chat: Creating Online Agents 
In the online chat environment, participants utilize numerous 
mechanisms for creating and presenting online self-agents. One important 
initial element in the creation of online agents is the designation of a screen 
name. Self-selected screen names are initially influential in determining the 
nature of interaction (Bechar-lsraeli 1995; Meyers 1987). When communicating 
in a chat environment, all participants know which other screen names are in 
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the channel and all communication is associated with the screen name of the 
message sender. 
Although persons can designate any screen name they choose, there 
are a few technical limitations. First, a screen name is usually limited to nine 
characters or less (some chat systems allow for spaces in the screen name, 
while others do not). Secondly, not all characters on the keyboard can be used 
in the designation of a screen name. Usually screen names are limited to the 
upper and lower case letters of the Roman alphabet, the numbers O through 9, 
hyphens, lines, the symbol A, and brackets (however, this also varies according 
to the chat system, as many only allow letters and numbers). Finally, no two 
persons can have the same screen name at the same time on the same system. 
Within these limitations, the range of screen names is enormous. 
Since a person's online existence and identity must be condensed into a 
single word or phrase, participants will often attempt to make these 
representational elements as prominent as possible (Bechat-lsraeli 1995). 
Therefore, screen names are a critical element in participants presentation of an 
online self agent. In fact, they are the only initial means by which participants 
can say who or what they are in literally one word or phrase (Bechar-lsraeli 
1995). 
Names in general are under examined as important elements in the 
projection of meaning. Yet, understanding elements of the construction of 
online agents necessitates an understanding of the importance of names. 
Although a screen name may consist of a mere word or phrase, as Haya 
Bechar-lsraeli (1995) illustrates, names can evoke complex meanings and 
images. For example, we often choose names to neutralize frightening or 
unfamiliar objects and occurrences to minimize negative connotations (i.e. 
calling the Lock Ness monster "Nessy," as if it were a cute little kitty. Or, the 
78 
practice of calling hurricanes by human names). A name may be used to glorify 
(i.e. to call a ship the "Queen Elizabeth"). Some na!Tles can carry such strong 
connotations that they become concepts in their own right (i.e. McCarthyism). In 
short, names are an important part of an individuals sense of self and how they 
are perceived by others (Bechar-lsraeli 1995; Strauss 1969), and participants in 
chat systems are acutely aware and manipulate the meanings that can be 
conveyed by the designation of a screen name. 
As chat participants designate, change, and play with screen names they 
engage_ in the initial elements of an identity game. That is, by designating a 
screen name, participants associate themselves with a label. Many screen 
names are neutral labels, but others serve as important indicators of interests 
and motives for interaction. As indicated by content analysis of member 
profiles, in many cases screen names are simple derivatives of the persons 
supposed real name. For example a screen name such as "M1che1e" is 
presumably based upon the users real first name "Michelle." Likewise, many 
screen names indicate location:· For example, "MrMaine" communicates the 
geographic location of the person; Similarly, screen names may also be based 
on the person's hobbies and interests. For example "GuitarPickn" indicates the 
persons interests in guitars and guitar playing. Other screen names are based 
on the person's occupation. For example "TeachMan" is suggestive of a male 
teacher. As can be expected, some screen names are based on life styles. For 
example "VegDiet" is an indication of a vegetarian. Not surprisingly there are a 
number of screen names that are based on an individual's motives for online 
interaction. For example a screen name such as "PhoneFun4u" is indicative of 
the users interests in obtaining potential contacts for phone sex. Likewise, a 
screen name such as "DarkElf" is suggestive of participants online gaming 
motives. 
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Regardless of its foundation, to designate a screen name is to associate 
oneself with a label. Because users have the power to create their own screen 
):' 
names, these labels become important self-selected components in the 
presentation of an online self. Furthermore, because of the absence of a 
physical body, screen names are "transformed into trademarks, distinctive 
individual smells by which their users are recognized (Meyers 1987 pp. 240)." 
Without physical presence, screen names are important means by which 
persons communicate qualities of selfhood that are normally observed (i.e. 
gender, age, geographic location, etc.), or otherwise discerned by interactive 
cues (i.e. hobbies, occupations, status, etc). 
The inaccessibility of information about others in the online context that 
would normally be observed in face-to-face interaction may be contrasted to the 
kind of interactions that became central to the work of Erving Goffman. Goffman 
(1959) emphasized that in the course of interaction persons convey two sets of 
impressions; impressions "given" and impressions "given-off." That is, persons 
intentionally give information to othersabout themselves, and unintentionally 
give-off other information. Usually, expressions given-off support the 
impressions persons give. However, when they do not a person's presentation 
of self may be jeopardized. Thus, expressions given-off often operate as a 
control mechanisms over the impressions given. However, when interacting 
with others in the online context only one type of information is initially provided-
-information that a person wishes to "give"--whether fictional or fantasy (Bechar-
lsraeli 1995), and other participants do not have access to anything else (at 
least initially). Consequently, screen names become one initial and important 
element of a participants selected presentation of self. 
However, designating a screen name is simply one facet of the 
presentation of an on line self. Presentation of an online self occurs in a manner 
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similar to face-to-face interaction. A self must be presented, negotiated, and 
validated in an ongoing process of interaction. Consider the following: 
,. 
RedWines 
LeFetes 
EdsFerret 
RedWines 
Doc Nut 
Red Wines 
RedWines 
Eds Ferret 
DocNut 
LeFetes 
Eds Ferret 
Doc Nut 
EdsFerret 
DocNut 
Eds Ferret 
LeFetes 
Red Wines 
RedWines 
LeFetes 
LeFetes 
Eds Ferret 
LeFetes · 
LeFetes 
Ball 0 
EdsFerret 
LeFetes 
LeFetes 
Eds Ferret 
Ball 0 
AndyCapps 
EdsFerret 
Ball 0 
Ball 0 
AndyCapps 
Ball 0 
Ball 0 
: Let's have an age/sex check 
: 24/F 
: <-------26 F 
: 20/f 
: 27/m 
: How about a state check? 
:MD 
:OH 
:Ml 
: FL 
: What is your occupation Doctor??? 
: psychologist. ... YIKESII! 
: Oh, no I already feel like I'm being analyzed 
: where ya from EdsFerret?? 
: Toledo, Ohio·. 
: Hey RedWines, what do you do? 
: I work with retarded adults 
: and what do you do? 
: I'm a secretary? 
: ... and I play th.e guitar . 
: Hello, LeFetes. is that a French name? 
: Actually I'm Italian 
: ... But my moms French 
: Hi everyone! 
: That's neat, do you know French? 
: me oui moin ami 
:yes 
: moi aussi aujourd hui. 
: Any college students here? 
: Yes, Miami Univ. in OH 
: The University of Toledo . 
: Univ. CA, San Diego 
: What are you studying, Andy? 
: Accounting. and you? 
: Psych 
: I'm learning to mess with people's minds. 
Conversations typically begin, and continue as illustrated above. 
Because chat environments are disembodied, simple elements of selfhood that 
are normally observed in face-to-face interaction--elements embedded in ones 
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physical being (i.e. gender)--must be presented and validated to others. Once 
participants have stated an age, gender and perhaps a few other demographic 
!,' 
variables, conversations are quickly formulated (as illustrated above). If 
participants want more information on any given person, or if they doubt the 
statements that someone is making, then a_ participants profiles can be obtained 
(this is possible only in some chat systems--not all chat environments allow for 
"profiles"). Therefore, "user profiles" provide another potential means by which 
participants present a selected self. Take for example the following profile of 
one of the participants in the above conversation: 
Screen Name: Ball O 
Member Name: Sabrina 
Location: Santa , CA 
Birthdate: 1-28-76 
Sex: Female 
Marital Status~ Single 
Computers: PC486DX33 · 
Hobbies: Music,· pool · 
Occupation: UCSD student 
Quote: "Jesus is coming .... look busy!" 
With information provided to others while interacting in chat channels, 
supplemented wit!i cues potentially derived from a participants' screen name 
and "profile," an online performance attains meaning. In other words, a 
"cyberself" agent is designated. 
In short, a self is a performance that includes a set of situational 
meanings that are derived from any meaning conferring action. In the absence 
of face-to-face indicators, participants designate and present a self agent by use 
of (1) screen names that are often descriptive self-selected labels, (2) through 
information provided in "profiles," but ultimately the online self agent emerges 
through (3) interaction with others (the processes of which will be detailed in 
part three). That is, screen names and profiles may be elements of online self 
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expression, but ultimately selfhood emerges through a process of 
communication in the chat environment. Thus, on one hand, the emergence of 
,!':• 
self in the online context is nothing new--it is a form of selfhood that emerges 
the same as any other form of self. Yet, on the other hand, "the medium is the 
message (McLuhan 1964 pp. 7)." Networks--or systems of carrying information-
-are not transparent (Woolley 1993). Online chat environments, like television, 
are not windows to another world--they do not simply show its audience 
pictures of events that happen to be taking place somewhere else. Rather, like 
television, the online chat environment itself has a role in determining what 
people see and how they interpret it. Elements of the online chat environment 
(the medium of communication) fundamentally alter the nature of human 
interaction, presenting a new range and scope of human interaction. Although 
' 
an online self-agent is designated like any other form of self, the medium by 
which this form of selfhood is enacted (the online context) allows users a new 
range of agency that can be attributed to this unique self-agent (as will be 
discussed in the next sections). 
PART TWO 
Constraints and Creativity: Emoticons and ldioculture 
Online chat is text based, and therefore contains no communicative cues 
of physical presence. There is no eye contact, voice tones, physical gestures, 
or any other traditional enthnomethodological means for maintaining a taken for 
granted communication order. Consequently, non-linear multiply-sycronistic 
communications, combined with the absence of communication cues of 
physical presence, presents constraints and limitations to the process of 
communication. These conditions pose certain difficulties to chat participants: 
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"Conversations can easily become disjointed. It's often difficult to keep 
up with what's going on." 
t· 
"I dislike the fact that you can't communicate emotion in text. This often 
leads to problems with members reading something into the text that isn't 
there." 
Problems like these are endemic to the multiply:-syncronistic and 
disembodied online chat environment. These and other limitations have been 
identified by some scholars of computer-mediated communication who argue 
that the constraints of the medium hinder communication (see Walther and 
Burgoon 1992;.Baron 1984; Cheseboro and Bonsall 1989; Kiester, Siegel, and 
McGuire 1984; Rice 1989; 1984). Because computer-mediated communication 
environments deny physical presence and related social cues, this approach is 
sometimes called "cues filtered-out." From this perspective, the lack of 
contextual, interpersonal, and social cues produce nurnerous interrelated 
outcomes that exert causal influence on communicative outcomes. 
Overwhelmingly, scholars of the "cues filtered out" perspective derive 
evidence from experimental research on task-oriented activities in 
organizational and occupational contexts. These were among the first 
researchers intrigued by computer-mediated communication, and they have 
focused on applications in organizational contexts where computer-mediated 
communication was first introduced (see Walther and Burgoon 1992; Baron 
1984; Kiester, Siegel, and McGuire 1984; Rice 1989; 1984). This kind of task-
oriented experimental research in organizational environments remains the 
focus of most computer-mediated communication research, which seek to 
reveal factors that exert causal influence on communication patterns and social 
organization (Baymn 1995). 
Scholars from the "cues filtered out" perspective generally seek to 
answer the question: how do computer-mediated communication technologies 
( 
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influence people, groups, and organizations. Through examination of task-
groups in organizational contexts, these scholars identify elements of computer-
"''· 
mediated communication, and causally link them to communicative outcomes. 
For example, participants in computer-mediated communication environments 
gain greater anonymity because elements of their public identity (gender, race, 
age, status, etc.) are not immediately available. As a consequence, scholars 
from the "cues filtered out" perspective have argued that the nullification of 
differentiating personal qualities allows participation in task-groups to be more 
evenly balanced and egalitarian (Walther 1992), making it more difficult for 
persons to dominate or impose their views on others (Baron 1984). However, 
when everyone is allowed to express their views, it often takes longer to reach a 
decision or complete a task (Sproull and Kiesler 1991 ). Thus, computer-
mediated communication heightens participation, but impedes resolution of 
tasks. 
Although the "cues filtered out" perspective may be a useful approach to 
understanding work and task-related computer-mediated environments, it does 
not provide an adequate model for interpreting on line chat environments, and 
some scholars argue that the model is over-simplified even for use in 
organizational contexts (see Baym 1995; Contractor and Seibold 1993; 
Steinfeld 1986). The "cues filtered out" perspective has been seriously 
criticized for assuming too much of a causal role to the computer itself. While 
there is no doubt that computer-mediated communication environments deny 
much of the physical and socio-emotional cues of face-to-face interaction, these 
conditions alone do not provide necessary and sufficient grounds for the 
assumption of computer determinism. It is necessary to take into consideration 
numerous other factors. Perhaps the most important factor over-looked are the 
purposes for which participants use computer-mediated communication 
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technologies. Task-oriented activities in work-related contexts represent only 
one set of purposes for computer-mediated communication. Recreational 
,!:• 
purposes, like those found in chat environments, represent an entirely different 
set of conditions in which task-completion may have little bearing. 
lt_can be argued that the "task at hand" influences the extent to which 
individuals are involved in what they say in computer-mediated contexts, what 
they do, what topics are raised (Baym 1995). Furthermore, to the extent that 
participants have prior relations (occupational for example) the very structure of 
the computer-mediated task-group may be influenced by pre-existing 
relationships. In chat environments, on the other hand, the only "task" is to 
communicate, and generally there are no pre-existing relationships save those 
which emerge in these contexts. · For these reasons it may be suggested that 
the conditions of "cues filtered out" may exert a substantially different impact on 
chat participants than on those who are studied within 'the occupational task-
groups contained within traditional computer-mediated communication studies. 
In online chat environments, understanding of the role of "cues filtered 
out" to the emergence of particular forms of online social arrangements might 
best proceed by perceiving the constraints imposed by the medium not simply 
as a hindering force to the completion of tasks, but as a structure in which 
participants focus creativE3 and imaginative communication efforts. As 
suggested by Brenda Laurel (1993), it is possible that constraints, or limitations 
of the medium can serve to focus creative efforts, and paradoxically increase 
imaginative powers by reducing the number of possibilities open to participants. 
That is, heightened creativity may arise out of the tension between spontaneity 
(the desire to communicate) and constraints (being confined to a text medium), 
forcing the spontaneity into various forms. 
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Emoticons and ldioculture 
"Emoticons" represent one of the best illustr?tions of heightened 
creativity in lieu of the constraints and limitations of online chat environments. 
Quite simply, the faceless and non-oral nature of online communication does 
not preclude the existence of emotional content in communication (as 
suggested by the "cues filtered out" approach). Rather, in the faceless and non-
oral online environment participants employ (and continue to invent) a lively 
system of typed symbols as a short hand for expressing emotion and action that 
cannot be captured in the text medium of online chat interaction. That is, 
participants creatively construct and employ text icons that symbolize socio-
emotional, contextual, and interpersonal communication cues. These 
"emoticons"--symbols for smiles, frowns, laughing, yelling, pointing as well as 
numerous other non-verbal forms of communication are constructed out of 
·,.' .'' ,· 
dashes and punctuation marks. Like Chinese· calligraphy, these emoticons 
seek to be literal representations of the ideas they seek to convey (Marx 1994): 
) 
( 
I ) 
{ } 
<--------
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
Amusement (notice the symbol is a sideways smiling 
face).· 
Disappointment, sadness (frowning). 
devilishness, playfulness, flirtation (winking). 
Hug (place a screen name between the brackets to 
indicate hugging that person). 
Pointing at one's self. 
In addition to emoticons, online chat participants create and employ a 
wide range of acronyms, as a shorthand for frequently used statements. Some 
of the more common acronyms used include: 
LOL 
ROTFL 
BAB 
BBL 
WB 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
"Laughing Out Loud." 
"Rolling On The Floor Laughing" 
"Be Right Back" 
"Be Back Later" 
"Welcome Back" 
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These symbols, in addition to hundreds of others (see Sanderson 1992) 
are used to indicate that a statement is intended to be humorous, sarcastic, in 
).." 
good spirits, in disappointment, surprise, and a wide range of other emotions. 
Participants freely use these symbols to communicate that which is not 
conveyed in words alone. Obviously, it is possible to write emotions _and even 
intonations with words which indicate that one is "just kidding" or being 
sarcastic, but doing so is not only time consuming, but seems to undercut the 
directness and spontaneity of what is expressed (Marx 1994). Thus, emoticons 
are usually intertwined with text communication as a kind of gestural an~ 
emotional punctuation mark, as illustrated in the following dialog: 
SimpleGirl 
Shane 
Dan 
CmLalnT 
Brian 
Ranger 
Terry 
Dan 
: Good morning!!! 
: hi SimpleGirl : ) 
: {{{{{SimpleGirl}}}}}} 
: good morning Simple!. 
: uggh .. vodka .. no more drinky drinky for me the next 
uhmm ... 12 .. naah .... 13 hours : ) 
: LOL brian! 
: bye y'all, see you later : · ) .. 
: bye terri ; ) 
Sometimes emoticons are extensively used to produce what would 
appear to outsiders as a discombobbled set of nonsense communications. 
New online participants can often be found inquiring as to the meaning of these 
symbols, and when used extensively become a form of slang that marks insider 
status. When used extensively, online dialogs become a form of 
communication that makes little more than hieroglyphic sense to those who are 
unfamiliar with the meaning of the symbols, as illustrated by the following: 
Lucky 
Dabble 
Dabble 
Lucky 
Lucky 
Endo Earth 
: Dabble!! 
: {{{{{{{{Lucky}}}}}}}}}}} 
: <-----Jon, fixing Dabbles pc 
:LOL 
.=.0 
: I'm back!! 
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Endo Earth 
Lucky 
Endo Earth 
Dabble 
KityKat 
KityKat 
: <--got booted 
:wb 
: thanks******* 
: <-brb, downloading ... 
)..' 
: Well all, it's been fun, but gotta do the work thing ....... Have 
a good one 
:TTFN 
Beyond emoticons and acronyms, some highly creative chat participants 
have discovered ways to create pictorial displays out of letters, numbers, and 
punctuation marks that are sent in a particular order at a rapid pace. These 
pictorial designs are frequently used to announce a participants arrival or 
departure (and, of course, sometimes these images are displayed for the mere 
fun of it). As can be seen, many of these images are quite elaborate, artistically 
impressive, and can be used as distinctive individual trademarks: 
Ki.tty: 
Ki.tty: 
Ki.tty: 
Ki.tty: 
Ki.tty: 
Ki.tty: 
Ki.tty: 
Ki.tty: 
Ki.tty: 
I\\_,--/ 
I _ _ I , 
C @ @) I,-' 
\ ~T_!-._( C 
I , . \ 
I \ I 
\ \ ' / I 
11 I-_\_.;_ I 
C C-1' C~-- , - ' 
Ki.tty: meow! 
Ti.ger: 
Ti.ger: 
Ti.ger: 
Ti.ger: 
Ti.ger: 
Yang: 
Yang: 
Yang: 
Yang: 
Yang: 
shasta: 
shasta: 
shasta: 
shasta: 
( "'-''-/") --'"''-
·--·· ·-
'6_ 6 ) 
(_Y~.)' 
'-. C.· ).'-. __ .') 
) ' ' ' 
·- . 
, __ , - I /--' , , 
-·. -·. - -· ' (i.l), '' (li.),' ((!.-' 
* ----------------------- -A- ----------------------- * 
Io)=\ 
{ I===} 
\ (=O=I 
* ----------------------- A-__ A ----------------------- * 
(-._.-) 
(Y) 
--()-' -()- -<@ 
(_)-(_) 
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*Zappa*: 
*Zappa*: 
*Zappa*: 
*Zappa*: 
*Zappa*: 
*Zappa*: 
*Zappa*: 
*Zappa*: 
*Zappa*: 
*Zappa*: 
*Zappa*: 
*Zappa*: 
*Zappa*: 
*Zappa*: 
*Zappa*: 
*Zappa*: 
*Zappa*: 
*Zappa*: 
*Zappa*: 
*Zappa*: 
*Zappa*: 
*Zappa*: 
*Zappa*: 
*Zappa*: 
*Zappa*: 
*Zappa*: 
*Zappa*: 
*Zappa*: 
*Zappa*: 
*Zappa*: 
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Since words and keyboard characters are all that are available, then 
participants creatively compress the richness of meaning into symbols that aid 
in the construction of a context for words int9 words themselves (Reid 1994). In 
short, emoticons, acronyms, and pictorial displays are innovative forms of 
expression that vividly illustrate creative, spontaneous, and rich interpersonal 
communication in the disembodied "faceless" socially constructed online 
environment. 
Emoticons, acronyms, and pictorial displays are important elements for 
creating a context of online chat communication. However, these are not the 
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only mechanisms by which socio-emotional and interpersonal cues are 
communicated. The speed of a participants response, pauses, and other ,, 
elements of socio-emotional meaning are equally important, and cannot be 
recaptured in text alone. These elements of online communication are purely 
contextual, indicating that online interactions are not to be read as an artifact, 
but to be subjectively experienced. As stated by Elizabeth Reid (1994): 
"It is not a text, but a context. Virtual ·interaction loses emotional and 
social meaning when transposed to a computer file and re-read. 
Pauses, breaks, disjunctions, speed and timing of virtual conversations 
are lost in such transposition, and such factors are a crucial signifier of 
meaning and context ... (pp. 26)." 
Finally, unconventional spellings, and means for placing emphasis upon 
particular words become another mechanism by which participants create a 
context for words unto words themselves. In chat environments sentences are 
often ended without periods, commas are positioned to indicate pauses rather 
than clauses, and ellipses are used to indicate long often thoughtful pauses 
(Marvin 1995). Utterances like "uh-huh," "yee-haw," "yippie," "hummm," 
"ooops," and "yeeeoooch" are frequently used. Upper case letters are often 
' ·' 
used to indicate shouting (i.e. "will somebody PLEASE answer me?"). 
Similarly, astricks are frequently used to place emphasis on particular words 
(i.e. "*don't* tell me what to do!"). This.agreed upon use of unconventional 
English1B, sprinkled with emoticons and acronyms, functions to heighten a 
sense of spoken conversation (Marvin 1995). 
Although the richness of face-to-face interaction, and even electronic 
forms of interaction (i.e. telephone conversations) cannot be entirely recaptured 
in the text medium of chat environments, they are not entirely eliminated either. 
It is clear that in chat environments contextual, interpersonal, and emotional 
cues are creatively communicated and thus cannot preclude meaningful social 
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interaction (as is sometimes suggested in "cues filtered out" perspectives). 
Indeed, the opposite could be true. As suggested by Rollo May (1975), 
}. 
constraints--or limitations posed to participants--represent a structure that 
channels creative energies, allowing persons to manipulate available materials 
to construct innovative forms of expre~sion. In online chat environments the text 
that can be communicated is limited to the characters of a typical keyboard. Yet, 
emergent from these constraints are the creative forms of interpersonal 
communication described most accurately as "written speech" (Elmer-Dewitt 
1994)--a set of expressive resources for communication (Marvin 1995). 
Although the specific mechanisms by which participants creatively 
overcome limitations of the computer-mediated environment represent 
interesting dimensions of online chat, in final analysis the importance of 
emoticons and other contextual and interpersonal cues is not that participants 
"feel" emotions, or "sense" a context. Rather, two more important issues arise 
when considering the role of emoticons to online chat communication. First, 
emoticons, acronyms, and other online cues allow participants a mechanism to 
communicate socio-emotional and contextual indicators to others, and hence 
validate them in a social context. As others see and respond to these symbols 
they become meaningful and experientially real. 
Secondly, emoticons, acronyms, and pictorial displays can be seen as 
important elements of an online "idioculture" (Fine 1987; Fine 1979). "An 
idioculture consists of particular examples of behavior or communication that 
have symbolic meaning and significance for members of a group (Fine 1987 pp. 
126)." If culture is "a set of expressive and interpretive resources (Marvin 1995 
pp. 1)," then these online para-linguisic constructs become a cultural lexicon 
that identifies members of a distinct idiocultural group. Like occupational 
groups (Mccarl 1986) and close-knit families (Zeitlin et. al. 1986), online chat 
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participants have a specialized vocabulary based within their unique 
environment (Marvin 1995). 
Generally speaking, idioculture may include a wide range of things such 
as slang, clothing styles, jokes, nicknames, rules of conduct, music, and so on. 
In any group culture some elements of idioculture will have more significance 
than others. Therefore, important items are those that are repeated on many 
occasions (Fine 1987). Emoticons and online acronyms represents one such 
repetitive and thus salient element of online idioculture. Because "knowledge 
and acceptance of a group's idioculture is a necessary and sufficient condition 
for distinguishing members of a group from nonmembers (Fine 1987 pp. 128)," 
by use of emoticons and other online.communicative cues, participants display 
a cultural mastery and thus validate themselves as members of a larger 
"electropolis" (Reid 1991) of chat participants: 
"Ironically, the use of these specialized symbols disrupts the illusion of 
virtual speech created by conventionalized misspellings and paralinqual 
smileys. · They are the marks of 'inside status' because they demonstrate 
knowledge and skill which are the requirements of belonging for a group 
with no kinship, geography or occupational ties (Marvin 1995 pp. 4)." 
The blanket assumption that constraints imposed by the computer-
mediated environment hinder meaningful social interaction and 
deterministically cause particular forms of social organization, as often 
articulated by scholars of the "cues filtered out" perspective, is unfounded in 
online chat environments. Rather, in chat environments the constraints of the 
medium represents a structure that channels creative communication energies 
to overcome the limitations of the online environment. Emoticons and acronym 
cues represent the most salient of these creative measures. Additionally, these 
creative means become defining elements of the online environment in a 
cultural sense. As chat participants create and disseminate such things as 
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emoticons and acronyms as creative solutions to the limitations of the computer-
mediated environment, they become important elements of an emergent and 
l;' 
evolving online idioculture. Knowing and using these idiocultural constructs 
define and identify members of the group, and serve to distinguish them as 
unique from others. 
There is no doubt that "cues filtered out" poses constraints on 
communication, however previous research on task-related activities in 
organizational contexts proves an inadequate model for interpreting the 
activities of chat participants. The findings presented here suggest that, at the 
very least, task-related activities in organizational contexts involve a 
fundamentally different set of purposes by which participants use the 
technologies computer-mediated communication, and that these group 
' 
purposes exert an influence on what ultimately emerges from their interactions. 
When considering online chat, similar to the findings reported by Meyers 
(1987), Reid (1991 ), and Baym (1995), rather than being constrained by the 
medium, participants creatively exploit features of the online environment, 
develop new forms of communication, and new ideocultural constructs that are 
not a derivative of the comptuer-medium alone, but emergent from the 
interactions between persons in response to the constraints imposed by the 
medium. Clearly, one must consider the human participants and their purposes 
for interaction as having a role in the kinds of communicative outcomes that 
emerge in computer-mediated contexts. To simply ask "how does the 
technology effects people," is to ignore the question "how do people manipulate 
technology for their purposes?" Or, as stated by Giuseppe Mantovani (1996) 
"The question: how do new technologies change people, groups and 
organizations? only deals with half of the problem. It should be 
completed with the second half: how do people, groups and 
organizations modify and adapt new technologies to suit them? (pp. 93)" 
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PART THREE 
Translating Self to the Conventions of the Medium: 
,. 
Bestowing Online Self-Agents With Agency 
Through interaction with others, the computer-m~diated environment 
becomes a socially produced place. The chat channel is a situation to define 
and interact within; room names are self-selected labels that provide important 
definitions of the situation and indicate a context for interaction. In the absence 
of ethnomethodological cues of face to face interaction, participants employ a 
wide range of emoticons that serve to make contextual and emotional indicators 
communicable and thus validate these as features of communication. Also, 
emoticons become a form of slang that identifies members of the online group 
as participants of a distinct idioculture. Furthermore, the structure of 
communication is organized in a manner that promotes a non-linear multiplicity 
of communication. As illustrated in part one, the structure of the system is 
organized to be conducive to multiple-simultaneous interactions. The potential 
to engage in a multiplicity of simultaneous conversations, is a characteristic 
unique to cyberspace, and is central to the emergence of "cyberselves" as a 
uniquely situated experience of personhood. 
Up till this point, this study has merely examined how participants interact 
in the online environment, overcome the limitations of the medium, and in the 
process designate a self-agent that is associated with a larger group of online 
participants. It is now necessary to examine how participants bestow agency to 
the designated self agent and therefore construct a "cyberself." To do this 
participants must translate interaction to the text medium of the online 
environment. To translate interaction to a computer environment, one must 
transform human traits, or even endow a self-agent with new traits in order to 
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enhance abilities to act in the mimic world of online chat (Laurel 1993). To 
accomplish this it is necessary "to make self out of any collection of attributes 
,. 
that we think we can recognize as possessing agency ... that is, that resembles or 
acts like our definitions of a 'person' (Stone 1995 pp. 83)." 
The Concept of Cyberselfhood: 
In the case of online chat, a cyberself is an emergent set of situated 
meanings, dependent on processes of interaction and temporarily associated 
with a screen name. More generally, a cyberself is the meaning of personhood 
(or experience of personal identity) emergent within dislocated and 
disembodied forms of electronic and computer mediated interaction between 
persons and/or communication technologies. Like any other self, a cyberself is 
' presented and negotiated in an ongoing process of communication. Unlike 
other forms of self, cyberselves emerge in electronic and/or computer-mediated 
communication environments that involve qualities that challenge traditional 
conceptualizations of self hood ( as detailed in Chapter Two). 
Several scholars have noted that selfhood manifests itself in qualitatively 
different forms in the online context (see Jones 1995; Turkle 1995; Meyers 
1987; Stone 1995). To emphasize the differences between online forms of 
selfhood and more traditional manifestations of self some scholars have 
suggested the term "cyborg self." In this study, however, the term "cyberself" is 
used as an alternative to "cyborg self," which is seen as inadequate on at least 
two grounds. First, "cyborg self" is often articulated as a solopistic form of 
selfhood. According to Elizabeth Reid (1994), "cyborg selves" are an emergent 
process of character development that is "at all times in the hands, or 
imaginations, of the player (pp. 61 )." To the extent that selfhood emerges in the 
online context, and this form of selfhood shares characteristics that are similar to 
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other forms of self, this solopistic conceptualization will not suffice. A self, 
regardless of its context, exists between individuals, ever emergent in an on-
,. 
going process of social interaction. A self is never simply the product of ones 
solipsistic imagination. To merely view cyberselfhood as a solopistic creation of 
virtual personas is to ignore the important processes of interaction with others, 
the context, and the means of interaction by which selfhood is situated. 
Secondly, the term "cyborg" refers to an entity that is half human and half 
machine. As stated by Sherry Turkle (1995), this suggests that "distinctions 
between what is specifically human and specifically technological become 
more complex," and that "the traditional distance between people and machines 
has become harder to maintain (pp. 21 )." Although the computer-mediated 
context in which cyberselfhood emerges contains unique technological 
' qualities that alter the nature, range, and scope of human interaction, the 
suggestion that selfhood in the online context is therefore "half technological 
and ha.If human" seems grossly overstated. Furthermore, this technological -vs-
human distinction poses a false binary distinction that impedes understanding. 
Selfhood, regardless of its context, is a symbolic process of meaning conferring 
activity, and always emergent between persons in processes of interaction. 
Although emergent in computer-mediated contexts, at this point there is no 
reason to conclude that online selves have anything to do with machines. 
By use of the term "cyberself" it is suggested that online forms of selfhood 
are like other forms of self--they emerge and maintain themselves in ongoing 
processes of interaction between persons. Like any other self, on line selves 
must be presented, negotiated, and validated in a process of interaction. Or in 
other words, through interaction with others cyberselves--online self agents (a 
means of personhood)--are endowed with agency (any collection of meanings 
and attributes that resembles our definition. of a person). 
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Selfhood in the online context is not automatic, but only occurs when an 
online self-agent--a means by which persons may be recognized and therefore 
,, 
interact with others--attains agency in a process of interaction. Through 
interaction with others any and all self-agents are endowed with agency--
collections of meanings and attributes that resemble personhood and are 
associated with the agent. This process, when it occurs online, is not unlike any 
other means of acquiring a self in a given situation. Face to face and electronic 
forms of interaction contain the same basic elements. What is suggested here 
is that all forms of acquiring selfhood entail a process by which an agent is 
designated, and agency is bestowed. These are two separate processes that 
may be configured differently to create different experiences of selfhood. For 
example, in face to face interaction the self agent is always the human body, 
which becomes a translucent means of personhood around which agency is 
attributed. Likewise, in telephone communications, the voice is the agent, 
around which agency is attributed. Thus, what distinguishes cyberselves from 
other forms of self-agents and experiences of agency is the computer-mediated 
means by which it is produced and maintained. 
Cyberself Consistency and Fluidity: 
Like any other self, as one interacts with others in the on line chat 
environment a cyberself is momentarily validated. Yet, unlike other selves, 
cyberselves emerge in the disembodied and dislocated context of cyberspace 
and thus selfhood cannot be affixed to a body, place, or any other fixed physical 
thing. Furthermore, cyberselves are not necessarily affixed to a screen name 
either. In spite of the potential consistency of ones screen name, when new 
people enter the chat-channel, when one switches to a different channel, or 
when one carries on private message conversations with others it is still 
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necessary to present and negotiate all elements of one's cyberself all over 
again. Hence, cyberselves are always situated performances that exist at the 
).' 
surface of a communicated knife-edge present. In short, a cyberself is always 
whatever is passing for a self at a given moment in an electronic or computer-
mediated context. 
In spite of the potential for self fluidity, frequent visitors to the same chat 
channels, who communicate with the same people over an extended period of 
time, achieve a degree of cyberself consistency. That is, a cyberself can be 
validated through time in· a group to which the cyberself has a history and 
becomes personally known. This is vividly illustrated by revisiting the important 
role of screen names. Although participants in chat systems may change their 
screen name at any time, ahd often use more than one screen name, recent 
' 
studies have shown that most participants retain one screen name amidst all 
the others as representative of themselves (see Bechar-lsraeli 1995). 
Participants in this study convey the same finding: 
"I use this screen name because people know me by it." 
"I prefer to go to the chat channels where people know my screen name." 
"I use one name most of the time and it has the most recognition as 'me."' 
"I use this screen name because it's well known by the people I chat 
with." 
This suggests that participants in chat environments retain at least one 
online self-agent around which they anchor some degree of stable 
cyberselfhood. However, this potential for online self consistency does not 
negate the transitory nature of cyberself enactments. Rather, this highlights the 
same processes by which any meaningful relationship and/or self performance 
emerges and extends beyond the surface level of a communicated present, 
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regardless of its context. Additionally, this highlights the processes by which 
meaningful personal relationships can (and do) emerge in the online context (in 
'-'' 
spite of the fact that contemporary research seems inclined to ignore the 
existence of intimate and deeply personal online relationships). Quite simply, 
all cyberselves are situated surface performances in a computer-mediated 
context, yet when persons consistently interact with a relatively stable group of 
other online participants, through time a non-temporal role sediments. The 
meaning of these roles draw from both the history of an individuals computer-
mediated interactions with stable sets of other online participants, and broader 
socio-cultural structures of self-symbolism (i.e. a person formulates conceptions 
of what "kind" of person they are on the basis of information provided). 
In sum, the creation of an online self is not merely the designation of a 
screen name, but an emergent process that forms out of, and is based within 
ongoing computer-mediated communications with others. To access a chat 
system and create a screen name provides the individual a self-agent, and 
through processes of interaction agency is associated with that self-agent. 
When online, as in everyday life, self-agency is continually presented, 
negotiated, and validated through interaction with others. As stated by one 
participant: 
"I didn't think through the creation of identity, it just evolved. I just make it 
up as I go along, as I talk to people ... I don't change online, I just evolve." 
Anonymity, Engagement, and the Fluidity of Cyberselves 
Numerous participants identified the anonymity of the context as an 
important element of online chat interaction. As stated by some participants: 
"I like the fact that in chat channels people are not blinded by age, sex, 
nationality, race etc. Since everyone is anonymous there are no barriers 
to communication." 
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"Anonymity. This is what makes it all worth while. The ability to meet 
people without seeing a face." 
Anonymity is widely sited as an important element of online chat and 
widely implemented by participants. The prevalence of anonymity is illustrated 
as one examines the content of participant profiles. Of 100 randomly selected 
screen names sampled from chat areas, twenty-two percent did not have a 
profile whatsoever and therefore exist only as a screen name. Of all the 
information that can be provided in member profiles (name, gender, marital 
status, birthday, etc.), only fifty percent of the information was actually reported 
(Consider, for example, something as simple as gender: Ten percent of the 
sampled member profiles refused to report whether they are a male or a 
female). 
In the anonymous context of online chat presentation of self is everything. 
To compromise one's anonymity is to compromise the power to construct any 
sense of self that one desires (Baym 1995; Meyers 1987). Thus, anonymity is 
the essential means by which dynamic cyberselves are constructed. Through 
anonymity participants can present any self they choose at any given moment: 
"Online can be fantasy--You can be anyone you want to be." 
" ... To be free from our own personalities for a little while. To be free from 
inquisitive minds we may know." 
"Many people lie about what they look like, age and so on and I guess its 
a fantasy thing because if you want to be pretty you can be pretty on here 
because no one knows the truth, but no one is going to come out and say 
they are fat and ugly." 
"Online allows much more freedom -it's anonymous- whatever mood 
you're in you act upon. We all project an image with others - and are 
pretty consistent in person -- online it doesn't have to be consistent." 
"It also allows some to exercise a fantasy existence that they would never 
dare in real life." 
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As the above statements illustrate, the anonymity of online interaction 
allows participants the option of being "something different." In online chat 
,•.· 
environments any potential self is possible, and anyone can present 
themselves as being anything. Categories of personhood--race, gender, socio-
economic status, age, physical appearances--all become pure labels, self-
symbols that participants use to think and interact with, not to be contained 
within. 
When online one does not occupy a fixed physical form. That is, in 
cyberspace there is no such thing as a body, at least not in the sense that we 
inhabit a body (Penny 1994). All that "exists" are fleeting electronic 
presentations of self that are loosely associated with a self-selected screen 
name (another fleeting electronic image). In this sense, cyberselves are literally 
"disembodied." The self is freed from any physical form, and thus challenges 
the traditionally perceived relationship between body and self (see Chapter 
Two). This fact alone would suggest that cyberselves are always divergent from 
selves that emerge in a participant's everyday life, regardless of the intentions 
of individual participants. That is, some cyberselves are intended to be different 
from selves that define participants in everyday life, other cyberselves are 
intended to be attempts at a "true reflection" of "who the person is." Regardless, 
a self is not a fixed entity that one carries around like an appendice of the body. 
Rather, it is a continuous product of a meaning-conferring process of 
communication. Because the online chat environment does not include a 
veritable, fixed, physical entity that represents the person (a body), no single set 
of culturally grounded meanings can be attached to the person. Therefore, 
situational elements of communication are particularly central to the 
emergence, maintenance, and transformation of the cyberself. Cyberselves are 
always situated, disembodied performances. To this end, cyberselves will 
102 
always represent some degree of departure from the selves that participants 
present in everyday life. 
'·' 
In chat environments, one's gender, race, nationality, ethnicity, 
occupation, interests, and all other elements of selfhood exist as possibilities 
that can be instantly realized or altered simply through one's online 
presentation of self. All "properties" of the self become selected, variable, and 
dynamic tools of interaction. Many respondents report this to be a liberating 
experience of free self expression: 
" ... the anonymity factor can be intriguing, it gives one the freedom to 
chose which room to go into, whom to talk to and when, what to say, to lie 
or be honest while also knowing that every other user has the same 
freedom." · 
"The anonymity allows me to be myself, allowing a certain freedom of 
expression in which I rarely indulge in person." 
"It gives me the opportunity to express myself with no one to stare or 
wonder and not worry about where I was or with what company I was 
keeping." 
"Sometimes I pretend I'm a woman. I've also invented experiences. It 
enables me to play out fantasies. It allows me to take dreams one step 
closer to reality." 
"You can be anything. I may stretch truth, and be with who ever I want -
no inhibitions." · 
"I'm constantly changing my alter-egos and identities on this silly system. 
You think I could get a life or somethin'." 
Although many participants value the freedom of self exploration afforded 
by the anonymous chat environment, these conditions pose problems of 
legitimacy. The ability to "be anything" implies that all online presentations of 
self exist only as possible truths, and all claims of selfhood are potentially 
suspect. Indeed, the "freedom to be anything" is contradicted by constraints 
imposed by the fact that everyone knows that all others are "free to be anything," 
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and persons cannot be anything short of what is passing for a self at the 
moment. Therefore, the "freedom to be anything" can also represent a source of 
f..' 
frustration and concern. To illustrate, consider the Net folkstory of "Douglas 
Adams." According to Net folklore Douglas Adams, having assumed celebrity 
status among some Net participants for his Hitchhiker Guide to the Galaxy, paid 
a visit to his own online fan club. However, upon arrival he was ruthlessly 
accused of being an impostor, and no amount of biographical trivia or 
argumentation could sway the consensus that he was a fraud. As a 
consequence, Adams was not allowed to participate in his own electronic 
collectivity of enthusiasts (Hertz 1995). This Net folk story conveys the way in 
which the "freedom to be anything" can become a source of frustration and 
concern. Consider the following responses to the question: "What, if anything 
do you dislike about onHne chat"? 
"I don't know if people are as they claim to be. Many people are not what 
they claim to be. Men posing as women, etc!" 
"I enjoy the opportunity to meet people anonymously, but people often 
misrepresent themselves and turn out to be vastly different than their 
profile and behavior online would indicate." 
"Because people can take any identity they want, they do. People who 
are 50 tell you they are 25, Males tell you they're females, etc. People lie 
about who they are." 
'There are alot of very very horny guys out there, and so much so that 
they sometimes pretend they are women to get the bi or lesbian girls to 
talk to them. I don't know if that's a sexual game they play for their own 
fantasies, or if they're just lying assholes." 
Although there is no reasonable way to validate the Douglas Adams Net 
folk story, the tale is plausible and highlights some of the problems posed by 
anonymity in everyday online situations. In chat environments, it is not unusual 
for persons to present themselves as being what they are not; for men to 
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present themselves as women, for women to present themselves as men, for 
children to present themselves as adults, for people to claim expertise in areas 
1;., 
they are unqualified to give advice, and so on. Each presents potential 
problems endemic to the situation, making anonymity both a value and a source 
of frustration. However, in spite of this problem interaction persists (and even 
thrives) through what Erving Goffman (1959) calls a "working consensus." That 
is, "together the participants contribute to a single over-all definition of the 
situation which involves not so much a real agreement as to ~hat exists but 
rather a real agreement as to whose claims concerning what issues will be 
temporarily honored (Goffman 1959, p. 9-10)." Similar to what Goffman 
indicates, MacKinnon (1995) notes that because users are denied direct 
knowledge of other participants, they must suspend or "forget" about the person 
behind the persona and rely on the individual's word as an accurate 
representation of self. Thus, in order for interaction to proceed it is necessary 
for participants to formulate a "working consensus" and suspend disbelief. This 
process is noted by several participants: 
Question : "If you don't actually meet the person, how do you know if 
they are what they claim to be?" 
Response : "You don't! That's part of the appeal! Some u meet some 
u don't but u get right to the heart of an issue without 
getting caught up. If u don't meet what difference does it 
make? As long as you have a good time, who cares!" 
Question : ""How can you tell if the people you meet are "genuine" or 
"fake?" 
Response : "I have yet to be disappointed. I just go on instincts, trust, 
and faith. Mostly I go on how they treat me and what I pick 
up along the way." 
Others are less aware of the somewhat arbitrary construction of a 
working consensus and suspension of disbelief. Most often these persons 
claim to "be themselves" online. Yet, their presentations of self are equally 
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suspect by other participants because everyone knows that anyone can claim to 
be anything, and there is no feasible way of discerning the "real" from the "fake" 
(unless participants meet "off-line"). Participants who claim to "be themselves" 
online are frequently aware of this problem: 
"I am honest about who I am online. But there's no way to tell between 
people who are honest and people who lie, so I'm often accused of lying 
when I'm not." 
"I'm real. Are you?" 
"I guess I try to be honest about myself. Why lie when you know 
everything may be false? I have both, thank you." 
"I'm sure people are skeptical about who I say I am. I'm skeptical too." 
By agreeing on a working consensus (regardless of whether individuals 
are aware of this agreement or not) participants initiate a form of engagement--a 
willing suspension of disbelief (Laurel 1993). Participants generally understand 
that cyberselves are dramatic enactments. Or in other words, persons enact a 
self performance and they know that others do not have access to the 
information necessary to confirm the validity of this performance. Hence, like 
any dramatic performance participants generally recognize that the enactment 
is not necessarily real. However, to enjoy the drama (the chat) one must at least 
temporarily suspend knowledge that it's all "pretend." This suspension of 
disbelief, affords users a certain privilege. of engagement: "Pretending that the 
action is real affords us the thrill or fear, knowing the action is pretend saves us 
from the pain of fear (Laurel 1993 pp. 113): 
"Engagement is what happens when we are able to give ourselves over 
to a representational action, comfortably and unambiguously. It involves 
a kind of complicity. We agree to think and feel in terms of both the 
content and conventions of a mimetic context. In return, we gain a 
plethora of new possibilities for action and a kind of emotional guarantee. 
One reason why people are amenable to constraints is the desire to gain 
these benefits (Laurel 1993 pp. 115)." 
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By engagement participants can experience the representational and 
dramatic world of online chat directly without mediation or distraction. This 
,. 
necessitates that participants proceed with interaction under the assumption 
that what you see is what you get, and the representation is all there is. Thus, 
agency is bestowed unto online self agents in a process that involves a willing 
suspension of disbelief and engagement in the drama of self production. 
Communication Play and the Multiplicity of Cyberselves 
"A surprisingly popular thing to do online is pretend you're someone 
else. Why not? It's not like anyone can really see you or anything. With 
online chat, you can pretend to be someone or something else, change 
your personality, or take on another gender (Kinkoph 1995 pp. 134)." 
In addition to the opportunity to present an alternative image of ones self, 
participants can have a multiplicity of screen names, each independent of the 
others. Many participants consider this to be an important and valued aspect of 
online interaction, providing the opportunity to construct multiple anonymous 
cyberselves: 
"I actively use four of my five screen names. Each screen name 
represents a different persona." 
Question 
Response 
Question 
Response 
: "How many screen names do you have?" 
: "3" 
: "Why you use more than one screen name?" 
: "I am curious to see other people's different reactions to 
various 'personalities'." 
" One name is known only to my closest on-line friends. I use that name 
when I don't want to be bothered by strangers. The other names are 
used when I go in to chat rooms or private rooms where I wouldn't 
normally want my friends to find me." 
The multiplicity of simultaneous and anonymous self-enactments that are 
frequently realized in online chat environments often results in communications 
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that may be metaphorically called an ongoing "self-game." After all, online chat 
interaction is a past-time that participants purchase--usually for leisure and 
.. 
enjoyment. Not surprisingly, online chat interaction and cyberself enactments 
often become a literal form of communication play: 
"Some people take this as a total game--1 call it Nintendo for adults!!" 
"I'm sure people modify who they are online, it's part of the game I guess, 
the mystery and fun of discovery." 
"I enjoy talking to people and having fun without being tied to 'who we 
are'." 
"It's quite fun to create a completely new identity. I have three others!" 
"Like anything else, online is a game. Isn't everything a game? Only 
here, I play with who I am." 
"I have a different persona for each moniker. One is very sexy, but I have 
one who is grouchy and a reaJbitch .. Another sarcastic, and another is 
very sweet. I know it sounds very schizophrenic, but actually, it is a lot of 
fun." 
"The lifestyle is 'who cares?' It's all a persona, it's all an act." 
In the process of enacting a self-game there is little commitment to any 
given self19. In online chat environments one's self can be a fluid, discursive 
horizon of possibilities. In online chat environments each user has the power to 
create any sense of self, through interaction with others in a given situation as 
illustrated in the following: 
"It's kinda like split personalities. Shows that someone is only who they 
want to be when it's most comfortable." 
"I use different screen names to fit the environment of the chat channel." 
"Online allows much more freedom. Whatever mood you're in you act 
upon." 
"I think if a person has a good imagination the skys the limit--You can 
become anything you want!" 
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"It's a way for people to be who they what to be, haven't you ever tried to 
be something your not?" 
As indicated above, participants themselves frequently use a game-
metaphor to describe online chat. This metaphor can be useful for 
conceptualizing online chat interaction. However, it is important to note two 
observations in relation to the self-game metaphor. First, "play" and "game" are 
used as metaphors to highlight qualities that onHne participants often attribute to 
interactions and presentations of self. To take this metaphor one step further, 
interacting with others in online chat environments necessitates that one 
translate oneself into the conventions of the medium. These conventions are 
like rules to a game, and participants often "play" with them. However, this 
playfulness does not imply that all is merely "fun and games." Persons can (and 
do) form deeply meaningful interpersonal relationships in the course of playful 
encounters. Playfulness does not eliminate capacities for such things as 
commitment and trust, but merely makes such qualities playable, like any other 
quality of human interaction (Kristeva 1987). The "play" -vs- "serious" 
dichotomy that pervades the literature in online interaction is a false (and 
binary) distinction that does not hold empirical muster. "Serious play" is not 
only possible, but a prevailing standard for gaming activity (i.e. people often 
take "seriously" the things that occupy their "play"). Online self-games, although 
playful, are "serious play" and we belittle them at our risk. 
Secondly, if we adopt a game metaphor for interpreting online leisure-
social activities, it is important to acknowledge the distinctions between "finite" 
and "infinite" games (see Carse 1986). A finite game is played for the purpose 
of winning. In contrast, an infinite game is for the purpose of continual play. 
Finite games have distinct rules that all players must know. However, with 
infinite games the "rules" change during the course of play. Players of finite 
games play within boundaries, while the players of infinite games play with 
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boundaries. Clearly, if a game metaphor is to be adopted, the "game" is infinite. 
Ultimately, it makes no difference whether a person intends to be 
,. 
genuine or non-genuine, playful or serious in an online self-enactment. In final 
analysis, the meaning of the activity is established in the expressive-impressive 
dimension of communication (Brisset and Edgley 1990). Therefore, instead of 
embarking on attempts to impose a binary play -vs- serious, genuine -vs- non-
genuine distinction on the processes of online interaction, analytical attention 
should focus on the production of meaning--a process that remains consistent 
across perceived categories of "play" and "seriousness," "genuine" and "non-
genuine." A game metaphor may be more-or-less helpful in conceptualizing 
this process, however explicit focus should be on the processes by which 
meaning is produced in online environment irregardless of participants intent. 
In summary, when online, just as in face-to-face situations, a sense of self 
emerges through interaction with others. The structure of online chat 
communication is multiple-simultaneous, and not surprisingly so too are 
cyberselves. Within the multiple-simultaneous medium of online 
communication emerges a multiplicity of potential cyberselves. Each cyberself 
represents an anonymous set of meanings associated with any given screen 
name of one's choosing--all of which may be dramaturgically presented as 
virtually anything. These interactions become a form of dramatic 
communication play--a hyperreal saturation of communication and a simulacra 
of the self--all reflective of symbolic interaction situated within a technology of 
social saturation. 
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PART FOUR 
Negotiations of Reality: Experiences of Multiplicity, and 
,!;• 
the Ideology of a Unitary Self 
" ... true self No other concept so dominates the literature of despair and 
pessimism in our society; no other prize is so frequently promised in the 
guides and handbooks to alternative reality. The link between this goal 
and the pluralization of our life worlds is evident. We see our existence 
as made up of different life-worlds, various phenomenal universes within 
which we display desperate modes of consciousness. Our very lack of 
full commitment to any or all of these worlds produces within us the 
sense of some entity which stands back from reality, an entity which is 
presented within all of them but which is fully realized in none .... Our new 
search for a real self may have done little more than add another self 
conception to the stock derived from our supposedly 'unreal' involvement 
in work, marriage, bureaucracy, leisure (Cohen and Taylor 1992 pp. 
218-219)." 
In online chat environments participants enact self performances in a 
dislocated and disembodied context that allows the freedom to "be" without 
"being." The online chat environment in-and-of-itself is a multiple-simultaneous 
and sychronistic mode of communication (see part one). Coinciding with this 
multiple-simultaneous and syncronistic communication environment, 
participants enact selves that are equally multiple-simultaneous and fluid (see 
part three). In short, online chat environments provide a structure for multiplicity 
and dramatic self fluidity that is frequently realized as some participants play 
with who they claim to be, and all participants know they may do the same. 
These elements of online chat conflict with deep seated cultural 
prerogatives. Specifically, these elements of self multiplicity and self fluidity 
conflict with the cultural prerogatives of a unitary self. In the highly 
individualized cultures of western society persons are socialized to have a 
unitary self. That is, persons in contemporary western society continue to be 
socialized to have a personality,a relatively stable set of personal 
characteristics that are carried with them from place to place, situation to 
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situation. The multiple-fluid online chat environment challenges this cultural 
ideology and subsequent experiences of self and social reality. Therefore,how 
J..• 
participants negotiate this apparent conflict is important to understanding the 
relationship between online chat environments and off-line experiences of self 
and social world. 
Several contemporary scholars have noted that the emerging post-
industrial/post-modern society has been progressively marked by increasing 
social-psychological conditions of multiplicity and self fluidity (see Gergen 1991; 
Stone 1995; Turkle 1995; Meyrowitz 1987; Schwalbe 1993). Yet, older social 
orders and cultural ideologies do not rapidly dissolve (Bell 1976). Older visions 
of social order hold-on, even when experiential conditions no longer sustain 
them. Thus, experiential conditions of multiplicity and self fluidity may become 
increasingly common, yet cultural prerogatives may nonetheless continue to 
provide lip service to unitary self interpretations. This is one condition 
characterizing persons caught in the margins of two currently competing 
asethetics. How individuals negotiate these competing world views will 
comprise a defining element of their self-social world relationship. Online chat 
environments exemplify this struggle over meaning, as participants confront and 
respond to this ideological challenge. 
Illustrative of this ideological conflict is the amazing controversy that 
sometimes arises when these issues are raised in groups of persons interacting 
online. When these issues are raised, persons quickly take sides, discussion 
becomes lively, and sometimes angry. Consider the following: 
Question 
Mary 
Ellen 
Hank 
Bruno 
Ellen 
: Can you tell the difference between online fakes and those 
that are "genuine"? 
: Yes I can, but it took over 7 years of being online 
: You are kidding yourself, Mary 
: <--- Genuine fake 
: Sometimes I can spot the liars 
: How could you tell if I was lying? I mean, REALLY! 
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Siz 
Mary 
Ellen 
Siz 
Mary 
Bruno 
Bruno 
Siz 
Ellen 
Siz 
Question 
Bruno 
: The tone of your typing, Ellen. LOL! 
: It's not hard to do I was a liar for years now I only tell the 
truth 
: Online is fantasy, if you want to know the truth, you have to 
meet someone. See their body language, look in their 
eyes. 
: Right, online everyone is well endowed and good looking! 
LOL! 
: Not to me. If people need to lie and only hurt themselves 
it'sok 
: See that's the problem. People making this a fantasy world 
: I don't have the need to lie online It's classic projection--
people project what they want onto a person, and 
disappointment awaits! 
: I think alot of people use this as an outlet, saying or doing 
things they won't let themselves do in reality. 
: Yes, I think so too, and the behaviors become surprisingly 
extreme! I mean, every woman online says she loves oral 
sex. THAT has to be a lie! 
: You are ALWAYS who you are, but some circumstances 
will censor or govern your behaviour differently. 
: Some people claim that when online the lack of inhibitions 
reveals their true self. do you think that's true? 
: kinda like being drunk then? 
As the above illustrates, participants in online chat environments often 
indicate strong sentiments with regards to selfhood and multiplicity, and these 
discussions expose widely dichotomized viewpoints. The dichotomy that is 
revealed in these controversial discussions highlight the two primary 
interpretive means by which participants negotiate between cultural 
prerogatives of a unitary self -vs- experiences of multiple-fluid self enactments 
in online chat environments. It is important to note that both of these interpretive 
approaches recognize multiplicity and fluidity of self, yet each accommodates 
for multiplicity in different ways resulting in differing sets of experience and 
understanding. 
First, there are persons who wholeheartedly accept and embrace self-
multiplicity and self-fluidity, altogether rejecting the ideology of a unitary self. 
These persons play with multiple potentials for being, and see little difference 
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between online and off-line social worlds: 
Question : "Do you think most people are who they claim to be when 
on line?" 
Response : "I think that they are showing one of their true selves. I 
think people have many selves. I don't necessarily think 
the people one meets in person are being any more 
genuine than those one meets online." 
"Each of my screen names is a different representation of my multi-
faceted personality .... I consider myself witty, intelligent, and 
sophisticated. And I have a sparkling personality! Each screen name is 
just a representation of different parts of my personality. One screen 
name is the eternal child within me--she has the 64 pack of Crayola 
Crayons, you know, the one with the sharpener and stuff. Another screen 
name represents the lady I am--she has read Emily Post's Book of 
Etiquette, 15th edition. And a third screen name dreams of waltzing to 
Strauss on a moonlit eve in Vienna. But I don't act any differently offline" 
[italics added]." 
"Didn't you ever sit in the bar and try to pick up some girls, or tell old war 
stories with the barkeep? It's a bunch of 'old Irish Billy Liars." It's a 
fantasy world my man! My truthfulness borderlines naiveness. I'm just 
playin' around and telling you my truths." 
For these persons the self-evident multiplicity of online chat 
environments presents no conflict with regards to cultural ideologies of 
selfhood. These persons embrace a postmodern aesthetic, and embody what 
Lifton (1993) calls the "Protean self," but Gergen (1991) more accurately refers 
to as a "relational self." Robert Jay Lifton argues that due to contemporary 
socio-cultural conditions and historical forces persons have evolved a shape-
shifting mode of selfhood that he refers to as the "Protean self" (after Proteus, 
the Greek sea god of many forms). However, Lifton views the Protean self as 
largely a tactical move that enables persons to engage in continuous 
exploration and personal experimentation. This is not what these chat 
participants indicate. 
These chat participants exemplify more than merely a "pastiche 
114 
personality." Instead, these chat participants exemplify a fully "relational self" 
(Gergen 1991 ). These participants embrace multiplicity, yet acknowledge that 
.,,. 
individual autonomy is a state of "immersed interdependence, in which it is 
relationship that constructs the self (Gergen 1991 pp. 147)." These participants 
are quite comfortable--not with an orgy ~f self hood ( as suggested by Protean 
self, and pastiche personality)--but with abandoning the view of self-
constructions as objects (i.e. a true self), and viewing these self-constructions as 
a means of getting on in the social world. As aptly stated by one participant: 
Question : "How do you know if the people you meet online are 
genuine or fake?" 
Response : "Do we ever really know people, though we may meet 
them in person? Everyone is genuine in the moment. The 
moment is a spark. The person is genuine in many styles. 
He has many faces. Like a masquerade.~ 
In contrast to these participants, others take a slightly different approach 
with vastly different experiential consequences. Whereas the first group of 
persons presented a self-social world interpretation that poses no embedded 
conflict, this second group embodies a world view that vividly captures the 
struggle for meaning that participants in chat environments may latently 
encounter. This second approach consists of persons that accept the fact that 
people can be self multiple-fluid, but deny that they in fact are: 
"I see nothing special in your survey .... I am me, and am what I am. If 
people don't like me for what I am, then. it's their right. I don't put on a 
show for anyone. I am proud of who I am ... Chatrooms are a place to go 
to make jokes--nothing more." 
These participants make sharp distinctions between online and off-line 
social worlds. These participants often perceive online activities as an escape 
from the realities of everyday life. That is, persons who accept the possibility of 
multiplicity and fluidity of self, yet deny that they are multiple-fluid, tend to view 
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the online social world as an illusionary never-never land of make-believe. To 
these participants the attraction of online chat environments stems precisely 
,. 
from its unreality. To these participants online chat environments represent a 
place to take a socio-emotional time-out from the burdens of everyday life: 
"This is all make believe ... a world of phony smoke screens, lights, and 
mirrors. But illusion is always prettier than reality." 
Response 
Question 
Response 
Question 
Response 
Question 
Response 
: "Online is an escape from loneliness." 
: "Why online, and not in person?" 
: "Real life is too scary in the real world. Too much 
commitment, sexually transmitted diseases, etc. . .. We are 
all trying to escape from reality for a little while and this 
fantasy is a great way to do it." 
: "Is that what it all amounts to--a fantasy?" 
: "It is an ESCAPE not fantasy." 
: "Escape from what?" 
: "Work, bills, life." 
As the above quotes indicate, these participants sometimes apprehend 
the world as overwhelming, restrictive, and inhibiting. Often these participants 
view everyday life as a burdensome chore to be endured. Even the task of 
face-to-face interaction can require too much of ones' self: 
"I find at times that it's just hard to listen, to have patience to discover 
someone, or get to know someone. I think it's cuz living just requires so 
much of you, that often you're just too tired to try." 
"I get bored and I like to talk to people without anyone really knowing me . 
. . . It is nice to be able to have a conversation with a friend when you don't 
feel like physically talking. It's easier sometimes. It's like, you can talk to 
a lot of people at once, and say the same stuff you can on the phone." 
However, in a paradoxical twist of logic these persons tend to view their 
online cyberselves as more reflective of their "true self" than off-line self 
presentations. That is, in spite of drawing sharp distinctions between online 
and off-line social worlds, and denying that they are multiple-fluid, these 
persons arrive at the interesting and conflicting conclusion that their online 
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cyberselves as more reflective of who they "really" are than their off-line selves: 
"Actually, in most chatrooms, if anyone is talking long enough their real 
personality comes out. ... Once you get people talking they become more 
real than face to face--no masks. You can always change your name if 
things get ugly. You can't change your face, so you are always watching 
out." 
"I feel more like my true self online. Is that weird? My whole life should 
be conducted online. I'm more confident. I'll say anything! You can say 
what you want without looking someone in the face. Sometimes it's 
easier to say what you think on here. Well - as my shrink confirmed - it's 
safe! You can open up to people." 
"Have you ever thought that people are more open here, and can be with 
no inhibitions, and can actually get closer to knowing someone? I feel 
people can open up easier here. People are more open when they are 
not face to face" 
It is amazing that these participants can sustain such vividly conflicting 
sets of beliefs. On one hand, they claim that they "are who they are--and no one 
can change that." When online, they are the same person as when they are off-
line. On the other hand, they claim to be "more real" online than in face-to-face 
interaction20. Most surprisingly, none of these participants saw these two 
statements as conflicting. Why? 
The extraordinarily contradicting sets of beliefs that these chat 
participants articulate only makes sense, when we consider processes of self 
formulation in the context of the perceived "rat cage" of real "off-line" life, and the 
perceived "fantasy" or "unreality" of online activities. It is not difficult to 
empathetically understand the perceived monotonous "rat cage" that these chat 
participants sometimes attribute to the "real world." As articulated by Stanley 
Cohen (1992): 
"The regularized nature of our life begins to loom within consciousness 
as a cause for dissatisfaction ... Our house appears much like one of the 
little boxes in the song, our relationship with our spouse and children 
indistinguishable from those paraded in the soap operas or radio and 
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television. Our job comes straight out of the textbook discussions about 
alienation at work. We appear to live by order, moving from network to 
cable television, from vinyl records to compact discs, from natural gas to 
microwave, along the market tramlines of consumer society. How may 
we declare ourselves still free and indeterminate, individual and unique, 
when uniformity asserts itself so massively within our daily life? ... At such 
times words like 'freedom', 'spontaneity' and 'indeterminacy' seem empty 
slogans. The only freedom lies in doing nothing, in standing still. The 
habitual stretches out like a contagion into every region of life; it feels 
inescapable. This is the world despaired of by the existentialists, the 
empty hollow nothingness of a Beckett play, in which no one moves, 
nothing changes, and no one comes (pp 48, 49, and 51)." 
Under these perceived conditions, which are similar to those conveyed 
by these chat participants, Cohen makes clear how selfhood is stifled. Ones 
very sense of self, and the materials by which persons construct a unique sense 
of personal identity can be perceived as systematically eliminated by one's 
sense of imprisonment within the monotony of everyday life: , 
" ... each day's journey marked by feelings of boredom, habit, routine. We 
feel dissatisfied with our marriage, our job and our children. The route 
we take to work, the clothes we wear, the food we eat, are visible 
reminders of an awful sense of monotony. For some people such 
feelings may be so intE;}nse that they are led to search for alternative 
realities; they set out to change their whole world. But for most of us, the 
periodic sense of dissatisfaction is related not to marriage, work, children 
as such; we do not wish to rid ourselves of these involvements 
altogether. What we object to is the sense that we are sinking into a 
patterned way of existence in all these areas; that they no longer appear 
to us as fresh and novel. Jhey are becoming routinized. They no longer 
help us to constitute our identity (Cohen 1992 pp. 46-47)." 
When one's world appears as such, it is not unusual for people to take 
measures in which to gain a sense of individuality and selfhood. Through 
momentary "role distancing" (Goffman 1974) or all-out "escape attempts" 
(Cohen 1992) persons create experiential spaces in which the routines and 
roles of patterned life may be temporarily abandoned--a means of detaching 
from ones' oppressive sense of reality. Thus, for these participants, online chat 
represents an "activity enclave" (Cohen 1992) in which they may carve out 
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space for the expression and experience of meaningful personal selfhood. 
For these participants, online chat is an "actiyity enclave" --like hobbies, 
games, gambling, and sex (Cohen 1992)--online chat is an experiential space 
where participants dig out a safe place for meaningful personal activity and 
individualized selfhood. It is a momentary slip through the fabric of what is 
perceived as an oppressive and monotonous social reality. As an activity 
enclave, it is easy to see how some chat participants can perceive their online 
sense of selfhood as more reflective of "who they are" than off-line self 
experiences. If one perceives the "real world" as a rat-cage of stifling, 
monotonous, and determined patterns of existences, then the "fantasy" world of 
online environment becomes "unreal" precisely because it lacks these qualities. 
In lieu of this perceived freedom, participants can enact a form of selfhood that 
may appear more personally meaningful than that which is either provided by 
the monotonous routines of everyday life, or that which one may purchase in the 
form of image commodities from contemporary consumer-media culture. Thus, 
these participants may not act any differently online than off-line. Rather, they 
perceive the online world as merely allowing for self enactments that are not (or 
cannot be) realized in everyday life. 
The resilience of human selfhood is truly remarkable. There is little doubt 
that the emerging post-industrial/post-modern world is marked by increasing 
experiences of multiplicity (as suggested by numerous scholars including 
Gergen 1991; Stone 1995; Turkle 1995; Meyrowitz 1987; Schwalbe 1993). Yet, 
these conditions do not mark the demise of either selfhood or the cultural 
ideology of a unitary self. What emerges is a conflicting set of conditions--a 
cultural prerogative of a unitary self amidst experiences of multiplicity and 
fragmentation. Not surprisingly, negotiations of reality in lieu of this conflict 
either reject the cultural ideology of a unitary self, often fully embracing a 
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"relational self" interpretation. Or, retain faith in the ideology of a unitary self by 
viewing ones participation in the world as incondus1ve and stifling to the 
cultivation of a "true self." Both approaches are reasonable adaptations to the 
experiential conditions of selfhood for persons caught in the margins of an 
eroding mechanical era, and an emergent yet not culturally formulated 
information era--and both may be vividly seen in the everyday occurrences of 
chat environments. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSIONS 
Conclusions will be organized into three parts. The first will seek to 
generalize elements of cyberselfhood as they relate to broader issues of 
contemporary experiences of self and social world. By generalizing elements of 
online selfhood discussion will seek to briefly identify descriptive pegs on which 
future analysis and investigation can proceed, and yield helpful understandings 
that pertain to more than just computer-mediated contexts. In the second part, 
the problem of presence will be addressed as it applies to theoretical 
understandings of human interaction. In part three, by addressing the "so what" 
question, discussion will generally comment on the findings of this study and 
what these findings imply. 
Descriptive Elements of Online Selfhood 
Online chat communication is a unique form of interaction situated in an 
electronic-computer medium that challenges the significance of time, space, 
and physical location as interaction variables. As suggested in this study that it 
is the form of interaction that transforms social spheres into new online 
environments, with new patterns of social interaction and amidst new situations. 
Furthermore, as suggested in this study, it is the form of online chat interaction 
that allows for a fluid multiplicity of cyberselves that may be realized or deleted 
at any moment. What are the descriptive elements of this form? 
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On the basis of this study, the following elements of the form of online 
interaction may be identified, and utilized as grounded analytical pegs by which 
,':' 
interpretation and implications may be derived. As discussed in Chapter Two, 
online chat interaction displays two constant qualities; online chat is dislocated 
and disembodied. Because technologies of computer-mediated 
communication transgress the boundaries of social situations traditionally 
considered distinct, taken-for-granted conceptions of "space" breakdown. Yet, 
what occurs in online environments is not purely imaginative. Computer 
network technologies are physically real, they do occupy space, and the 
existence of these technologies is a prerequisite to online interaction. Online 
forms of interaction are contained within concrete physical technologies that 
exist somewhere. Thus, what occurs online is not necessarily "spaceless," but 
rather space has little bearing on what transpires. Online interaction is situated 
in "virtual space"--a socially constructed context that cannot be explained or 
reduced to its technological components alone, nor can it be readily described 
using the same terms of physicality widely implemented in the world of matter. 
Two key issues of the dislocated form of online chat interaction must be 
considered. First, as technologies of communication colonize the reality of 
everyday life, it becomes increasingly difficult to define situations utilizing 
traditional space-segregating labels. For example, distinctions between 
"public" and "private" domains of experience are routinely transgressed by 
technologies of communication (see King 1996; Waskul and Douglass 1996). 
While physically within the "privacy" of their home, participants interact with 
others in the "public" environment of cyberspace. In cyberspace, where social 
worlds emerge within the technology of communication itself, distinctions 
between such things as "private" and "public" are exceedingly difficult to 
maintain, especially when considering forms of online chat interaction. 
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Second, the dislocated nature of virtual space breaks down not only the 
traditional segregation of space, but also the traditional segregation of social 
, .. 
situations that are routinely bestowed unto physical places. The relationship 
seems so natural, that we have yet to realize the implications of dislocating 
social situations from physical places. For example, words like "school" and 
"home" refer to both physical places and social situations (Meyrowitz 1985). 
Within electronic and computer-mediated forms of interaction, these kinds of 
space-place associations with social situations are no longer necessarily 
determined by physical location. As a result, previously distinct social worlds 
can easily overlap in the online context, especially within leisurely and 
recreational forums. Children have access to online information and situations 
that were previously segregated to adults in adult places, men have access to 
situations previously segregated to females, females have access to situations 
previously segregated to males, and so on. As dislocated electronic medias 
provide universal access to information and situations once available only 
when participants moved from one place to another, then electronic medias 
begin to reshape the meaning of social situations altogether, eroding 
segregations that once maintained places as distinctly adult, youth, male, 
female, work, school, etc. Therefore, not only is it increasingly difficult to use 
space-segregating labels to describe online interactions, but also it is 
increasingly difficult to use situation-segregating labels to define experiences in 
an online context. 
Online chat interaction not only illustrates a condition of dislocated space 
and social situations, but also illustrates the dislocation of the physical body 
from the context of interaction. That is, online chat interaction is a uniquely 
disembodied experience. Traditional conceptions of selfhood as that which is 
contained or affixed to physical body are deeply problematic, and will not hold 
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empirical muster in the online context. Important questions need to be raised 
with regards to what it means to be disembodied, and to closely examine the 
,. 
relationship between bodies and selves in the disembodied online context, and 
how these relationships relate to off-line body-self relationships. 
Disembodied and dislocated forms of interaction depart from other forms 
of interaction, resulting in controversial situations problematic to traditional 
understandings of selves and social worlds. By posing a new range of 
possibilities that depart from traditionally conceived understandings of self and 
social world, new questions and problems arise (i.e. cybersex infidelity, 
determining who's laws shall prevail where for what online activities, etc.). 
These problems and situations are representative of the shifting boundaries of 
the self-social world relationship made manifest by the dislocation of social 
worlds and disembodiment of self, and serve to mark changes that have 
occurred in self-social world relationship. 
Dislocation and disembodiment are constant features of online chat 
interaction. Additionally, these two constant qualities allow for the emergence 
of several variable elements. First, because the form of online chat interaction 
is dislocated, constraints posed by geographic space, social place, and the 
physical body are lifted, exposing the potential for hyperfluidity of self 
enactment. Indeed, fluidity of self is often hard-wired within the very form of 
multiple-simultaneous online chat communication.- As widely observed, online 
social environments are a literal smorgasbord of potential interaction. 
Participants belly-up to the buffet of a vast and widely diverse selection of 
forums and potential others to engage in interaction. Like a communication 
orgy, the technologies of online chat interaction allows users the potential to 
simultaneously converse with numerous others through a multiplicity of 
channels. As such, online chat interaction takes a potentially multiple and 
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simultaneous form. 
The multiple and simultaneous form of interc~~tion is reflected in the 
fluidity of online chat associations. Like a finicky eater at the social buffet, many 
participants come and go with more or less consistency as they wander from 
one location to the next. Meanwhile, other participants display some degree of 
commitment to a given online location and/or forum for interaction. As such, 
online chat associations, groups, and "virtual communities" are loosely and 
informally organized at best (in fact, anything more represents a serious 
organizational challenge). As the metaphors indicate, the multiple and 
simultaneous revolving doors of access invite participants to "browse" a variety 
of locations as they "surf" from one location to the next. 
Secondly, online chat interaction is a potentially anonymous form of 
interaction. Participants can choose their level of anonymity, allowing for 
degrees of selectivity in the personal information they report. Participants in 
chat environments can (and do) situationally modify presentations of self to 
meet the demands of the situation. These choices are shaped by the context of 
the online situation (i.e. in some contexts anonymity is more-or-less practiced 
and valued than in others). However, the range of possible selves one might 
present are as limitless as the possible situations in which one presents a self. 
Participants in chat environments may present themselves under a variety of 
identities, sometimes simultaneously, to a variety of other participants, where 
presentation of self is equally as metamorphic, fluid, and ambiguous (Jones 
1994). The anonymity of interaction allows users the option of presenting a self 
that is virtually unlimited in form and content. It is the variable anonymity of the 
context that allows participants the option of negotiating "actual social identities" 
in the non-verifiable presentation of an online "virtual social identity." 
A third variable element that is made possible by the dislocated and 
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disembodied form of online chat interaction is a condition of complete 
dramaturgical awareness. That is, cyberselves emerge as the person is acutely 
,. 
aware of the personal fronts, facades, and veneers that are adapted and 
maintained in the process of interaction. In fact, online chat interaction cannot 
proceed without dramaturgical awareness--an awareness of the necessity to 
present and maintain all elements of selfhood. When online, we create 
representations of ourselves in the mimetic universe of computer environments 
(Laurel 1993), and having literally written a self into existence participants are 
therefore implicitly "dramaturgically aware." Furthermore, while interacting in 
chat environments, one's dramaturgical awareness in conjunction with an 
understanding of the dramaturgical awareness of others (a mutual 
dramaturgical awareness) is extended to the point of an ongoing self game, 
where it is not uncommon for participants to dramaturgically enact a wide 
variety of divergent selves. When chatting online, participants are performers 
performing to an audience of performers--all aware that everyone is performing. 
To be sure, self games (online interaction, role playing games, phone sex, etc.) 
can only be played in a state of mutual dramaturgical awareness, as the entirety 
of one's cyberself exists on the surface of a communicated present. 
Finally, the dislocated, disembodied, anonymous, multiple-simultaneous 
nature of online chat interaction invites variable forms of a distantly intimate 
interaction. Cyberselves emerge as personalized-anonymous presentations 
within an orgy of dislocated multiple-simultaneous interactions. As such, online 
chat interaction presents a condition where the experience of participants is 
strikingly similar to Simmel's (1908) description of the "stranger." As Simmel 
notes: 
"If wandering, considered as a state of detachment from every given point 
in space, is the conceptual opposite of attachment to any point, then the 
sociological form of the stranger presents the synthesis, as it were, of 
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both these properties ... He is fixed within a certain spatial circle--or within 
a group whose boundaries are analogous to special boundaries--but his 
position within it is fundamentally affected byJhe fact that he does not 
belong in it initially and that he brings qualities to it that are not, and 
cannot be, indigenous to it (Simmel in Lemert 1993 [1908) pp. 200)." 
Cyberselves are strangers, in the sense that Simmel describes above. 
That is, the cyberselves observed in leisure chat environments emerge in a 
process of social interaction situated in cyberspace, where attachment to a 
given place is difficult to achieve. As a result these cyberselves are fixated in 
social circles to which participants do not belong in any necessary physical or 
social sense of membership. Hence, the cyberself citizenry of chat 
environments represent an infinite series of personalized strangers--reflections 
of persons caught in the margins of an eroding industrial-mechanical society 
and an emerging information-digital society, experientially made manifest by 
computer-networking technologies. In these regards, the Simmelian strangers 
of online-chat environments are not necessarily strangers to other people. 
Rather, they are strangers to an imploding and/or changing social world. 
Indeed, chat participants represent "reality hackers" (Stone 1995)--people 
struggling to do what they have always done--to understand themselves and 
their world using whatever materials they have at hand (Turkle 1995). 
The Problem of Presence 
Communication and language theorists make sharp distinctions between 
the spoken and written word. "That distinction is based on the perception of 
temporal and spatial proximity in the case of spoken communication, and 
distance in the case of written communication (Reid 1991 pp. 3)." Furthermore, 
"most analyses of linguistic interaction are based on the paradigm of two people 
speaking face-to-face (Baron 1984 pp. 120)."- Within these distinctions, it is 
often assumed that alternative methods of communication (i.e. telephones, 
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letters, computer-mediated communication, etc.) are simply supplements to 
traditional face-to-face interaction (Baron 1984). In short, "the underlying 
,. 
assumption that physical contact is necessarily a part of human communication 
pervades social theory (Reid 1991 pp. 3)." Online forms of interaction, such as 
those described in this study, seriously challenge .these assumptions of 
presence and proximity. 
Computer-mediated communication, and other contemporary 
communication technologies, extend an individuals physical presence. 
Whereas Marshall McLuhan (1964) argues that media represents extensions of 
the human body, the growing datasphere of interlinked communication 
networks does more than simply extend the bodies ability to see and speak 
over great distance. The current and expanding datasphere made possible by 
cable, fiber-optics, telephone lines, computer networks, micro-wave 
transmission, and satellite relay, extend one's very sense of presence. 
Furthermore, online chat interaction entails a form of "written speech" that 
erodes theoretical distinctions between the spoken and written word. Finally, 
the sycronistic chat environment implodes linear models of human 
communication and interaction. Each of these conditions suggest that 
telepresence is more than simply a "supplement" to face-to-face interaction, and 
requires newly invigorated and creative investigation. 
According to Steuer (1992) telepresence is "the experience of presence 
in an environment by means of a communication medium (pp. 75)." Given this 
definition, telepresence is possible in online environments, as well as 
numerous other communication medias--not the least of which is television. As 
these communication technologies continue to colonize the reality of everyday 
life, telepresence poses an increasing range of potential experience that 
remains difficult to incorporate into existing models of human communication 
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and interaction. For example, consider the infamous O.J. Simpson and his epic 
Bronco chase. As Los Angeles residents were watching the live slow motion 
~.· 
chase on television, many realized that O.J. Simpson was going to pass by their 
homes and they ran out to cheer him on. In the process, observers became 
subjects at the same time, as they jumped onto their own television screens. 
Action and reaction occurred at the same moment, as the media audience 
became a participant in the events that transpired. The impact of the original 
image was intensified by a non-passive telepresent audience participation, 
which drew more television viewers, and more camera crews: 
"It was as if the theories of quantum physics were demonstrating 
themselves on CNN, with the viewing audience playing the scientists 
who find themselves under their own looking glass. Subsequently, the 
O.J. coverage that followed had more to do with the auqience than the 
subjects. Audience polls, "Talk Back America,n Geraldo Rivera, and 
Court TV spent as much time chronicling our reactions to evidence as the 
jury's (Rushkoff 1996 pp. xiii) 
This is one of many cases illustrating the nature of telepresense in 
everyday life, and how these situations erode distinctions contained within 
traditional theories of human communication and interaction. Cases like these 
should serve to illustrate that telepresence is not merely a "supplement" to face-
to-face interaction, it is an entirely new situation, communication environment, 
and context for human interaction. These new telepresent situations for human 
interaction, which mostly explicitly manifest themselves in "reality television" 
and computer-mediated Internet environments, are exposing new dynamics 
and theoretical anomalies that beg for direct and serious examination. 
Although this study was not intended, nor does it necessarily shed light 
on the problem of telepresence, this study does suggest that there is more to 
telepresence than first meets the eye--especially with regards to issues of 
theoretical import. As discussed in Chapter Two, symbolic interactionist and 
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dramaturgical perspectives have traditionally been preoccupied with face-to-
face forms of interaction. However, neither symbolic interactionism or 
," 
dramaturgy have ignored the situations posed by electronic forms of interaction. 
Although willing to include electronic (and presumably digital) forms of 
interaction within the scope of symbolic interactionist and dramaturgical theory, 
neither perspective has yet to acknowledge the challenge posed by telepresent 
forms of interaction made possible by communication technologies. Within 
these telepresent environments the very concept of "presence" is being re-
shaped. Within these environments distinctions between "audience" and 
"subject" is eroding. Within these environments the dramaturgies of 
performance take on new salience. What do these situations have to offer with 
regards to the advancement of theoretical understandings? Indeed, there is 
much work to be done. 
So What? 
"The agent of change will be the Internet, both literally and as a model or 
metaphor. .. The information superhighway is more than a short cut to 
every book in the Library of Congress. It is a totally new, global social 
fabric (Negroponte 1995 pp. 181 and 183)." 
* * * 
"John Perry Barlow, a songwriter ... described bullshit as 'the grease for 
the skids upon which we ride into the future.' ... To most outside the 
industry, the personal computer is a white-collar toy, an accessory for 
those already plugged into the power circuits. It is easy to forget that 
bullshit like 'the fastest route from imagination to reality' is not really for 
greasing the skids upon which we ride into the future, it is for greasing up 
to potential customers (Woolley 1993 pp. 12 and 35)." 
The computer revolution and the rise of the Internet has been 
excellerated and hindered by both utopian and distopian hopes and fears. 
Utopian dreams of a new world order, greater democracy, greater equality, 
greater freedom, higher standards of education, greater quality of information, 
and equal access are the words by which corporate CEO's become rich, 
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politicians become elected, and magazines are sold. However, these utopian 
images are not unlike that which is often ascribed ~! the advent of other 
technological innovations. In fact, they reveal an interesting contemporary 
condition where the hopes and dreams to which we seem to have become 
apathetic and have abandoned as attainable goals to strive for in everyday life 
have been transferred unto our technologies. This "better living through 
science" attitudinal framework reveals the hope for Star Trek solutions to 
contemporary problems (in which Dr. Spok always knows the answer, Scottie 
can always find a way to generate more power, and Bones can always find a 
medical cure). These were human goals of a previously more hopeful and less 
cynical generation (as evidenced by such grand ambitions as the 
preponderance of utopian movements at the turn of the century, the "war on 
poverty," the civil rights movement, etc.). What can be said about a society that 
seems to have lost hope in .human potential, yet bestows these grand ambitions 
and dreams to the perceived potential of technology? 
Distopian visions offer no better interpretations. Distopian images of the 
computer revolution and the rise of the Internet allege that computers represent 
a new form of technocratic exploitation. Persons are expected to know and 
produce more, technology replaces human labor, and the computer revolution 
becomes a new form of power for those already in the ranks of the "haves." 
Enhanced and excellerated alienation and isolation mark the rise and diffusion 
of computer networking technologies. These are often the views of 
fundamentalists who long for an unrealized and idealized past. Distopian 
images are plagued with romanticized views and yearn for a reversal of 
terminal occurrences and events. There is no "going back." In fact, there may 
not have ever been a "back" that these distopian images seek to re-establish. 
Clearly, both the utopian and distopian views represent little more than 
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ideological fortune telling. Both tell us more about our own hopes and fears 
than about what is going on or what has occurred. However, these views do 
, .. 
illustrate a generally recognized period of great social change. The sheer 
volume of literature surrounding these hopes and fears suggests that something 
is going on, that there is a growing recognition of socio-cultural change, and a 
increasing awareness of an uncertain future. 
In this study itis suggested that computers are not only tools, but arenas 
for social experience. Within these uniquely disembodied and dislocated social 
arenas we gain a vivid, yet momentary glimpse of processes occurring in 
society as a whole. When persons interact with others in the online context, 
they must translate themselves into the conventions of the medium. Likewise, if 
we are to consider the situation to be social, persons must also translate their 
social worlds and situations for interaction into the conventions of the medium. 
How participants make this translation and the unique qualities of these 
constructions tell us much about the nature of self-social world relationships in 
our technologically enabled contemporary era. 
When considering computers as arenas for social experience one arrives 
at two potential answers about what is new in these experiences: 
1. "Nothing: The tools of computer networking technologies are 
essentially the same as they have been since the telephone (Stone 1995 
pp. 15)." 
2. "Everything: Computers are arenas for social experience and 
dramatic interaction, a type of media more like public theater and their 
output is used for qualitative interaction, dialogue, and conversation. 
Inside the little box are other people (Stone 1995 pp. 16)." 
Both answers are correct, and both answers are incorrect. In the context 
of online chat, selfhood arises like any other form of self--it is presented, 
negotiated, and validated in a process of social interaction. Thus, the 
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emergence of self in online chat does not, in and of itself, reveal anything 
sociologically new. On the other hand, cyberselfhood displays unique 
V 
characteristics that depart from traditional forms by which self is made manifest. 
As illustrated throughout this study, the means by which persons interact with 
others subtly, yet powerfully, alter the boundaries of self and social world. What 
do these alterations tell us about contemporary forms of selfhood? 
When we tear apart the taken-for-granted seamless surface of reality, as 
is exemplified by the online experiences of virtuality, we find a liminal creature 
existing within the nuts and bolts of the situation (Stone 1995). This liminal 
creature is situated in the boundaries of the experiences of disembodiment and 
hyperfluidity of self. Although the societal imperative is to have one primary 
persona, these prescriptions appear to be firmly affixed to the physical body. In 
other words, in spite of widely diverse self enactments, consistency between 
selves in everyday life can be comfortably maintained by the self-evident, matter 
or fact, physical just-thereness of the body. As long as my physical body is 
present, I can always be certain it's me--no matter what I'm doing. The 
experience of hyperfluid disembodiment, characteristic of online chat 
environments, does not provide such cognitive consistencies. In cyberspace, 
there is no physical form on which to affix a self, and participants are exposed to 
"the wonder and terror of the masquerade (Stone 1995 pp. 180)." 
Leisure forms of online interaction can become a masquerade--a 
rejoicing of unconfined self enactments. Some participants playfully toy with the 
virtual actualization of multiple potentials of being. Yet, this wonderment also 
entails the terror of realization: If all people are "free" to be anything, then 
everything we "are" amounts to little more than fleeting disembodied electronic 
images on a computer screen. Both the body and the self implode in these 
virtual spaces. While at the masquerade we discover that beneath the mask of 
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one persona is another mask, and another mask, and another mask ... Yet, at 
the masquerade everyone appears to be wearing remarkably similar masks. 
/·• 
When participants communicate (no matter what the context), meaning 
simply does arise out of thin air. Answers to questions such as "who am I?" 
"what is going on here?" "how shall I apprehend this other person?" are 
grounded in a broader socio-cultural context. Although disembodied and 
dislocated, participants in chat environments are not apart from the socio-
cultural interpretive apparatus that provides meaning to self, situation, and 
others. Thus, in the dislocated and disembodied context of onHne chat 
interaction the social production of a meaningful self manifestation assumes 
new salience. 
What does this indicate about the contemporary relationship between 
selves and social worlds? First and foremost, the changes noted in this study 
are not isolated nor limited to certain recreational dimensions of cyberspace. 
Rather, they are embedded within (and extensions of) much broader shifts in 
socio-cultural beliefs, practices, and technologies. "These include repeated 
transgressions of the traditional concept of the body's physical envelope and 
the local of human agency (Stone 1995 pp. 16)." There is reason to suggest 
that similar to technologies have (and continue to) facilitate the potential for 
multiple selfhood and opportunities for multiple body manifestations. For 
example, tailor made bodies courtesy of cosmetic surgery, are initial elements 
of this over-all phenomena. Like virtual cosmetic alterations, social activity on 
the Net extends upon, and normalizes the potential for multiple-fluid self 
manifestations. What it means to be warranted to a body has clearly been 
altered, and perhaps it will become necessary to reconceptualize what it means 
to be "embodied." The traditional assumption of self as that which is contained 
or affixed to the body, is increasingly a questionable assertion--especially with 
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regards to the experiences of virtual reality. 
Unfortunately, discussions of virtual reality have unduly focused on 
, .. 
technologies capable of creating sensory illusions. As a result, we have been 
blinded to virtual experiences that have embedded itself in everyday 
technologies of communication and subtly colonized the reality of everyday life. 
Consider such situations as; online interaction, reality television, Nintendo, 
cosmetic surgery, re-mastered digital photos, and audio disks. Virtual reality 
has slipped into our vocabulary (we can consider the entire entourage of 
"politically correct words" as an awesome power struggle over the means by 
which virtual images may be controlled in actual settings). Virtualness has 
been adopted and marketed by commercial slogans such as "reach out an 
touch someone," "is it real or is it Memorex?" and the endless barrage of 
commercials that suggest that by using their product you will be this-or-that kind 
of person. Virtual reality is an experience (Rheingold 1991) that is everywhere, 
evidenced by the fact that "it is becoming increasingly difficult to say with 
certainty that something has happened (Chayko 1993 pp. 180)." 
Within this techno-social system of change, the meaning of selfhood is 
manifesting itself in a transformed and transforming state. What is emerging is 
not a "self as affixed to body" relationship, nor is it a "self as confined to 
geographic space" relationship. Rather, what is evident in this study and 
suggestive of broader socio-cultural changes is a self, body, and social world-
as-performance relationship. Increasingly, the meanings of the actions taken by 
human agencies define self, body, and social world within a translucent horizon 
of dramatic possibilities. As this research suggests, the most stable personal 
characteristic--our sense of where we are in space--is now open to redefinition. 
Within these translucent horizons of symbolic meaning systems, one can only 
wonder where this might lead. What is a virtual person? 
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NOTES 
1. Although "reality" is becoming an increasingly slippery and divisive term, 
here the word is used to refer to the meaning of the context of human 
interaction. All human interaction is situated in a context,.and the web of 
meanings associated with each context of interaction comprises the reality of 
the particular situation. Like. all other structures of meaning, the meaning of the 
context emerges in processes of interaction with others. 
2. The word "parallel" is not meant to imply that social worlds are 
complementary, or in any necessary state of equilibrium. Parallel is used to 
convey the characteristic of simultaneousness. In other words, not only are 
social worlds multiple, they are also simultaneous. In this state of social reality 
(multiple and parallel) a social world can be complimentary--but it may also 
conflict with other social worlds, or simply remain compartmentalized exerting 
little or no consequence on other social worlds. 
3. Imagine the academian that acts the same in a committee meeting as he/she 
does at home. Such a person would either be a poor academian, a poor 
spouse, or both. It is doubtful that such a situation will be tolerated over time, 
and thus reveals the essential dynamic nature of the self-social world 
relationship as individuals inhabit a multiplicity of parallel social worlds. 
4. Certain electronic forms of communication display this characteristic as well. 
Phone sex is an excellent illustration. However, even here it would be 
exceedingly difficult for a male to enact a female presentation of self (or vice-
versa), or for a child to enact an adult self presentation (or vice-versa). Thus, 
even in the context of a telephone situation, the body poses constraints by the 
necessity of voice communications. One's voice conveys distinct bodily 
impressions of gender and age. Such limitations are not posed within the 
disembodied context of online interaction. 
5. "On" or "off'("+" or"-") refer to either the existence or non-existence of 
electrical current, which is the essential binary building block of all computer 
programs. Whether "on" or "off" a bit is a state, simply because an "off" bit is as 
instrumental to the computer program as on "on" bit. Whether a bit exists is less 
important than it's state in conjunction with other bits. 
6. Most studies have focused on conceptions of computer technologies as a 
tool, rather than a constructed environment (Lawley 1995). Nonetheless, the 
"computer as tool" metaphor is rapidly eroding, if not dead already. The 
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computer is a "metatool" (the prefix "meta" is used to convey a "beyond" quality). 
As Brenda Laurel (1993) makes poignantly clear, the "tool" metaphor is 
inextricably connected with modernist assumptions,and grand narratives. 
There is nothing inherently "toolish" about the computer. It is a complex 
electromechanical machine that can function as many "tools," but also provides 
a medium and environment for human interaction in and of itself. Furthermore, 
the "multimedia" revolution is, by nature, imploding the boundaries of these 
various computer qualities (tool and non-tool alike). Multimedia transgress the 
boundaries of computer-as-tool, computer-as-medium, computer-as-
environment--that is, after all, what multimedia is all about. 
7. As will be emphasized, this same observation can be made of any 
technology of communication; typewriter, pencils, pens, telephones, etc. The 
mechanics of the technology are secondary to the meaning of what is produced. 
However, as will also be emphasized, various technologies allow for the 
production of different kinds of meanings, and environments for human 
interaction. But this is not to be regarded as a function, or necessary derivative 
of the technology alone. 
8. It is important to note that the fluidity of contemporary experiences of reality is 
not a product of the postmodern condition--such a cause and effect assertion is 
another convolution of the postmodern critique. Rather, the conditions of the 
postmodern era have merely excentuated and problemized the processes by 
which reality has always been produced. The processes by which reality is 
produced have not necessarily changed, they've merely become increasingly 
manifest. 
9. Although discussion will focus on the nature of virtual experiences in the 
online context, the reader is encouraged to consider the extent to which 
"virtuality" has come increasingly to characterize experiences of contemporary 
social life in general. The reader is encouraged to consider the extent to which 
virtuality has embedded itself in our everyday technologies of communication, 
and subtly--yet powerfully--colonized the reality of everyday life. 
10. This observation (as well as this entire subsection) is applicable to all user 
interfaces, however discussion will often center on WIMP interfaces. WIMP user 
interfaces refer to graphically based IMndows, /cons, Menus, and Pointing 
devices, the development of which served a critical role in the explosive 
expansion of the personal computer industry by making making computers 
more intuitive, consistent, predictable, and forgiving (Beekman 1994). With 
early computers it was necessary to conserve limited capabilities that a 
graphical WIMP interface would unnecessarily use. Hence, arcane 
hieroglyphic command languages became the rule. With the development of 
powerful personal computers it has become not only possible, but standard, to 
replace arcane command languages with intuitive WIMP interfaces. Both forms 
of user interface have the same simulating quality, however WIMP interfaces 
greatly excentuate the simulating nature of computer environments by creating 
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virtual environments (i.e. a "desktop,"), and by allowing the user to operate the 
system with little prerequisite specialized knowledge (i.e. computer languages, 
and system operations). As such, WIMP interfaces,.have been critical to the 
emergence of computer-mediated virtual environments, not simply because 
they excentuate the simulation, but also because they have made these 
simulated environments widely available to non-specialized populations. 
Although many sections of this dissertation presume a WIMP user 
interface, the reader should acknowledge that these observations are also 
applicable to early hieroglyphic computer environments, and are equally 
applicable to newly developing user interfaces. The reader is encouraged to 
consider how recent historical developments in user interfaces have served to 
transform the cryptic computer environment into a diffuse arena for virtual 
action, and what this implies for future transformations that may accompany new 
user interface technologies. 
11. This may appear tautological: People use technologies for purposes, the 
purpose of which defines the transformative role of technology. That is not what 
is implied. The relationship between technology and human social and 
physical environments is not this linear. In a fundamental McLuhnesque sense, 
technology has both manifest and latent transformative potential. This kind of 
analysis will be highlighted through this dissertation, however for now it is 
sufficient to say that it is often difficult to see what technologies do to us, for part 
of what they do is structure the act of seeing itself (Stone 1995). 
12. For an empirical analysis of a text-based virtual reality see Reid 1994. 
13. It should be noted that this is not only the brilliance of Laurel (1995), but 
also the brilliance of both Aristotle and Erving Goffman. Dramaturgical 
enactments, whether in theater-proper or as metaphorical elements of human 
social life, center on action--not persons, places, or things. Action is the primary 
component of any drama, "and that it is mainly for the sake of the action that it 
imitates personal agents (Aristotle 1450 pp.1)." Indeed, Aristotle goes so far as 
to acknowledge that drama is possible in absence of characters, but without 
action no drama can exist (see Aristotle 1450; Laurel 1995). Goffman's work 
exemplifies the same level of analysis as the entirety of his work emphasis an 
analysis of "Where the Action Is (1967):" 
"Plainly, it is during moments of action that the individual has the risk and 
opportunity of displaying himself and sometimes to others his style of 
conduct when the chips are down (pp. 237) .... And now we see character 
for what it is ... it refers to attributes that can be generated and destroyed 
during fateful moments (pp. 238) .... there at the end is action and 
character (pp. 270)." 
14. It should be noted that this is hardly a problem of validity, at least not to any 
greater degree than that which poses itself in traditional survey methods. One 
cannot be any more "sure" of the validity of responses in an online context than 
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by use of traditional survey methods. Responses are given, and we must 
proceed with that information at face-value lest we achieve anything from our 
efforts. Although techniques for "assessing validity" are available for survey 
methods, I make no assertion that such techniques are necessary or valid in the 
context of this study. 
15. MUD's stand for "Multi-User Dimensions" and "MOO's" stand for "Multi-
Oriented Objeqts." Although the distinction between them is anything but clear, 
both are "game" oriented in that both are intentionally fantasy role-playing 
games. Like the popular dice-game "Dungeons and Dragons" these games 
involve participants as characters that are created within the confines of 
"gaming-rules" for the purposes of the role-play game. 
16. For ethical reasons, the source will not be identified. 
17. Not all "real-time" chat environments were deemed appropriate for study. 
For example, initially this study intended to include CU-Seeme chat 
environments. In CU-Seeme chat, participants interact with one another while 
sending and receiving live televideo images (by use of inexpensive digital 
cameras). However, upon entry into these video-chat environments it was clear 
that participants in these online group organize themselves around sensitive 
issues (often sexual in nature) that are exceptionally susceptible to damage 
from research and potential exposure. As such, all initial data from these 
groups were destroyed, and no attempt was made to further include these 
persons in this study. 
18. On this note, as Marvin (1995) accurately observed, grossly poor spelling 
and syntax are not tolerated without some teasing, or at least self-critical 
remarks from the participant (usually some form of an apology, or self-
correction). Participants are not particularly concerned with spelling and syntax. 
However, typos and occasional misspellings clearly occupy a different status 
than "ignorant" spelling and syntax. This makes sense considering the 
importance of words in an environment that is intended to be spontaneous, yet 
is dependent on the written word. 
19. This is true of online chat environments, and all other forms of self-game 
play. Phone sex represents an excellent example of another self-game with 
equivalent results. 
20. It should be noted that not all participants who claim to be "themselves" 
online, also claim that online is "more real." As with any generalization--there 
are exceptions. However, the tendency is quite strong, as hopefully the reader 
can see by the data provided. 
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APPENDIX B: Interview Questions 
All interviews in this study were open-ended and no set agenda of 
questions were used (see Chapter Three). However, some questions turned 
out to more frequently arise in order to warm-up the participant, and create a set 
of responses from which additional probing questions could be derived. The 
following list of questions are among the most commonly used: 
1. How often do you communicate with others in online chat? Why? 
2. What, to you, are the personal benefits of online chat communication? 
3. What, to you, are the shortcomings of online chat communication? 
4. To what extent do you think persons modify who they are when 
communicating with others in online chat? Explain. 
5. Do you ever change your presentation of self in the online context? Explain 
why. 
A. What about the online context allows you to make these changes? 
6. When online do you think most people are who they say they are? Explain 
why or why not. 
A. How do you convince others that you are who you claim to be? 
7. Can you tell the difference between online "fakes" and those that are 
genuine? Explain. 
A. If you can't tell the difference, then does the difference matter? 
Explain. 
8. How many screen names do you have? Why more than one? 
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